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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Cover: USS *Idaho* (BB-42) fires 14"/50 guns of turret three at nearly point-blank range during the preinvasion bombardment of Okinawa, 1 April 1945. Seen from USS *West Virginia* (BB-48). (Photo: courtesy of the Photo Section, Naval Historical Center.)

The Secretary of the Navy has determined that this publication is necessary in the transaction of business required by law of the Department of the Navy. Funds for printing of this publication have been approved by the Navy Publications and Printing Policy Committee.

President's Notes

Two and a half years ago Admiral Watkins directed that the Naval War College become the crucible of strategic thinking in the Navy. The War College was to educate our best and brightest officers to think in strategic terms and to learn to "fight smarter." A large task, but most of the key pieces were already in place. I looked upon my effort as a two-step process, first to improve the quality of each element of the system and then to weld the segments into a coherent, vital whole. I believe we have established a very significant and positive momentum toward these goals, have made very substantial progress, and will continue to improve over time as fine-tuning efforts are pursued by all members of the War College team.

In 1982 less than half of the students were Navy officers and very few of these had had command experience. The academic departments were high in quality, but lacked a common goal. Research, under the newly appointed Director of Naval Warfare Studies, was underway but was not yet an integral part of the Naval War College.

Today, well over 50 percent of our students are Navy officers and among them we have a good balance between the warfare specialties. In the senior class, 70 percent have had either sea or shore commands. We have reached a steady state in student quality, as measured by the enthusiasm in the classroom, the penetrating nature of the lecture hall questions, and the papers submitted for curriculum requirements.

In addition to our regular students, 73 more officers will pass through our brief Integrated Warfare course for post-command officers this year. This 8-week course, offered three times per year, is a rigorous, stand-alone experience that challenges and stimulates the students in every sense of the word. It utilizes the seminar case-study approach which requires full, active participation by each member of the class. Feedback from former students indicates a very high degree of satisfaction and relevance to their post-graduation assignments. This March we graduated our 10th post-command class.

In round figures about one-half of the officers who have completed a satisfactory command tour are now attending the War College. We have been assured by the Chief of Naval Personnel that these officers are the top competitors within their year groups and that the Navy's future flag officers are among their number.

Our curricula are prepared in the light of OpNav and DoD thinking and policy. In cooperation with the DCNOs, we have revitalized the eleven military chairs and have increased our dialogue with their various communities. More than ever, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies reaches out and expands its contacts with both OpNav and the fleets. We plan to increase these efforts for the mutual benefit of everyone.

We have increased the effectiveness and reach of our Center for Continuing Education. Five hundred twenty-five students are actively participating in our correspondence programs. Because of tightened acceptance procedures, the seriousness and the success of these individuals is up significantly. We have expanded our off-campus seminar program from Washington, DC (only) to include Annapolis, Corpus Christi and Pensacola. There are 350 students enrolled in this program. The new sites are doing well and we are looking at Norfolk and San Diego as added locations.

The heart and soul of our work, however, is our regular 10-month curriculum. It is through this curriculum that we equip our graduates with the tools and knowledge that will make them valued members of our defense teams. The Strategy Department aims to help our officers to think strategically. By "thinking strategically" we mean something easy to say but difficult to do: to be able to reconcile what our values at home require with what our power abroad permits; to be able to use military force *successfully* in the support of policy.

Among the things this requires is to be able to distinguish real strategy from the mere knowledge of capabilities in search of missions. We want our graduates to be able to propose suitable alterations to our strategies as conditions change. Above all, we want them to see the world, not as they passionately want it to be but as it truly is.

Our second course, Defense Economics, focuses on force planning. Students integrate the many and sometimes competing variables involved in planning, choosing and obtaining future military forces. After considering economic, political and military factors in the national security environment, they consider differing methods for assessing threats and overall balance of military forces. Soviet intentions, broad trends in military capabilities, and changing vulnerabilities are among the issues examined.

Because our primary effort is to immerse each student's thought process in major force planning issues, we simulate as closely as possible the environment in which these choices are made; highlight the guidance, objectives, and constraints related to these choices; and sharpen his capacity to think, analyze, and write about not only these issues, but those they are likely to encounter in the future.

Our third academic leg, Naval Operations, deals with operations at the CINCs' or four-star staff level, with emphasis on the forward maritime strategy. Chiefly we teach the fundamental naval warfare mission areas through the use of case studies. War gaming, in various forms, occupies a most significant portion of the students' time in the NavOps trimester. Our games use today's strategy and

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today's capabilities with current forces and weapon systems. Essentially, we play three major types of games. A crisis action game which is both political and military, where the students act to avert war; a theater level war game, and finally, the Global War Game when students are assigned individual roles in all levels of government and military from the three-star level up.

Nearly as important as the foregoing is the activity within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. What started as a modest research effort a few years ago has developed into a major research center.

The Center for War Gaming has grown in importance in both our academic and research efforts. It acts as the integrator for all that we teach our students. It is a research tool for strategic research and it tests war plans and educates staffs. We are today using war gaming as effectively as we did in the 1930s.

Our Center for Advanced Research has also grown over the past few years. This research has become a cooperative effort among the academic departments, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and fleet users. Some examples of advanced research conducted by students and faculty are in the areas of:

- Battle group operations
- Global war game support
- Soviet air threat
- AAW defense
- Cruise missile employment

As you can see, we have now forged an effective union between the academic and research sides of the institution. It is a synergism of great potential value to the Navy and the country at large. Our faculty and students are heavily involved in the studies and research at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The faculty participates in research and in many of our most important war games. The students, in turn, benefit through curriculum war gaming by participating in advanced research projects, by having major roles in the Global War Game, and by rubbing shoulders with the faculty that is involved in research.

My years at the Naval War College have been a high point professionally. There are few other places where one deals so broadly in scope and depth with naval issues as does the College here in Newport. I have been privileged to be a part of an effort which has significant potential to positively influence the course of maritime strategic thought and, therefore, the Navy's and the nation's deterrent and defensive posture.



JAMES E. SERVICE
Rear Admiral, US Navy
President, Naval War College

The Changing Strategic Balance and Soviet Third World Risk-Taking

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

What is the relationship between the changing strategic balance and Soviet risk-taking in the Third World? Is Soviet risk-taking in the Third World likely to increase? If so, under what conditions and for what reasons?

As we look ahead, the questions of Soviet perceptions, Soviet behavior, and Soviet intentions—and of the interrelationships among them—loom large. Crucial to any analysis, whether interpretation of past actions or speculation about future ones, is the accuracy of the assumptions on which it rests. There is a need continually to ensure that they rest on perceptions of reality that are as undistorted as possible, on data which shed light on the questions they are intended to illumine, on projections and comparisons and analogies, and on evaluations which avoid reading into what is seen or discovered that which is preferred and expected.

There is clearly no Rosetta stone for deciphering the past or anticipating the future. Since reality is infinitely more complex than the theories that seek to explain it, any explanation is vulnerable to criticism. Nonetheless, if we are to speculate about the future, we need to assess the past, making as explicit as possible our assumptions concerning Soviet policy and motivations, and the circumstances that occasioned them, and indicating how this record of Soviet performance in the Third World is apt to presage possible future behavior.

Since the Soviet Union became an integral factor in the politics of the Third World, it has undertaken a varied and extensive range of activities that permits some generalizations about the characteristics of its policy. Its gradual shift from a continental-based strategy to a global strategy entailed a readiness to increase economic and military assistance, protect clients from defeat, and accept possible confrontations with the United States. A review of Soviet behavior over the past generation suggests a kind of operational code guiding Moscow's policy in the Third World. There are, inevitably, exceptions to some of these propositions, as will be noted. Nonetheless, the

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effort to distill a set of operational principles may help to clarify basic assumptions about Soviet aims and thus contribute to speculation about future Soviet policy.

First, the Soviet Union has pursued a differentiated policy that reflects a keen appreciation of local and regional realities, and a sharp eye for opportunity. Whether exploiting the polarization in the Middle East and South Asia wrought by the US policy of containment in the 1950s, normalizing relations with countries aligned militarily with the United States, or encouraging militancy and efforts to weaken pro-Western regimes, it has proceeded pragmatically, on a case-by-case basis, and adapted to the preferences of regional clients. In seeking to maintain close government-to-government relations, Moscow consistently used whatever instruments of diplomacy were appropriate to a given situation. To increase the range and effectiveness of its imperial outreach, in the 1970s it learned to use surrogates (especially, Cuba and East Germany).

Second, strategic and military considerations, not ideology or economics, impelled Soviet policy. By courting Third World countries opposed to Western-sponsored alliances and intent on undermining their Western-oriented regional rivals, the USSR sought to fashion a regional environment conducive to the promotion of its geopolitical and military aims, especially in the context of the perceived rivalry with the United States. If tangible military benefits resulted from a particular courtship or commitment, so much the better, but at no time were they prerequisites for the largesse that Moscow offered. The main objective was always to enable a client to pursue policies that Moscow deemed advantageous to improvement of the strategic context within which Soviet diplomacy proceeded rather than to acquire specific influence over the client. Put in another way, the aim is to weaken the United States, the Soviet Union's principal adversary. It is this underlying rationale that accounts for the USSR's adapting to the shah's conservatism, Sadat's de-Nasserization, Qaddafi's endemic anti-Americanism, Khomeini's fundamentalism, and Assad's ambitions in Lebanon. All of this adds up to a quintessentially imperial policy.

Third, with the exception of Soviet policy in Afghanistan after 26 December 1979, the level and character of Soviet involvement was determined by the Third World country. Soviet assistance, advisers, and involvement on behalf of a Third World country came as a result of invitation, not imposition. As a rule, Moscow acceded fairly quickly to requests from would-be clients, especially when it sought to establish an initial presence and when the client was in a situation of "clear and present danger." Considerations of cost do not seem to have been a serious constraint on Soviet support.

Fourth, the Soviet Union has raised arms-giving to a political art. To strengthen a client and its ability to resist or undermine a pro-Western

regional rival—without giving the impression or the wherewithal that would lead the client to believe it had a "green light" to start a war and expect full Soviet support—is to tread a fine line, but Moscow has done precisely that in a number of explosive situations, most recently, in the support that it provided Syria after Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Soviet arms transfers and use of military power are continually, and skillfully, adjusted to the political and military needs of the client. None of the supposedly inherent dilemmas facing the Kremlin are weighty enough to change Soviet policy in any fundamental way because Moscow realizes that only through arms can it secure its political position.

Once the arms had paved the way for the establishment of a political relationship, their continued flow and level of sophistication depended on different considerations, in accordance with Moscow's differentiated approach and aims: the importance of the political connection, e.g., India and Cuba; the client's military situation, e.g., Egypt, between 1967 and 1973, and Syria, since 1973; the privileges extended the Soviet Union, e.g., Somalia, until 1977, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen); and the ability to pay, e.g., Libya and Iraq.

Fifth, in the main, Moscow has been skillful in stimulating but not inciting a client's ambitions—a subtle but significant distinction. Except in the notable cases of Angola and Afghanistan, it counseled clients to temper their eagerness for quick advantage from Soviet arms with awareness of the consequences of escalation. Thus, there is no evidence that Soviet suppliers ever goaded regional recipients into untenable courses of action in order, for example, to intensify their dependency. Moscow's way was to provide arms and support enabling the client to follow its preferred course that suited general Soviet purposes.

Sixth, the Soviet Union has demonstrated an increasing readiness to commit its own combat forces on behalf of clients, though in ways that do not directly or immediately threaten the survival of US-backed regimes. When committing its forces (or those of proxies), Moscow has kept the military purposes limited and specific, primarily to preserve the regional balance of power and not create a new one—notable exceptions were Angola and Afghanistan. This readiness to project power stems from an impressive and continually improving conventional capability. The growing disparity between the USSR's conventional force capability and that of the United States makes for greater Soviet risk-taking, as indeed does the availability of suitable proxies, consideration of which goes beyond the scope of this paper but needs to be calculated in any assessment of Soviet risk-taking.

Seventh, Moscow has been patient, equanimous, and adaptive in the face of setbacks. It learned to accept periodic "failure" as a hazard of seeking influence in the Third World; to recognize the limits of its influence; and to treat constraints and disappointments as concomitants of new options and

advantages. The period of the establishment of a presence and the accumulation of easy benefits having passed, Moscow appreciates that future gains will be costly and uncertain. Privileged access to military facilities (e.g., Cuba, South Yemen, Egypt from 1967 to 1976, and Somalia from 1974 to 1977) has been the exception rather than the norm, and political alignment to the Soviet bloc has more often than not been superficial, notwithstanding the large number of friendship treaties. And the more Moscow becomes involved, the more it tries to obtain for its commitments, the more it invariably arouses nationalist resentment and opposition. None of this is unknown to the Kremlin. Yet judging by Soviet behavior, there is no wavering in the forward policy adopted in the mid-1950s.

Eighth, the Soviet Union has proved a reliable, effective patron-protector, openly supportive of clienrs who request assistance against external attack, against internal opposition, and against pressure from a US-backed regional rival. Once involved, Moscow has shown a readiness to stay the course, irrespective of the military and economic costs or the adverse effect on its relationship with the United States. The net effecr has been to enhance the USSR's credibility as a superpower guarantor.

Ninth, though rendering military assistance and fueling regional arms races, Moscow has done so with due regard for regional balances. It has tried to avoid or severely limit local wars. Realizing that its principal attraction for many clients derives from its ability to supply weapons and protect them from defeat, the USSR has been generous with arms, but has by no means acceded to all requests for aid. Arming anti-Western Third World regimes has been Moscow's tried-and-true method of securing a political role for itself and of thwarting US aims. Initially, rhis policy was designed to exploit regional conflicts, for example, between Iraq and Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, South Yemen and Oman, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, and Somalia and Ethiopia, by developing a close arms relationship with one party to the dispute; but, once having forged a connection, it generally prefers to dampen regional conflicts and, as in the Iraqi-Iranian and Somali-Ethiopian cases, to improve relations with both parties and help mediate their disputes. The notable exception since 1967 has been the Arab-Israeli sector of the Middle East.

Finally, to Washingron's continual surprise, Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated rhat it will not curb its relentless quest for strategic and political advantages in the Third World in order to improve relations with the United States. The Kremlin does not accept the notion, fashionable in US foreign policy circles, that linkage is applicable to superpower rivalry in the Third World. On no Third World major issue since 1967 has it deferred to American preferences or drawn back from regional face-offs. Increasingly, Moscow, through manipulation of Soviet weapons and myrmidons, determines the course and outcome of regional conflicts. It is still, of course,

keenly interested in détente with the United States, especially as it relates to SALT, trade, technological transfers, and credits, but refuses to see any long-lived contradiction between this set of aims and the on-going superpower rivalry in the Third World. For Soviet leaders the big unknown in the future is not what Moscow will do, but what Washingron is apt to do.

The Soviet Union's growing ability to project power could lead to a propensity for higher risk-taking in areas and situations of opportunity in the Third World. Quite evident in the characteristics of Soviet-Third World diplomacy noted above is the shift from inhibiting and undermining Western options and positions to the forceful promotion and advancement of its own interests and concrete objectives. The phenomenon is easier to identify (Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cuba) than to date. Initial tentativeness has given way to open assertiveness. Leonid Brezhnev told the 26th Congress of the CPSU on 23 February 1981: "No one should have any doubts, comrades, that the CPSU will consistently continue rhe policy of promoting cooperation between the USSR and the newly free countries, and consolidating the alliance of world socialism and national liberation movements."

In speculating on the possibility of greater Soviet risk-taking in the Third World, it is necessary to clarify terms and assumptions, and to distinguish between risk-taking and less threatening, albeit challenging, forms of Soviet activity.

Firsr, intervention is different from involvement, which is a normal process whereby government A becomes engaged in a variety of economic, military, political, and cultural activities sanctioned by government B. Involvement is overt, on-going, noncrisis oriented, and generally geared to some long-term objective. It is directed inward, aimed at strengthening B's internal system.

Second, involvement transmutes into intervention when there is a direct and intrusive projection of military power by the patron on behalf of the client in order to bring about a preferred political outcome, in an atmosphere of tension, with unmistakable external ramifications. Thus, in contradistinction to arms transfers—i.e., the providing of military equipment and advisory personnel, which is a form of involvement—intervention enrails the commitment of combat or combat-supporr personnel to produce a favorable resolution to a crisis situation. It also differs markedly from subversion in that it is overt and managed on behalf of the ruling authorities.

Third, an intervention may be regarded as low risk, if one or more of the following circumstances prevail: the intervening power did not initiate the intrusive projection of military power but acted in response to requests from the legitimate government; the intervention was mounted to preserve the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of a legally recognized government; the intervention was regulated by norms that typify interactions

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between independent governments and was arranged through proper diplomatic channels or procednres; the forces deployed were not used to alter the internal or regional situation existing prior to the crisis that triggered the intervention in the first place; finally, the intervening power was not indiscriminate in its nse of force, but deployed only forces appropriate to the actual threat facing the client and in ways that sought to allay the concerns of its superpower rival and avoid confrontation or exacerbation of tension.

Finally, high-risk intervention, viewed in the context of Soviet behavior in the Third World, would entail the following:

- an attempt to use the intervention to acquire a decided advantage over the United States,
- the use of Soviet forces to extend the USSR's control over the client state,
- the nse of the intrusive military power to change the client's leadership,
- encouragement of the client to seek to alter the existing regional balance of power, and
- the deployment of Soviet forces to affect the outcome of a civil war.

As will be shown, the line between low-risk and high-risk intervention (which implies greater possibility of superpower confrontation) is not always easy to establish, because we are not calibrating inert or easily measured phenomena. At issue are very different policy assessments of the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States and very different prescriptions for coping with the Soviet challenge at the nonnuclear level of superpower interaction. Accordingly, since Soviet interventions in the Third World, although few in number, increased significantly in the 1970s, took place in regions and crises that could not be ignored by the United States, coustituted unmistakable challenges to America's interests, credibility, and commitments in the regions involved, and acquired a potential for dangerously escalating superpower tensions, a brief review of their character and consequences is appropriate.

Moscow went from involvement to intervention toward the latter part of the Khrushchev period. The first venture, albeit tentative and ineffectual, was in Zaire in the late summer of 1960, when Soviet aircraft flew in small arms and supplies to help Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in his quarrel with the country's president, Joseph Kasavubu. In its attempt to affect the ontcome of an incipient civil war, the USSR provided a few pilots and aircraft. After Lumumba's deposal at the end of September, its intervention on behalf of his heir, Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville, was more blatant and, if undertaken today, theoretically high risk. However, it was really a low-risk affair, because of the USSR's insignificant logistical capability for projecting military power in Central Africa, a shortcoming Moscow worked

assiduously to overcome during the following decade. The result was displayed in Angola.

The second intervention occurred in Cuba and was divided into two phases. The low-risk phase began with heavy shipments of Soviet weapons several months after the failure in late April 1961 of the CIA-organized attempt at the Bay of Pigs to topple Castro. A year later, there were approximately 20,000 Soviet troops on the island, manning an impressive array of MIGs, SAMs, and patrol craft, as Moscow helped to entrench the anti-American regime in Havana and protect this internationally recognized government from possible invasion. However, the attempt to implant nuclear-tipped IRBMs in Cuba was a high-risk intervention that represented a quantum escalation of Soviet aims, having nothing to do with the protection of a client. The missile crisis of October 1962 was the result of a high-risk gamble that sought to exploit Third World real estate for the promotion of Soviet strategic objectives at a time of obvious nuclear inferiority to the United States. In a word, Moscow took its greatest risk to date in the Third World when, and because, the strategic balance was weighted heavily in favor of the United States. Nuclear inferiority, it needs to be stressed, did not prevent high risk-taking.

A third intervention was made in Egypt in the spring of 1970, during the final stage of the "war of attrition." After Israel's victory in the 1967 June War, the USSR mounted a costly program to rebuild the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. By the fall of 1968, Nasser felt strong enough to commence a series of low-level military engagements along the Suez Canal against the Israeli occupiers of Sinai. Within a year, Nasser's "war of attrition" backfired, escalating to a major conflict, with Israeli air power pounding the Egyptians and threatening Nasser's very political life. Soviet air-defense forces saved him from defeat. The cease-fire agreement of 7 August 1970 came before the point at which the intervention might have assumed a high risk character, i.e., have involved Soviet forces in backing a crossing of the canal and a change in the status quo ante.

The fourth intervention came in October 1973. Three days after the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, when the battle was tilting against its clients, the USSR launched its biggest air-supply operation in the Third World up to that time (the 1977-1978 airlift to Ethiopia was larger), transported four times as much materiel by sea, deployed a sizable fleet that served both to protect lines of supply and to signal the seriousness of its commitment, and placed its seven airborne divisions in a state of high alert for rapid deployment in the event that combat troops were needed to prevent the Israelis from marching on Cairo or destroying the surrounded Egyptian Third Army.

Though starting out as a low-risk intervention, Soviet behavior during the October War quickly escalated to the threshold of high risk, because of a

determination to shield clients from defeat, regardless of the possibility of confrontation with the United States. Moscow's behavior suggests three propositions for further consideration, namely, that the Soviet Union is prepared 1) to commit whatever forces are necessary to save a client from defeat; 2) to go to extraordinary lengths to deny victory to an American-supported client; and 3) to jeopardize détente with the United States if need be in order to safeguard a prized Third World client. The new (post-1970) risk-taking bent of Soviet operation in the Third World was perhaps most forcefully on display during the October War.

The fifth intervention—in Angola in 1975-1976—was distinctive in that it began before there was an internationally recognized government in Luanda. The Portuguese had agreed in January 1975 to grant Angola independence in November, and by March the USSR was already funneling military supplies to the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) via Congo-Brazzaville. Initially, the aim may have been to prevent a takeover by the Chinese-backed FLNA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola). By July, however, the MPLA was in the ascendancy. Crucial to its victory was the influx of several thousand Cuban combat troops (the number rose to 11,000 by early 1976), who were flown across in Soviet Ilyushin-62s, which refueled in Conakry, Guinea. This effort was buttressed by an airlift of AN-12s and AN-22s mounted by Aeroflot and by a substantial sealift, which had Soviet naval protection. This is an unambiguous instance of the USSR's projection of power in order to determine the outcome of a civil war and thereby refashion the strategic situation in southern Africa. Accordingly, it would seem to fall into the category of high risk; however, the publicly proclaimed and evident constraints placed on the US government's options undoubtedly convinced Moscow that it had nothing to fear from Washington and could proceed with relative impunity, suggesting that the Angolan affair was a much lower risk intervention than is usually bruited about in most analyses of the crisis.

The intervention in Ethiopia two years later was also a low-risk intervention, given its objectives of preserving the territorial integrity of a newly embraced client and expelling the invading Somalis from Ethiopian territory. The furor it created and the deleterious effects it had on the evolution of US-Soviet relations and on the consequent evolution and realignment of the politics and strategic environment of the Horn of Africa are beyond the scope of this paper. But in terms of the earlier criteria suggested for evaluating Soviet interventions and risk-taking, the Soviet action was a low-risk projection of military power.

A case can be made that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan started out in April 1978 as low-risk, but there can be no disputing the categorization of Soviet actions after 27 December 1979, as a high-risk intervention. For the first time in the Third World, the Soviet Union intruded its armed forces

blatantly into the domestic affairs of a friendly government in order to replace one pro-Soviet faction with another, more compliant one.

In evaluating the considerations that may have tipped the decision in the Kremlin in favor of intervention, contiguity should loom prominently, because it could occasion a similar high-risk Soviet move in Iran, if Iran's revolution were to veer to the pro-Soviet left in the wake of a post-Khomeini succession crisis and then be threatened with destabilization, counterrevolution, and an unsatisfactory satrap. Currently, this appears to be a most unlikely scenario, certainly compared to three or four years ago. Admittedly, Afghanistan's very contiguity limits the utility of the Afghan experience as a model for anticipating other possible high-risk Soviet moves in the Third World. Still the Afghan events demand very careful attention, not just because of the Gulf's importance and Moscow's willingness to assume additional costs in pursuance of imperial ambitions, but also because of what we can learn of the Soviet military's ability to adapt lessons learned in one theater of operations to another.

The USSR's most recent intervention occurred in Syria between late 1982 and early 1983, when it deployed SA-5s and thousands of air defense personnel in a measured response to Israel's battering of Syrian forces in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in June 1982. Moscow's aims were to deter an Israeli attack on Syria and to signal the United States to rein in the Israelis, lest the superpowers become involved in a direct confrontation. Hafez Assad's strategic prudence had paid off: by signing a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation on 8 October 1980, after almost a decade of Soviet cajoling, he had assured himself of Moscow's full support in the event of war with Israel. For its part, Moscow demonstrated anew that it would not stay on the sidelines and watch a prime client defeated by a US-backed rival.

In addition to the Third World leaderships that have already attracted some kind of direct Soviet military intervention, three other countries stand out as possible candidates: South Yemen, Libya, and Iran. Whether in accordance with existing treaty obligations, as in the case of South Yemen, or informal, still-secret, but presumably extensive promises, as in the case of Libya, or in quest of new geostrategic advantages, as in the case of Iran, the Soviet Union is very intimately interested in each of these countries and each is at the hub of a potentially explosive regional conflict.

Looking ahead, from the Kremlin's point of view, the three key Arab countries are Syria, South Yemen and Libya. The three share certain characteristics: they are anti-American; threatened by or at odds with a US-backed regional rival (other than Israel); assertive, ambitious, and apt to find themselves at war with a contiguous opponent; regarded with suspicion by their Arab neighbors; and heavily armed by the USSR to whom they are linked by treaties of friendship (in the cases of Syria and South Yemen) or by

elaborate military "understandings." There is every reason to assume that Moscow takes seriously its defense commitments, explicit or informal, to these unpredictable regional actors and that it would come to their assistance if they became involved in hostilities with a US client.

Militarily, Moscow has the air and seapower to project itself effectively into any crisis that might involve a prime client in the Eastern Mediterranean, on the North African littoral, or in the Yemeni part of the Arabian Peninsula. The assurance of land-based facilities in each of these sectors enhances the credibility of the Soviet commitment.

The case of a possible Soviet intervention in Iran has, for obvious reasons, attracted by far the most attention. Paradoxically though, for the foreseeable future, it may well be the least likely of the four. Iran is in a crisis, but unlike Syria, Libya, and South Yemen, it is strongly anti-Soviet, critical of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and unreceptive to Moscow's overtures for closer diplomatic and economic relations. Notwithstanding Iran's preoccupation with internal unrest and the war with Iraq, the Khomeini regime continues to denounce Moscow for its meddling in the Kurdish and Azerbaijanian areas of Iran, niggardly offers for Iranian natural gas, and its assistance to Iraq. Not even the protracted 444-day hostage crisis with the United States found Tehran receptive to Soviet blandishments of aid, transit rights or protection.

Moscow has adopted a watch-and-wait attitude, satisfied to see the deterioration of Iran's socio-economic situation and the polarization of the political system wrought by the hardline fundamentalists, operating through the ruling Islamic Republican Party. Even though the mullahs are anticommunist, their dissemination of a virulent anti-Americanism makes them inadvertent allies, meriting Moscow's forbearance; and even though Khomeini has decimated and outlawed the communist Tudeh Party since May 1983, the USSR's proximity and power make Moscow an ever present threat to the Iranian regime. But the threat is long term rather than imminent. As has been evident throughout the more than four year old Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet Union is not bent on disrupting the flow of Persian Gulf oil, and thereby triggering a confrontation with the United States. Nor is the USSR a military threat to Saudi Arabia or the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf.

If the past record of direct Soviet interventions in the Third World has any predictive value for alerting us to the political requirements or circumstances that might induce Soviet leaders to move into Iran, the indications are that two preconditions would be essential. First, a friendly regime would have to emerge in Tehran. All previous Soviet interventions were mounted on behalf of friendly regimes, which took the initiative in inviting greater and greater Soviet commitments on their behalf. As long as the Khomeini regime remains bitterly hostile, Soviet-Iranian relations will remain cool and distant. Second, there would have to be some evidence of a growing Soviet support for and

involvement on behalf of the regime, which, of course, presupposes a very different attitude on the part of the government in Tehran. But even in the event that the Iranian government proved receptive to Soviet overtures and began, for example, to expand economic ties, purchase Soviet arms, and align itself with the Soviet position on various international issues, it would, if the past has relevance to projections for the future, have to intensify interactions at the political and military level. And this, in turn, would be the result of a serious and immediate external threat to the survival of the regime in Tehran. Barring a sudden magnification of the military threat from Iraq or an imminent American intervention to topple Khomeini or his successors, Iran's danger comes primarily from within, not from without. Without a request from a courted client, and with no friendship treaty to provide a legal cover, Moscow is not likely, judging from the case studies presented earlier, to intervene.

The absence of the above-mentioned circumstances, however, though it may decrease the possibility of Soviet intervention, does not eliminate it. Since history plays a significant role in Moscow's thinking about its relations with neighboring countries, Iran may well hold a special importance for Soviet leaders, who remember well that for most of the century prior to World War I northern Iran was a virtual Russian protectorate and pro-Russian Iranians generally reigned in Tehran. Such a situation is once again within reach. A state of quasi-anarchy or a weak central authority in Tehran might tempt some form of intervention under the terms of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty, periodic Iranian abrogations of which Moscow has chosen to ignore. Under the treaty, Soviet forces may unilaterally intervene in Iranian affairs in the interests of self-defense if a third country threatened to attack the Soviet Union from Iranian territory or if Moscow considered its border threatened. Moscow might exploit the treaty's provisions in one or more of the following ways: to encourage, as it did in 1945-1946, the establishment of separatist regimes in the Kurdish and Azerbaijanian provinces of Iran; to occupy Tehran and northern Iran—but not southern Iran and the oil fields—under the pretext of intervening temporarily to restore "law and order"; to occupy northern Iran in response to, or in anticipation of, an American seizure of Khuzistan, the strategically salient naval base at Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz near the entrance to the Gulf, and/or the smaller naval base (and surrounding territory) at Chah Bahar in Iranian Baluchistan, near the Pakistani border.

Under any variant of this general scenario, the Soviet intervention would be restricted to northern Iran, to that part of the country that had been under czarist influence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although obviously a stepping stone toward an eventual foothold on the Gulf, it would, as a czarist minister of foreign affairs wrote at the turn of the century, seek to make Iran "politically an obedient, i.e., sufficiently powerful, instrument in

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our [Russian] hands, and, economically, to preserve for ourselves the large Persian market for a free application of Russian labor and capital." Southern Iran would be negotiable, depending on the US response. The Soviet leadership might well reason that if it did not threaten the oil areas of the Gulf, the United States would not go to war, and that a "deal" could be struck.

Under the worst case scenario—a sudden and unprovoked Soviet invasion of Iran—a Soviet-American confrontation becomes a near certainty. Such a contingency, however, is the least likely to occur—for the reasons set out above—not merely because of probable adverse political consequences, but also because of the very severe military constraints, which have been informatively and cogently developed by various Western specialists. A Soviet intervention in Iran, comparable with the takeover of Afghanistan in December 1979, poses formidable logistical problems for Kremlin planners. With three times the population of Afghanistan and two and a half times the land mass, Iran would be a far more costly and difficult venture. Moreover, at a time of great uncertainty in Central Europe, of US edginess over any threat to the security and stability of the Arabian Peninsula, and of looming succession travail in the CPSU, Moscow has strong reasons for restraint.

Attempts to establish connections between the strategic balance and Soviet risk-taking in the Third World face a myriad of methodological and conceptual hurdles. The root difficulty is determining the relevant data and criteria for assessing the strategic balance, compared to which establishing the parameters of risk-taking is relatively easy. American and Soviet perceptions and determinations of "strategic balance"—in Soviet parlance, commonly referred to as "correlation of forces"—are inherently asymmetrical, complicating comparison and opening the pandora's box of contentiousness over threat assessment. Fundamentally, whereas the Americans stress the military component, the Soviets consider it only one of several key variables; and whereas US analysts devote preponderant attention to the nuclear dimension, the Soviets, in their published commentaries, write more about conventional forces—an emphasis that may, apart from a morbid sensitivity to security, stem from their historical experience, geographic situation, internal system, and imperial foreign policy. Moreover, as is sharply evident in their contrasting approaches to the regional arms races that each fuels, the former conceive of them as ancillary adjuncts of a military policy geared to the preservation of the status quo, whereas the latter, operating relentlessly at multiple levels to acquire incremental advantages that they believe over time will bring about qualitative shifts in regional and strategic balances, see them as integral to the prosecution of political and military struggle, as a way of eventually undermining the status quo.

There is no convincing evidence that the perceived state of the central strategic balance played any discernible role in Soviet decisions to mount

interventions or run risks. Even in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when it was clearly inferior to the United States in strategic weapons and delivery systems, the USSR pursued an active, far-ranging policy in the Third World that was aimed to weaken the Western position. The relative paucity of direct interventions (two in the 1960s compared to five in the 1970s) was more a function of limited opportunities and an inadequate power projection capability than of the state of the strategic balance. Inferiority was no bar to high risk-taking, as Cuba showed.

Three factors strengthen the assumption that Soviet risk-taking in the Third World will increase in the years ahead: the USSR's enormously enhanced capability to project military power beyond the confines of the Soviet bloc; its perception that the United States, notwithstanding greater defense spending, is increasingly constrained or unwilling to use its power for the promotion and defense of political-strategic objectives in the Third World (arms sales are no substitute for a coherent policy); and an increase in the opportunity factor, which derives from local and regional instability and the alacrity with which local actors turn to the Soviet Union in order to advance their own ambitions and acquire added leverage over the United States. This situation is unfolding concomitant with, yet independent of, the nuclear relationship between the superpowers.

The strategic balance is not apt to affect Soviet risk-taking, because both superpowers seem to share the conviction that a nuclear war is too high a price for marginal real estate; and because essential equivalence at the nuclear level seems destined to persist for the foreseeable future. If these assumptions are accurate, the Soviet Union will, accordingly, neither resort to its nuclear power to acquire some mere local advantage nor precipitate a nuclear confrontation by doing anything as rash as choking off Persian Gulf oil from the West and Japan.

Why the Soviet Union shoulders the burdens, bears the costs, and takes the risks it does in pressing its forward policy in the Third World in the face of seemingly limited, often ephemeral, gains perplexes many an analyst. We do know that the Soviet quest for influence remains unabated. In assessing the political utility of the USSR's Third World policy, it is important not to impute to Soviet leaders the yardsticks of success and failure that seem reasonable or compelling to us. There are three essential and distinctive ways one can characterize Soviet policy: superpower, imperial, and ideological. It is, I submit, the *imperial* model that holds the key to understanding Soviet behavior and anticipating future risk-taking—it combines the insights of historicity and contemporaneity with prognosis. There is still merit in Lord Palmerston's 1830s' aphorism, "It is always the policy and practice of the Russian Government to expand its frontiers as rapidly as the apathy and timidity of its neighbors permit, but to halt or recoil when met with determined opposition."

Naval Presence: Sizing the Force

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During the period from 1946 through 1982 US military forces were postured some 259 times as a political instrument in support of national policy. In over 80 percent of these instances, naval forces were employed. In examining these naval operations a number of problems were quickly identified. First, naval presence has different meanings to different people. Second, there are dissimilar opinions on how naval presence is scheduled and how it can be used effectively. And last, if forces are not properly chosen, i.e., structured to a crisis management (CM) response, there can be a much greater impact on fleet operations than is necessary. Hence the purpose of this study is threefold.

- to establish our definition of naval presence,
- to briefly describe how it is scheduled and some factors that may determine its effectiveness, and, most importantly,
- to develop a rational, structured approach to choosing a force to respond to CM situations.

Such a framework should aid in identifying the "proper" force to accomplish the objective of the naval presence mission with the minimum of impact on scheduled fleet operations.

More often than not the impressions one has on the concept of naval presence rests with the *beholder*. One of the first statements made by two former CinCs in separate interviews on the subject was that "we [in the Navy] do not understand naval presence." They both went on to say that naval presence is the most powerful and effective lever that can be used in pursuit and support of our national policy. In our discussion here we will consider naval presence to encompass those actions as indicated in Figure 1.

One should first distinguish the level of "violence" between routine presence and a show of force. Routine presence includes those actions conducted during regular deployments, primarily training exercises and port visits, while a show of force would be a specific deployment of naval forces

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

Figure 1. Use of Naval Forces

that are planned in pursuit of an identifiable political objective in which the use of force is contemplated or could reasonably be expected to occur if circumstances arise. These two divisions of naval presence would be roughly equivalent to preventive deployments and reactive deployments as described by Admiral Stansfield Turner in his definition of the missions of the US Navy.[1] The division of routine presence and show of force equates to the terms latent and active suasion, respectively, as used by Edward Luttwak in *The Political Uses of Seapower*.[2] Show of force as defined to include limited or symbolic use of force also equates very closely to James Cable's definition of gunboat diplomacy.[3]

Routine presence encompasses those benign and latent actions expected on a deployment including normally scheduled exercises and port visits. The primary objective of routine naval presence is to demonstrate that we have interests in various regions of the world and to reassure our friends and allies. Some naval persons are skeptical as to the degree that naval forces could favorably support national strategies. Yet, a majority of opinion supports the proposition that routine naval presence can be effective if utilized properly. An experienced US foreign service officer assigned to the Embassy in Tokyo related a specific instance in which the Japanese expressed open concern over the movement of carrier battle groups which they apparently perceived as a lessening of US commitment. Jonathan Howe in his book *Multicrises* concludes that "in regions of vital security

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interest to the United States, the advantages of maintaining a naval presence appear to far outweigh the disadvantages."[4]

Port calls constitute a great part of what we have defined as routine naval presence. Besides the normal objectives of liberty for the crew, maintenance for the ship and dollars for the host country, port visits serve other uses. They can signal the closeness of relations of the United States and the host nation. The sophistication of our advanced technology looks impressive and generates enthusiasm. Port calls serve as showcases for our technology and can help to boost foreign military sales. The scheduling of routine naval presence is normally affected through interaction between the CinC or his fleet representatives and the on-scene ambassador. This interaction allows for a comprehensive evaluation of the results and reduces to a minimum port visits to which there is an overall negative reaction.

Further up the violence scale, a show of force is usually in support of a national political objective that has the attention of the highest levels of government. A show of force is scheduled and coordinated by the CinC or his superiors, including the commander in chief, depending on the specific situation. The requirement could be identified at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, or the State Department level. The JCS would coordinate requests with other CinCs, especially in those cases where the forces required were in excess of the forces available to the requesting CinC. In a parallel information flow the on-scene ambassador would report via State Department channels what he perceives as the requirement for a show of force, and other diplomatic and economic action. Conflicting views, if any, would then be resolved by the National Security Council.

What constitutes a show of force has been a matter of some debate. Within the Navy there is general appreciation that naval units smaller than aircraft carriers can show naval presence. But outside of the naval service, the idea that naval task groups come in nothing smaller than CVBGs (or now battleship surface action groups), is generally the norm. This latter concept is probably most appropriate for most show of force missions. When a show of force is required in support of a national interest, the situation generally requires that it be the high scale of naval presence, such as the CVBG.

Yet there are dangers that should be recognized if only carriers are used to respond to naval presence requirements. One deals with "devaluing of the currency." As pointed out by Kenneth McGruther in his article on naval diplomacy, if aircraft carriers are used too frequently, and come to be the expected response, they will thereby be robbed of their special significance for use in future crises. Besides, the use of a carrier battle group may be overkill which may send unintended signals—a greater level of commitment than is really intended.[5] One can imagine the effect that a Royal Navy SSN would have if seen in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. It could have served the deterrent purpose without requiring any more forces to be employed.

In searching for general principles one seeks to develop a rational framework that can be used to size a force for a particular need. Existing scholarly studies of the subject arrive at conflicting conclusions, however, a few observations in some areas of general agreement would seem useful.

First. A routine or latent naval presence may detract from a show of force, that is, one that has been undertaken in an active attempt to evoke a specific reaction. The strongest message of resolve and commitment is usually associated with the arrival of the forces and tends to decrease over time as the forces become institutionalized and are no longer unusual and newsworthy. Should a force be in the area of concern, then one must expand the present force and demonstrate a higher level of resolve. However, the expansion of the existing force will probably not be as effective a message as when a force is first introduced into a region. The balance between the need for routine presence in support of a forward strategy and the diluting effect this may have on a show of force requirement needs to be considered when constructing both routine presence and show of force missions.

Second. A show of force in its coercive role can be used in two ways. It can be used to compel a party to change his behavior and it can be used to maintain an established behavior. Of the two, it is generally agreed that a show of force is more effective in maintaining an existing behavior than in effecting a change in behavior. Accepting this proposition, it would follow that the timing of introduction of the force into the area of concern is critical for two reasons. First, the force should arrive in the formulative stage of a crisis. Studies indicate that prior to the outbreak of a crisis there are many underlying forces that gradually build and the crisis is finally precipitated by some event that may or may not be related to the underlying causes.[6] Secondly, in a situation which would involve a show of force by both the United States and USSR in an attempt to influence a third party, the second force to arrive will serve primarily to mitigate or counterbalance the influence of the first force. Rear Admiral Edward Wegener points out that "if both sides are present, their presence neutralizes each other."[7] Howe's analysis of various crises would support this neutralizing effect and he further states that "since neither superpower is likely to risk a direct confrontation it is extremely important to gain the initiative."[8] It would follow that the most effective influence would be executed by the first force, and then only until arrival of the second force.

Third. There is general consensus that where a show of force "maintains" behavior, it slows the rate of crises development, thereby, allowing more time for diplomatic and economic initiatives to succeed. The mere fact that a show of force is required implies that policy has not been successful. A show of force is not an end in itself but only a means to complement political and economic initiatives. A show of force, or for that matter any military action, will not rescue ill-conceived policy. Without successful economic and political policy a show of force cannot by itself attain the desired objective.

Once the need for a naval presence has been established, then there is a need for a rational framework for sizing a force. Such a framework is intended only as a means to ensure that the proper questions are considered during the selection process. As Cable concludes after analysis of several crises in which naval forces were utilized with less than desirable results, "Perhaps the wrong questions were asked or in the wrong order."[9] Every situation requiring a show of force is unique. The force used must be tailored to the specific situation while considering applicable military, political and economic factors.

Objective

The first step in the process is to identify the true political objective—the what. The emphasis here should be on the real political objective and not necessarily the publicly stated objective. A recent illustrative example could be: was the objective of the Marine peacekeeping force in Lebanon to support the Lebanese government?, or was the true political objective to restrain Israel? The point being that the military leader must know the real political objective in order to take proper action and select the optimum forces.

After identifying the objective, the next question is, who are we trying to influence?—the government, the people, or a third party? And then, how are we trying to influence them? The relevance of this process is that the forces chosen must in some way be able to effectively communicate their presence. Without some form of interaction—landing of forces, aircraft overflights, positioning ships in view—or news media exposure, the ability to influence the desired party would be nonexistent. For instance, if one wishes to influence a local populace in a third world country with very limited internal communications, the use of an aircraft carrier—that by necessity must stay out of sight—would have limited, if any utility, unless the embarked aircraft are allowed to fly and exercise over the country in question. In this case, a better choice might simply be to employ smaller surface combatants that could be maneuvered in close vicinity of the country or could make a port visit.

Force Choice Assessment

Time Frame. The basic considerations of timing concerning arriving prior to precipitation of the crisis and being the first force to arrive were discussed earlier. There exists a common belief concerning crisis response that the time available for decisionmaking is necessarily short. However, Snyder and Diesing point out that while crises will involve urgency of decisionmaking due to a sense of danger and risk, it does not necessarily follow that short decision time is characteristic of crisis. They go on to observe that numerous

past crises have lasted for months or years.[10] Identification of the time interval early in the force-sizing process will allow for a realistic estimate of the time available for decisionmaking.

Committed vs. Uncommitted Forces. For the purposes of this framework, committed forces are forces that are inserted on the ground in the area of concern. Committed forces usually consist of Marines, Air Force assets (AWACS), Army forces or military training teams. The advantage of committed forces is that they portend a greater commitment and higher level of resolve than uncommitted forces. Some would argue that committed forces are more successful in attaining their objective than are uncommitted forces, but opinion is far from unanimous on this point.[11] Generally speaking, committed forces are more vulnerable, harder to sustain, and that once in place they are hard to extract as compared to uncommitted forces, such as naval units. Furthermore, the removal of committed forces prior to attainment of their objective can be more politically damaging than the removal of uncommitted forces. Committed forces will almost without exception be in more physical danger than uncommitted forces. This danger is even more pronounced with the increased terrorist activity of recent years.

Generally speaking, uncommitted forces are in the form of naval forces and their major advantage is mobility. Uncommitted forces are physically capable of being easily removed from an area although history shows a tendency for short-term crisis response requirements becoming long-term commitments. Uncommitted naval forces include Marine amphibious ready groups that can quickly become committed if the need arises.

One of the major factors when considering the use of a committed or uncommitted force is the uncertainty factor created by an uncommitted force vs. the known quantity of a committed force. As an example, the Marines while remaining on their amphibious ships introduce an uncertainty factor that includes questions of: Will or won't they land? If they do, when and where and in what strength? The uncertainty factor may act as a force multiplier with the potential adversary having to consider defending against all possible options. Once the force is committed the adversary can plan for fewer options and is dealing with a known quantity.

A similar consideration is that Marine forces while uncommitted perpetuate the perception of the invincible, 10 feet tall American fighting man. This perception will quickly dissipate if the force is put ashore and shows itself susceptible to combat attrition like any other fighting force. Along the same lines the USS *New Jersey* may have been more effective prior to firing her 16-inch guns—portraying an immense power limited only by the imagination of the perceiver. Once she has fired, her capability becomes a known and calculable factor. There can be little argument that even assuming that the military objectives of the naval tactical bombing raid on Syrian positions

were achieved, the overall negative perception caused by the loss of two aircraft resulted in a lessening of the effectiveness of the aircraft carrier as a show of force.

Dominant vs. Hostage Force. A dominant force represents the superior military capability in the region. It has the capability to protect itself from any potential adversary, is likely to prevail and may make the desired outcome more likely.[12] A dominant force is most probably required in a case where coercion is necessary, and behavior modification vice maintaining the present behavior is required. A hostage force on the other hand, is a relatively weak force that is interposed between two or more competing parties to cool a situation. As such it is dependent upon limited objectives and reasonable rules of engagement from competing factions for its very survival.

The hostage force has little chance of success in attaining the political objective if it is perceived as being other than neutral, or if one or more of the competing factions wishes to draw the hostage force into the dispute. An example of a hostage force would be the Marine peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. A hostage force could also have linkage to a stronger military force that has superior capability. For example, the Mideast Force, which is a small and relatively less capable force when compared to potential adversaries, has a linkage to the CVBG not far removed in the North Arabian Sea. To be deterred, however, the potential adversary must perceive that an unacceptable level of punishment would occur were he to take hostile action.

Force Credibility. One of the most important factors to be considered when posturing military show of force is the credibility of that force. In the event that the force is called upon to act—not just merely be present—is the combat capability of that force sufficient to attain the military objective? Present US military forces are stretched thin in their support of national policy. When a crisis looms unexpectedly, there is a tendency to employ the nearest or most readily available force without fully evaluating combat capability. In other words—bluff. Whenever military forces are utilized as a show of force, the possibility that these forces will be employed in actnal combat must be considered carefully. Only fully combat capable and credible military forces should be postured as a show of force.

Perceptions. Virtually every study consulted, dealing with crisis response, stressed the importance of perceptions. Luttwak stares, "because suasion can only operate through the filters of others' perceptions, the exercise of suasion is inherently unpredictable in its results."[13] When dealing with the third world, perceptions seem to take on even more significance. Milan Vego concludes that: ". . . the perception of military capabilities, when dealing with the problems of the third world, is often more important than real

power."[14] Howe observes that: "in the arena of the third world visible power has special significance: ready forces make an impression."[15] Thus, to a great extent, the selection of forces must be done through the eyes of the potential adversary.

Luttwak also observed that "Generally, political leaders around the world understand more about ground power than air power, and more about the latter than about naval power."[16] So it may be that a particular leader may be better influenced by a committed ground force of which he has a better understanding. Conversely, he also appreciates the capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities of this ground force and may be awed by the uncertainty and perception of the great power encompassed in the fleet off his shores. The overriding concern is that the force must be structured for each specific situation with thoughtful consideration of local perceptions.

Repercussions. The show of force may have repercussions in other nations not directly involved. These repercussions may be positive or negative. For instance, during the Indian Ocean buildup, some third party nations, India for example, reacted negatively to the increased naval presence. While overall, the objective of this particular event was worth the negative reaction, such may not always be the case. Additionally, a show of force that requires withdrawal of forces from and cancellation of exercises with third party nations may be greeted with dismay by those nations.

Applicability. The applicability and effectiveness of the force available to obtain the desired objective—in relation to the military threat of the potential adversary forces—must be taken into consideration. For example, surfacing a nuclear submarine in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands might well be the most effective choice of force if the objective is to deter future Argentinian incursions in the area. An Air Force AWACS aircraft may seem like a good choice to help interdict seaborne terrorist infiltrations. But if the deployed AWACS is vulnerable to the terrorist threat, then the use of carrier-based assets, while possibly less effective, may be a more applicable force selection.

Threat. When considering the threat of a potential adversary, it is important to consider it in relation to the military capability of the force chosen to show force. Such a threat should not be considered in relation to the potential military force that can be brought to bear, but only to forces that will actually be committed to the show of force. Howe points out that ships are symbols of the nations whose flag they fly and their influence may extend beyond their pure military capabilities, yet the *Pueblo* demonstrated the limits of protection afforded by symbology not backed up by credible power.[17] More recent events such as the Iranian hostage situation and the peacekeeping force in

Lebanon would indicate the continued decline of symbolic power. Cable observes that power has no absolute existence, but what is important is the ability to apply appropriate force about a given point.[18] With the introduction of sophisticated weapons into third world countries, the buildup of military forces has given these countries increased capability to apply force. Illustrative of this is when the carrier USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* made a naval presence deployment to the Mediterranean shortly after WW II; her airwing was larger than most all of the air forces of the countries bordering the Mediterranean.[19] Since then, the relative balance of power has changed and with it has come the decline of the symbolic power of the United States. The threat posed by even a small power, one that can muster a superior force around the chosen point, must be taken seriously.

Selected Forces

Sustainability. The selected force needs to be evaluated as to its sustainability. Is there adequate logistic support available to ensure that the selected force will be a credible force? Can the force be sustained over the prospective time frame? If the time frame cannot be readily identified, how long can the force be sustained and when is the likely decision point for its removal or reinforcement?

Costs Involved. What is the dollar cost of the selected force over the time frame required? Does the objective and probability of success justify the expenditure? Opportunity costs to be considered include the impact on other commitments, training, readiness and morale. A show of force crisis management response will have an impact in at least one and commonly all four of these opportunity costs.

The global commitments for our naval forces today provide for little flexibility to respond to emerging requirements without affecting other commitments. For example, when the USS *Ranger* battle group was diverted to Central America, this required either extension of the USS *Vinson*'s battle group deployment or gapping of the Indian Ocean commitment. When the Indian Ocean presence was built up to two CVBGs after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1977, naval forces had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Western Pacific to fulfill that new commitment for continued presence. Historically, crisis response show of force requirements have not developed in areas where training support and services are available. Crisis response restricts force mobility and reduces training exercises necessary for unit combat proficiency and integrated force training for general war strategy. The newly emerging Caribbean presence requirements may require the surging of forces during their training cycle which will necessarily result in loss of training and proficiency. The show of force requirement may well

justify the loss of training. But it must be understood that should the use of force be required, the reduced combat proficiency of the force could have an overall negative effect. Blechman and Kaplan noted, "Performance in war, of course, is of primary significance to the reputation of armed forces and to the consequent assumptions and decisions of policymakers . . . performance, more than victory or defeat, is the key."[20]

The increase in operations tempo associated with show of force response situations has a direct impact on maintenance time available and upkeep/overhaul schedules that affect force readiness. Morale may increase in the initial stages of most crisis response situations and can be maintained if the need for the response can clearly be established. However, where deployments are extended and stateside periods reduced, increased family separation is bound to have a negative impact on morale and overall retention.

In the final analysis, the question that must be answered is one that considers both monetary and opportunity costs. That is, does the objective justify the overall costs of the selected force or would a different force be more cost-effective? If in answering these questions, the selected force is deemed to be inappropriate, the framework should be reentered at the Force Choice Assessment block to select an alternative force.

Desired Actions

The measure of effectiveness of naval forces in a political role to influence another nation is purely subjective in nature and requires thoughtful attention as to the specific action the force is to carry out. The military commander must consider those actions that are and are not conducive to attainment of the political objective and give directions to the force commander accordingly. Appropriate questions include: Is the force to engage in joint exercises? Are live firing exercises desired or required? How are news media and news releases to be handled? Is embarkation of local military/political leaders desired for air/seapower demonstrations? Are there specific areas in which the forces should or should not operate? In short, what actions should the on-scene forces take and what actions are to be avoided?

The actual use of force requires special consideration. In a limited/general war scenario, the primary emphasis of the military commander will be on the ends to be achieved, i.e.: What is the military objective desired and, how can it best be accomplished? As has been previously mentioned, in a show of force situation where actual use of force is employed, the perception of performance can be more important than the ends achieved. For instance, consider again the Beirut bombing raid. The loss of two aircraft (performance) totally overshadowed any actual results achieved. However, during the planning and execution of the raid the primary emphasis was on the physical destruction of the targets as an end. This subtle shift in emphasis from operational objective

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to the display of the performance of forces employed is extremely important for strike planning and the ultimate results of the operation. This subtlety should not be lost on the operational commander.

Outcome

Lastly, the commander needs to try to anticipate all possible outcomes both successful and otherwise. What are the indicators of a successful outcome and attainment of the objective? When is the crisis over? When can the forces be withdrawn? Conversely what are the indications that things are not progressing as desired and additional forces are required or another course of action should be pursued? If additional forces are required, then the framework should be reentered at the Force Choice Assessment block as depicted in Figure 2. If it is determined that the outcome will not be satisfactory then the objective should be reexamined to determine if it is attainable through the use of military forces.



Figure 2. Sizing Force for Naval Presence

One of the primary considerations involving use of military forces is what the impact will be on the domestic political scene. While a proposed action to

augment or withdraw forces in a show of force situation may be correct from a military standpoint, political considerations may make the same move inadvisable. William Hickman points out that once the two carrier battle groups were committed to the Iranian hostage crisis, they could not be withdrawn without touching off a fire storm of domestic criticism.[21]

Answers to the foregoing questions and judging the impact of military actions on domestic political concerns will be difficult and in some cases impossible but the decisionmaker will be wise to heed the words of Carl Von Clausewitz, ". . . one should not take the first step without having considered the last."[22]

Naval presence is the peacetime mission of the US Navy. In this discussion, we have defined naval presence as being divided into two parts, routine presence and show of force presence. Routine presence encompasses those actions normally expected on forward deployments including port visits, joint exercises, and VIP visits. Forward deployments and the associated routine presence is important to show our interest in strategic areas of the world, to show our commitment to our allies, and our resolve to potential adversaries. Additionally, through forward deployments one is able to more favorably position forces for crisis response, and limited and general war contingencies.

Show of force constitutes the other division of naval presence. It is employed in direct support of our national interests and can be used to show resolve as well as signal intentions. Show of force can involve actual use of force so it is imperative that use of force be contemplated when structuring a show of force. The forces used for a show of force must be tailored to each specific situation. Each aspect of the situation must be thought through from objective to outcome. This rational framework is designed to assist in this task.

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The Canadian Navy in the Modern World
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C3CM—A Warfare Strategy

Gene E. Layman

The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans.
Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.

Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures (C^3CM) are focused means to disrupt the enemy's decisionmaking capacity and his command processes. The target is the enemy decision maker. The pressure points are his sensors, his means of communicating information, and his analysis centers. The purpose is to confuse him so he is unable to effectively control his forces.

Like any type of warfare, C^3CM requires a strategy, a doctrinal framework, to guide the practical application of its tactics. This strategy cannot be reduced to a number of rules where response to stimuli are specified in advance. An adequate set of such rules is, if not impossible, impractical. Rather we should examine the essential factors of C^3CM to assist us in the development of a strategy framework so that tactical employment will be the product of the general applications of the principles of that strategy. (Strategy being the art of selecting appropriate objectives and of organizing resources to efficiently secure these objectives.) My purpose here is, first, to clarify the general C^3CM mission at the US Navy battle group level and, second, to present the elements of a C^3CM strategy upon which employment concepts may be built.

C^3CM Within the Hierarchy of Strategies

There is a hierarchy of strategies that corresponds to the various levels of warfare conducted in execution of national policy. Grand strategy defines the type of war to be undertaken—the broad goals to be obtained and the general direction in which the war is to be conducted. Grand strategy is followed by theater strategy, and, for the Navy, this can be followed by a battle group employment strategy. Examples of individual warfare area supporting strategies are C^3CM, Antiair, Antisubmarine, and Antisurface Warfare.

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This hierarchical strategy structure illustrates key relationships; namely, the crucial need for guidance to be provided from higher to lower warfare levels, and the importance of corresponding support that lower levels must provide in supporting higher level objectives. Stated simply, the mission and operational objectives at any level must be subordinate to, and supportive of, higher level strategies in this hierarchy.

A second characteristic of this hierarchy is that as one proceeds down the operational hierarchy, the tactics applicable to the operational mission becomes more clear. This is generally the case until we reach C^3CM strategy at which point our lens becomes clouded. The problem does not lie in a lack of understanding of opportunities for disrupting enemy C^3 nor tactics that may be employed. The problem lies in the absence of a strategic framework that enables a battle group commander to define C^3CM objectives clearly—objectives upon which he can base a coherent plan of action.

Liddell Hart has defined warfare mission objectives into two broad categories—*dislocation* and *exploitation* of the enemy.[1] The first category includes dislocation of the enemy's position, organization and control of forces, intentions and plans, response to our initiatives, and his view of the tactical environment. The objective in this category is to position one's own forces in a more advantageous circumstance than one's enemy's. Mission objectives in the exploitation category are aimed at defeating the enemy through the physical destruction of his forces or by the threat to do so. Exploitation should follow dislocation. "You cannot hit [defeat] an enemy with efficiency unless you have first created the opportunity."[2]

C^3CM plays an important role in both dislocation and exploitation of the enemy. Most acts aimed at dislocation are a part of C^3CM in a broad sense because they are aimed at confusing the enemy decision maker. However, C^3CM essentially plays a *supporting* role in exploitation by enhancing the effectiveness of one's own destructive capability and reducing that of the enemy. The ultimate defeat of the enemy's forces must depend upon his capitulation or physical destruction.

In consideration of the hierarchical nature of strategies and the role of C^3CM in support of physical destruction, we may postulate a fundamental principle of C^3CM employment at the battle group level—*tactical C^3CM must be subordinate to the force (battle group) mission and supportive of destructive warfare task areas.*

There is a purpose for this rationale and for making what appears to be an obvious statement as a principle of employment. It places a requirement on the C^3CM planner to develop and clearly define C^3CM objectives and employment strategy in a manner that can be related to the overall battle group mission as well as to specific warfare area missions. This is necessary in order to integrate C^3CM with other supporting functions in the battle group mission. This is a challenge! Too frequently we think of C^3CM at the tactical level in terms of

jamming a communications link or producing false targets in an adversary's radar without fully defining the broader objectives we should be trying to achieve.

To provide a better focus, the mission of C3CM should be defined precisely in relation to general warfare. Clausewitz wrote that the object of war is to exercise control over the enemy by reducing the enemy to a state where he is neither able to prosecute effective warfare operations nor willing to resist. This control can be exercised either through the destruction of the enemy's military power—by making the enemy measure of sacrifice, real or perceived, unacceptable—or by causing the enemy to view his goals as unattainable. Therefore, a battle group's mission could generally be stated as: destroy the enemy's military power and engage in activities that deter the enemy's actions.

The reliability of the enemy's C3 structures must be regarded as a critical factor in his mission potential and in his own estimate of his ability to carry out operations successfully. C3CM then has the potential for reducing the enemy's operational capabilities. A general C3CM mission may be described by the following. Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures are offensive and defensive operations aimed at prohibiting the enemy from maintaining effective control over his forces by: initiating active measures to disrupt enemy C3 while maintaining the ability to control one's own forces by protecting them against enemy C3CM actions. When properly employed, C3CM will degrade the enemy's ability to execute initiatives against our forces and prevent effective counterresponse to our initiatives.

Accordingly C3CM operations are carried out by initiating actions aimed at impeding the flow and management of an enemy's essential information and by injecting false or misleading information into the enemy's C3 systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined C3CM activities as "the integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions."[3] Viewed in terms of affects, these activities are aimed at such results as distorting the enemy's understanding of the tactical situation, severing commanders from the forces they control, and preventing mutual support between force components.

The discussion thus far has been descriptive of C3CM mission and means. It still lacks a cohesive form that adequately relates means to mission. Central to the problem in defining this relationship are: knowing the vulnerabilities of the enemy's C3 process; knowing circumstances in which C3CM actions are likely to be effective and the proper manner to employ C3CM tactics; gaining relevant information for employment; and devising effective means to assess and control operations. Five core elements that address these central problems are:

- A perception of C3CM warfare focused on the enemy's objectives;
- The concentration of efforts on main C3CM objectives;
- Conducting operations under a single, integrated tactical plan;
- The proper balance between centralized and decentralized control; and
- The use of a strategy framework as a comprehensive means of operations assessment and control.

A Perception of C3CM Warfare Focused on the Enemy's Objectives

In warfare a whole range of activities are organized and executed toward achieving a small number of tactical objectives. The very principles of operations, i.e., doctrine, that the enemy is most likely to apply in the employment of his forces, should serve as the basis for planning an opposing C3CM operational strategy. The enemy's tactical objectives are central to his principles of operation. A grasp of his tactical objectives is the first step in exploiting his vulnerabilities. One's skill and ingenuity in planning C3CM operations rest largely on this fundamental notion.

Hostile Tactical Objectives. As an illustration of a concept of hostile tactical objectives, consider the Anticarrier Warfare (ACW) mission. An obvious enemy goal for ACW is to inflict sufficient destruction on the carrier battle group to render it incapable of carrying out its assigned mission. An enemy strategy for destruction would be to mass and deploy surface, subsurface and airborne platforms, so as to be able to deliver a devastating missile attack upon the battle group with the carrier as the primary target.

Given accurate information on the enemy, it is possible to anticipate the enemy's battle management process, from which one is able to partition his operations into discrete tasks for each general type of warfare. A representative list of hostile tactical objectives associated with Anticarrier Warfare operations might be:

- Establish and maintain surveillance of carrier battle group.
- Establish theater command post in place.
- Deploy surface, subsurface and air strike forces.*
- Confirm strike plan.
- Position surface, subsurface and air strike forces.*
- Assign targets to surface, subsurface and air strike forces.*
- Provide targeting information to surface, subsurface and air strike forces.*
- Position support aircraft.
- Authorize attack.
- Acquire targets by surface, subsurface and air weapons systems.*
- Coordinate launch.

*These forces could be considered as having tactical objectives.

The types of general warfare that the enemy may engage in can be partitioned into a set of separate tasks such as those shown. There are two reasons why this partitioning is important. First, it establishes the basis for selecting C3CM objectives and it is useful in establishing their priority. Second, it provides a planning methodology for the integration of C3CM with other warfare areas (AAW, ASW, ASUW) through common or complementary objectives. Before elaborating on this we should first examine some of the more apparent properties associated with hostile tactical objectives.

There are three such properties that establish a basis for predicting and evaluating the cumulative effects of multiple C3CM actions on an enemy's operations. Each objective has *tactical significance*. The degree of success of the enemy's overall mission is significantly related to the degree of success for each objective. Next, there are many *interdependencies* among hostile tactical objectives. Disruption of one often leads to disruption of others. And, finally, many hostile tactical objectives are *time critical*—to cause a delay in the achievement of an enemy's tactical objective is often as effective as denial. If we understand the tactical significance of each of the enemy's objectives, objective interdependency, and the criticality of timing, we then have a basic framework for evaluating opposing C3CM objectives. This framework can be further developed by the introduction of C3 corollary objectives.

The employment of C3CM relies on our ability to analyze the enemy's operations from a C3 viewpoint. To simplify this analysis we recognize that each hostile tactical objective has a C3 corollary objective in which we may group all C3 events supporting that objective. As an illustration, consider expanding the tactical objective of "Position surface strike forces." The enemy's plan for achieving this objective will include individual assignments to each surface combatant and directions to position each in a location with respect to the battle group. Movement of the battle group and its activities must be taken into account and will modify not only the actual desired location of each enemy surface combatant relative to the battle group, but may require changing its assignment as well. Information required for such maneuvering establishes the necessity for a C3 objective as a corollary to the hostile tactical objective, as shown in Figure 1.

From this we can see a natural C3CM objective in opposition to this pair: namely, to deny the enemy the ability to acquire, process and disseminate information. Yet it should be measured against the effect on the primary hostile objective, that of positioning surface strike forces.

Our ability to deny the enemy this type of information depends, first, on our knowledge of how he acquires it, and second, on the means available to deny, disrupt or present false information. We can create a model that defines the enemy's sensor deployment (satellite, radio direction finding, radar,



Figure 1. C^3 Objectives

visual, etc.); informational needs (acquisition, localization, targeting, etc.); communications channels (HF, VHF, data links, IFF, satellite, etc.); and spatial and temporal interrelationships that will allow us to determine the most appropriate C3CM means (emission control, deception, jamming, etc.) to prevent him from achieving his objective.

This perception of C3CM warfare focused on an enemy's objectives requires a systematic approach for analyzing and predicting his behavior and provides the basis for a C3CM strategy. If we know his mission we can project the enemy's tactical objectives. Applying knowledge of the enemy's resources, principles of operations, and the operational environment to a basic framework provides the C3CM decision maker a means to anticipate the C3 events the enemy is likely to initiate to achieve his objectives. The following sections build on this basic concept.

The Concentration of Efforts on Main C3CM Objectives

The concentration of one's strength against an enemy's weak points has been a fundamental principle of strategy throughout the history of warfare. The question to be dealt with here is: how does the principle of concentration

apply to C3CM? Clearly the need does not require a concentration of C3CM assets in the physical sense. Rather, the C3CM effort should be concentrated on weaknesses in the enemy's C3 process. Important and feasible C3CM objectives should be identified and pursued with determination, for only by a concentrated effort can there be confidence in achieving common goals—dispersed efforts will produce only random results.

The selection and establishment of priorities of C3CM objectives is an expression of the operational C3CM strategy. It involves considerable uncertainty since it is based upon an appraisal of factors that are largely outside the control of the battle group. However, this selection must be made, made carefully, and evaluated again and again during execution. The following C3CM objectives selection criteria will be considered here.

- Own Force Mission and Concept of Operations.
- Enemy's Principles of Operations.
- Unique Nature of the Operational Environment.
- Ability to Resolve Uncertainties Concerning the Enemy's Employment of Tactics.
- Balance Between the Probability of Achieving Objectives, the Demand on Resources, and the Benefit to the Battle Group Mission if Attained—feasibility, suitability and acceptability.

First, the particular C3CM objectives determined *must* support the force mission and be in concert with the general concept of operations of other warfare activities. The goal of all actions is the efficient use of resources to achieve the battle group mission objective. Within this context, C3CM is aimed at denying the enemy the effective use of his resources to achieve his mission. General opportunities are determined by applying our knowledge of the enemy's principles of operations.

The unique nature of the operational environment will provide a focus from the general to the specific. Numerous factors, such as, where we are, the respective orders of battle, how we are deployed, how the enemy is deployed, our estimate of his understanding of the situation, the physical environment, geopolitical conditions restricting freedom of transit, etc., must be considered in selection of C3CM objectives. It is through an analysis of the operational environment that we can estimate the methods the enemy is likely to employ to achieve his objectives, the C3 events that he will rely on, and the general opportunities for C3CM actions.

The choice of C3CM objectives is based on a general understanding of the tactic options the enemy may employ to achieve each of his tactical objectives. As an operation progresses through phases, knowledge of the enemy's methods can be further refined and confirmed through knowledge of his tactics. It is only through the resolution of uncertainties concerning the enemy's employment of specific tactics that we are able to refine our plans

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and select specific C3CM actions. The knowledge that a particular C3CM action would be highly effective is useless unless it can be applied in an operational situation. Finally, the selected C3CM objectives must meet the basic test of feasibility, suitability, and acceptability. The selection process should ensure that C3CM objectives achieve operational balance, spread the demand for resources over time, and provide mutual support of activities.

Conducting Operations Under A Single Integrated Tactical Plan

Once the general C3CM objectives have been established, it is necessary to work out a plan of action that can be executed with the resources available. Three employment concepts should be considered in formulating C3CM plans—planning for flexibility in execution, integration of C3CM with other warfare operations plans, and the proper balance of centralized and decentralized control.

Planning for Flexibility in Execution. The enemy's operations can be described by a number of tactical objectives. Each hostile tactical objective and its C3 corollary provides a potential C3CM objective in opposition. Based upon knowledge of the enemy's operational doctrine we may visualize the tactical situation as we would expect it to develop. There can be a wide latitude in our definition of C3CM objectives and in the means by which we choose to achieve them. The specific objective—whether to delay, partially deny, confuse, cause certain platforms to be out of position, etc., will be chosen in an environment in which considerable uncertainty exists.

It will be necessary to develop sets of alternate plans and variations as to how each objective could be achieved. Option selection from these plans will be determined through observing the manner in which the operation develops. In short, it will be necessary to develop sets of alternative plans, to evaluate them in context with the actual situation, and to select the best options to achieve the C3CM objectives.

Integration of C3CM With Other Warfare Plans. C3CM is not an end, but a means to mold a battle situation to place one's own forces in the most advantageous position to carry out its mission by *dislocation*. It is a means to reduce enemy force efficiency and to enhance one's own, thereby making the enemy susceptible to *exploitation*. Both these means may be achieved with the support of C3CM actions that prohibit the enemy from maintaining effective control over his forces.

Explicit here is the recognition that both dislocation and exploitation center on the positioning or the use of destructive forces. C3CM must be integrated with the other warfares. Integration is possible only by the selection of C3CM objectives that are common with or complement the other

warfare objectives that are basic to battle group operations. Once a proper set of objectives is clearly defined for each warfare area, appropriate plans can be developed in conjunction with one another to achieve a compatability among warfare tasks. It is only through focusing on common objectives that C3CM can be integrated with other warfare activities.

The Proper Balance Between Centralized and Decentralized Control

The ability to effectively plan and implement C3CM operations is strongly dependent upon the efficient collection and interpretation of tactical intelligence. The C3CM decision-maker responsible for planning and supervising overall C3CM operations should be in a position to observe the broad range of battle group and hostile activities.

Centralized planning functions include:

- Assessing the battle group situation.
- Selecting appropriate C3CM objectives to support the battle group mission.
- Developing plan options for the use of dispersed assets to achieve C3CM objectives.
- Insuring the integration of C3CM plans with other warfare plans.
- Promulgating plans.

Centralized supervision functions include:

- Assuring that force wide readiness posture is attained.
- Assessing the evolving situation.
- Selecting options from alternative plans and initiating actions.
- Coordinating C3CM actions with other warfare activities.
- Assessing effectiveness of C3CM actions.
- Modifying plans appropriate to the battle group situation.
- Providing tactical information to those executing C3CM actions.

Because of the dynamic nature of war, the pressure of unfolding operations limits the time that is available for leadership to fully exploit information sources. An appropriate distribution of authority for the employment of C3CM at a battle group level would be a mix of centralized planning and overall supervision, and decentralized execution. The informed decision maker at the scene of action is in the best position to judge the most appropriate means to achieve his assignment.

Decentralized execution requires that planned actions be clearly described and related to objectives. The overall results that the C3CM objectives are meant to accomplish as well as the tactics involved should be clearly described in a manner so that all participating decision makers are able to analyze their particular situation, weigh available assets, and direct their employment to support the commander's concept of operations.

Strategy as a Comprehensive Means of Assessment and Control

The prudent tactical commander dealing with the C3CM problem would make an estimate of the situation, determine appropriate C3CM objectives, and develop plans for the achievement of those objectives. Unfortunately, two fundamental problems complicate the smooth execution of even the best plans. First, C3CM is directed at an enemy that reacts and these reactions are not always predictable. Therefore, normal conditions will require that objectives be altered during the course of an engagement both in content and in relative priority. Second, it must always be assumed that the "fog of war" will set in and that breakdowns will occur between planning and execution. These breakdowns occur because of unanticipated enemy actions, faulty or conflicting information, poor coordination among activities, improper timing, etc.

An essential quality of an effective commander charged with execution of C3CM is the ability to assess the development of the situation and to make proper modifications to the plan that are fully consistent with the chosen strategy. It is a simpler task to develop a sound strategy and operation plan than it is to execute one, while at the same time being faithful to the strategy upon which the plan is based. The first requires a talented staff and proper intelligence. The second requires that which Clausewitz refers to as military genius—"a highly developed mental aptitude that provides a sense of unity and a power of judgment . . . which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities which an ordinary mind would labor to identify and wear itself out in doing so."[4]

The purpose here is to provide a theoretical framework that will minimize the need for "military genius" by the commander charged with the execution of C3CM. The concept is based upon the recognition of the need for several distinct levels of assessment, and upon the use of selected strategy to provide the standards against which performance is measured.

Figure 2 provides a graphic means to illustrate the relationship between planning and control. A strategy is developed by the selection of C3CM objectives and understanding their relative importance to the battle group mission (establishes priorities). General plans are then developed that define the means by which each C3CM objective is to be pursued. These plans set forth support functions, coordination, and timing necessary for success. The plan is then committed to action and the monitor or supervision of the planned action phase begins.

Operations Assessment and Control. While planning and commitment is a top-down process, assessment and control may be viewed as a bottom-up process. The right side of the figure shows three levels. The lowest level requires estimating the performance of individual tactics and tasks. This could be



Figure 2. Planning and Control

conducted at the battle group staff level but most likely would be the responsibility of those performing the functions. These include jamming, deception, operations security, destruction, intelligence gathering, surveillance and all positioning, coordination, preparation, and other actions required for the execution of individual or joint tactics. Performance monitoring includes all those activities required to estimate the degree of success of individual or joint tactics in achieving operational goals. This provides the first level of feedback. Command must decide if the tactic or task is being or was performed satisfactorily or if not, should the assignment be modified by tailoring the tactic or committing additional assets.

Failure to achieve tactical goals will require corrective action by the decision maker. If the tactical goal was an end in itself, which it rarely is, the decision would be simplified. But for the tactical decision maker to bring the situation into perspective, he must consider the relative importance of each tactic at a higher level, that is, with respect to the C3CM objective that the individual tactic supports. Only by estimating the degree of success that the tactic contributes to this higher goal can one gain the vision necessary to make decisions at the tactics level. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the C3CM decision maker not only to monitor the performance of individual tactics and tasks but to consistently evaluate the impact of an aggregate of actions toward the achievement of the higher level C3CM objectives. Generally this will require not only estimating the success contributed by the assets he controls, but also appraising the conditions of other warfare activities upon integration

of efforts and areas of mutual support. This is the second level of assessment and the proper use of objectives. This assessment provides the second level of feedback for the modification of plans according to an estimate of the most effective means to achieve the objectives.

At the battle group level the C3CM decision maker must frequently assess the validity of the strategy that was selected for the operation. He must consider the degree of achievement of the individual objectives and the cumulative effect on the battle group mission. He must reassess those factors that led him to the initial choice of particular C3CM objectives. Again he must balance his estimates of the probability of achieving each objective, the demand on resources, the impact on the battle group mission for achieving each objective, and the aggregate effect of achieving multiple objectives. Modifications in C3CM objectives and their relative priorities must then be reflected in changing plans and their execution.

The C3CM decision maker must always keep the battle group mission and other supporting warfare activities in mind when modifying objectives and adapting plans to circumstances. There are many ways to gain objectives but all actions should support the battle group mission in concert with other supporting warfare activities.

In summary, C3CM is a military strategy aimed at the disruption of enemy warfare operations by preventing the enemy from maintaining effective control over his forces. The cumulative effects of C3CM actions, although individually directed at thwarting the enemy's actions, can best be understood in relation to their disruptive effects on the enemy's tactical objectives. A C3CM strategy is expressed by a small number of C3CM objectives selected to oppose these hostile tactical objectives. This selection of C3CM objectives and the supporting plan of action should be based on an application of knowledge of the enemy's principles of operations and an appraisal of the tactical environment. C3CM operations should be conducted under a single plan integrated with other warfare activities. Finally, operational C3CM strategy should serve as a comprehensive means for the application of resources and must provide a frame of reference for operational assessment and control.

Notes

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Alliance Navies and the Threat in the Northern Waters

Commander Hans Garde, Royal Danish Navy

The northern European waters are an area of strategic change and innovation where the maritime security of the Western Alliance has long been recognized to be of decisive importance in any confrontation between East and West. During the Second World War, the Soviet Navy was pushed back on both northern maritime avenues. In the Baltic, it was tied up and destroyed in Leningrad where the sailors participated in its defense as infantry. In the far north, the convoys to Murmansk, which supplied the Soviet Union with 15 percent of the material necessary for the land battle, were run by the Western Allies alone.

As a victor of the war the Soviet Union extended its control over the Baltic coastlines from a mere 75 nautical miles in 1939 to more than 1,000 miles. Capitalizing on this, the Soviet Union has developed air and naval bases—including more than 50 percent of the Soviet shipbuilding capacity—training facilities and a balanced Baltic fleet capable of asserting sea control over what has today become a Soviet Mediterranean.

The Soviet Central Front forces are dependent upon the lines of communication from the industrial parts of the Soviet Union through Poland and across the Baltic to central Europe. The largest nonaviation warship built in any country since the Second World War, the *Kirov* was constructed and made operational in the Baltic before she left there in 1980. A year later, the Soviet antisubmarine carrier *Kiev* entered the Baltic in order to participate with more than 100 other ships, many aircraft, and troops from more than eight divisions in exercise Zapad 81, which reportedly tested new tactical concepts for amphibious operations.

Besides its value as a line of communication to the forward deployed troops in central Europe, the Baltic is important as the main base area for construction and training. The Soviet Union has developed land, air, and naval forces which, by themselves or in cooperation with the allies in the Warsaw Pact, have the mission to ensure Soviet sea control in the Baltic.

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

They far outnumber the only Nato forces in the area, those of Denmark and Germany, which are tailored to maintain sea control in the Baltic Approaches and, marginally, to exert sea denial in the Baltic proper.

At the northern approaches to the Barents Sea a similar development has taken place. The Soviet Northern Fleet has, since its creation in 1933, grown to become the most important among the four Soviet fleets. Behind this development was the clear recognition of the submarine's capacity to interdict the transatlantic sea lanes of communication.

At the beginning of the Second World War the Soviet submarine force was the largest in the world. The Soviets had a fleet of 165 submarines, compared to 57 in the German Navy, and 95 in the US Navy.[1] However, the value of the Russian submarine force in World War II did not compare with either the German or the American forces. But the Soviets learned their history well, particularly the lessons of Admiral Doenitz. Since the Second World War, the submarine has been the most important warship in the Soviet Navy. Its continuing role has been interdiction of the transatlantic sea lanes of communication, the glue of the Atlantic Alliance, and countering of Western forces for projection of power ashore. A more recent mission is as second strike strategic force.

"Truly, the Soviet Navy has been used for political purposes. Without firing a shot in anger, it has promoted an image of being capable of interposing itself between the United States and its northern allies."

The Soviets learned not only from German success but also from their mistakes. Admiral Gorshkov has repeatedly emphasized the importance of cooperation between submarines and other forces, primarily attack aircraft and sea control forces in defense of the base areas. The ice-free Kola Peninsula provides the Soviet Union with its best, although somewhat geographically restrained, access to the world's oceans. The Northern Fleet will form the bulk of the forces pitted against Nato strike force if war comes. Previously, the Nato force could operate from a position of strength. Now, however, the combined Soviet buildup and lack of a suitable Nato response have created doubt about the capacity of the Alliance to enter into the northern seas with reasonable assurance of gaining sea control of the Norwegian Sea, let alone the Barents or Baltic seas.

If sea control cannot be established in the Norwegian Sea, it follows that sea control will be in dispute in the North Sea. So, what has in fact happened in the Nordic area since the end of the Second World War? The correlation of forces, as the Soviets would say, has changed from the Alliance being able to assert sea control in all four Northern seas to a situation where it will be able to do so with less certainty and only after considerable time. Obviously, such

a change has political significance. Should the trend continue, the Soviet Navy will be able to create an impression of dominance in the north between the Nordic Nato members and their American allies.

Projection of Power Ashore

The military situation in the north may be characterized as follows:

- There has been a buildup of the Soviet Northern Fleet without a corresponding reduction in the Baltic Fleet.
- Primary Soviet naval forces tasks are to provide an assured second-strike capability, to counter Nato's sea-based nuclear strike forces, and to intercept allied naval forces and disrupt their sea lanes of communication across the Atlantic. These tasks would be made easier if the Soviets could gain control of the littoral around the Northeast Atlantic prior to or simultaneously with the outbreak of an armed conflict.
- Once hostilities start the increased Soviet naval and air capabilities in the area will make it more difficult to bring external reinforcements into the Nordic countries by ship and by air.

An added Soviet ability to threaten the Atlantic sea lanes would further aggravate the problem of getting timely reinforcements to the Nordic Nato countries in an emergency. A key assumption to a northern European strategy is an early reinforcement of the Nordic area. This is critical to the credibility of deterrence and to the stability in the region in general, and it is of decisive importance for the cohesion of the Alliance. As a result, Denmark, Norway and the United States have reached new agreements about rapid air reinforcements and prepositioning of heavy equipment.

Since its reorganization in the early 1960s, Soviet Naval Infantry has never been larger than ten percent of the US Marine Corps and its ability to project power ashore is limited in a global context. In a regional context, the situation is different, particularly in an attack without much warning. Along the shores of northern Europe, the Baltic Sea unites the Warsaw Pact countries, just as the Mediterranean does for the southern shores of Nato. In the Baltic area the Warsaw Pact has a Soviet naval infantry regiment, a Polish sea landing division, and elements of an East German motorized rifle division which are trained in amphibious warfare. These forces comprise more than 10,000 troops. The naval infantry units are extremely mobile; they are equipped with a considerable number of tanks; and they have the necessary combat support units to enable them to carry out independent operations during the initial phase of a major landing operation.

Particularly remarkable is the concentration in the Baltic of the Warsaw Pact's amphibious lift capability. The landing ships available in the area can simultaneously transport half of the forces with all their equipment—one third of the tonnage of the Polish Navy is made up by amphibious ships. But

Naval Infantry is only the spearhead. Follow-up forces will normally be army units using merchant ships and the Pact has sufficient lift capacity in the Baltic Sea to lift several motorized rifle divisions.

In the Barents Sea, the situation is similar except that the Soviet Union has no allied support. For operations along the Norwegian coast and in the Baltic, the introduction of roll-on/roll-off ships within the past few years has enhanced the amphibious lift capacity available for an attack into the northern area. Spearheaded by amphibious forces, protected by sea control forces, and supported by several hundred shore-based aircraft, the Soviet Union has a modern versatile air-ground-sea capability for the seizure of northern areas essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign in the Atlantic. Therefore, the Soviet Union has not only pushed its defense zones outward, it has also built up forces to project power ashore within the expanded Soviet defense zones.

While the Soviets have made progress, the Alliance forces have been on a different tack. Since the late 1960s there has been a considerable reduction of the number of ships and aircraft in the allied navies and air forces. New building has not kept up with retirement of older ships and aircraft. Furthermore, the diversion of US projection power to areas outside the Nato treaty area have tended to promote impressions of increased Soviet capabilities to project power into the Nordic area and relatively decreased US capabilities to reinforce and resupply the northern countries beyond the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. In other words, the Alliance's conventional deterrence has lost some of its credibility.

Deterrence

Alliance nuclear deterrence has also lost some credibility with the American acceptance of nuclear parity in order to stop, or at least control, the nuclear arms race. Developments in this field have brought and kept the Nordic area in the middle of East-West strategic issues. Soviet exercises and deployment patterns support the importance that the Soviets attach to the ballistic missile submarine. It is the capital ship in the Soviet Union and there exists a related emphasis by the remaining forces to act in defense of the base and operating areas for the ballistic missile submarines. The introduction of the ballistic missile submarine caused four developments in the Soviet Union.

First, it required that the Soviets direct considerable resources to antisubmarine warfare. To overcome a technological gap and defend against Western ballistic submarines, the Soviets launched a large antisubmarine warfare program.

Second, the Soviets deploy these units forward into the operating zones of Western ballistic submarines to supplement the defense of the inner Soviet

base areas. These zones became known as the outer and inner defense zones, and from the beginning they coincided roughly with the Norwegian and Barents seas.

Third, the Soviets have worked to increase the range of their ballistic missiles. Ranges in excess of 4,000 nautical miles allow the newest classes of Soviet ballistic missile submarines to remain in the north, in the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula. They need no longer pass into the Atlantic as they can fire their missiles against targets in the United States and Europe from the inner defense zone of the Barents Sea. Consequently, it appears that the Soviets intend to keep many if not most of their ballistic submarines north, to provide them with direct protection, and to devote a significant proportion of their general purpose forces to that task.[2] This means that Western antisubmarine assets, i.e., primarily attack submarines have "to penetrate deeply into hostile seas to conduct sustained independent operations" as Vice Admiral Nils Thunman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare says.[3]

Fourth, since 1976, the Soviet Union has begun to deploy older ballistic missile submarines in the inner defense zone of the Baltic Sea. This development has caused particular concern in the Nordic countries where it is seen as an obstruction to the idea of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the Nordic area—an idea first put forward in 1958 with a Soviet proposal to Denmark and Norway. In 1963, the Finnish President Kekkonen made his first proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone consisting of the Nordic countries. Again in May 1978, Finland proposed the Kekkonen Plan in an effort to preserve the Nordic countries as an area of low tension.

In Finland the Kekkonen Plan enjoys wide backing and, consequently, the accelerating debate in the other Nordic countries was followed with interest from Helsinki. But the other Nordic governments have expressed great reluctance since a nuclear free zone would be highly favorable to the Soviet Union. In essence it would transform northern Europe into a shield for the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts, including the Kola Peninsula—a fact recognized by the Soviet Union.[4] While the Soviets pursue a policy aimed at establishing a Nordic nuclear free zone,[5] they simultaneously seek to turn their inner defense zones on both the northern and northeastern maritime avenues into sanctuaries or bastions for their ballistic missile submarines. Thus, Soviet ballistic submarine deployments require US attack submarines to patrol in the waters of the northern seas and US antisubmarine warfare aircraft to operate above them.

Presence

Governments employ naval forces in conjunction with other instruments of diplomacy in order to demonstrate an intent, to support political initiatives, or to deter action considered inimical to their own national interests. The

heavy burden on American defense resources has tended to give the Northern Flank of Nato a low priority for deployed US naval presence compared with such other areas as the Southern Flank, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean. In these areas, the United States is maintaining a naval presence with preventive deployments. This enables the Western world to show a presence in peacetime, which when measured in figures, such as ship days out-of-area, can be compared with corresponding figures for the Soviet Navy. While such figures are relative and do not necessarily illustrate combat strength in a given area, they tend to be used—and perhaps manipulated—in each country's interpretation of the credibility of an ally or the intentions of an opponent.* In the period 1965-79 in the Atlantic, for instance, the number of ship days out-of-area showed a Soviet increase by a factor of 12 from 1,100 to 13,500 while the US decreased from 36,200 to 10,080. On the other hand, the Soviet figures have been relatively constant since the forward deployment was completed in the early 1970s, while the US figures show an increasing trend over the same period.[6]

In the Northeast Atlantic, the United States has for many years relied on a minimal naval presence in the form of reactive deployments. Given fleet disposition, the US Navy might only be able to respond with surface ships to a crisis in the area after considerable transit time from the normal operating areas of the Second Fleet. General stability in the Nordic area, traditional command relationship within the Alliance, and allied presence in the north have caused successive US governments to rely on a reactive deployment of forces into the area, should need arise. When viewing the relative changes that have taken place in the sizes of the US and Soviet fleets, it would seem prudent that an increased presence, although not necessarily a permanent presence, would have a stabilizing and deterrent effect. Forward deployments give an unmistakable credibility as well as increased capability to the participation of the United States in the defense of allied territory.

The Soviets have managed to create the impression that they have a global navy. We in the Western world have often helped them by exaggerating the Soviet global naval capability. However, in the northern waters the Soviet naval capability is more formidable than elsewhere, partly because of the proximity to the base areas and partly because the Western naval presence is neither extensive nor persistent.

Before 1960 Soviet naval activity was limited to local exercises in the vicinity of the base areas and a few ships were interchanged between the Northern and the Baltic fleets. Gradually, the pattern has been extended. First exercises had Soviet ships covering the Baltic and the Barents seas. Then units were regularly used for deployments to the Mediterranean and beyond

*For a discussion on the political implications of naval presence, see Thomas H. Etzold, "The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1984, pp. 4-22.

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while exercises gradually increased in frequency and area coverage to include the North Sea, the Danish Straits and the entire Norwegian Sea. It is through such activities that the Soviet Union has managed to give an impression of dominance in the area, the perception of a legitimate forward defense area down to the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, and raise the doubts within the Western Alliance of its capability to contest Soviet control beyond the gap. Truly, the Soviet Navy has been used for political purposes. Without firing a shot in anger it has promoted an image of being capable of interposing itself between the United States and its northern allies.

In peacetime the perceived Soviet naval strength could be used to try to exert political pressure on the littoral states. The political shadow of regional military superiority could represent, for the time being, a greater challenge to the countries of the Northern Flank and to the Alliance than the more distant danger of a shooting war with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union does increasingly flex its military muscles in the area, and it does so with increasing self-confidence. In late April and early May 1983, the Norwegians hunted a submarine in their internal territorial waters in the Bergen area. That was one of the major hunts. According to Norwegian statistics, it has had 122 certain, probable or possible submarine incursions reported from 1969 up to and including 1982.[7] In 1981, when a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine went aground in a military area well inside Swedish territorial waters, it was demonstrated that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to operate its submarines on neutral territory. With a reference to Nazi Germany, the Social-Democratic Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs characterized the intrusion as an act of the mentality of a master race.

But this was hardly the last Soviet submarine violation. In October 1982, four submarines were involved in the incident in the Swedish Haersfjorden, where two submarines simultaneously operated in the central archipelago of the capital Stockholm. The bipartisan Swedish Submarine Defense Commission concluded in its report in April 1983 that the number of submarine violations had increased considerably in 1982; and based on an analysis of conceivable motives, "the commission saw fir to point out the probability of motives of a military operational character."[8] This is certainly not regarded as being in harmony with the efforts to maintain stability and promote détente in the Nordic area.

Since the founding of Nato in 1949, the Alliance's strategic requirements have remained remarkably consistent. They can be separated into several broad categories: the requirement to deter Sovier military initiative against Western Europe, and if not successful, to fight a large-scale war; and the requirement to guarantee sea lanes of communication between North America and Western Europe.[9] Since Nato's military strategy rests on the certainty of timely US reinforcements, that certainty in turn must depend on confidence in the ability to use the Atlantic seaways in crisis and in war.

Nato's political and military health is directly related to the level of confidence the leaders in Europe have concerning those supposed certainties.[10] And the value of increased US naval presence in the northern seas is to raise this level of confidence.

The Alliance has tried to take steps to improve the situation. All the littoral states have emphasized an increased presence. The German Navy has extended its area of operations into the Norwegian Sea—partly in response to the US requests of increased allied burden sharing within the treaty area of the Alliance, when the United States was covering outside contingencies. But no European allied effort can really substitute an American presence. The required message is a sustained US commitment, not a reduced one. The fear of escalation is most inhibiting for the Soviets, when faced with a US naval presence.

Fortunately, to an extent that has been the US response. Traditionally, the Second Fleet participates once a year in a major fleet exercise with US Marines reinforcing Denmark or Norway; and recently US naval units of frigate and destroyer size have commenced an annual exercise with the littoral Nato navies in the Baltic. It is such exercises and the deployment of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic into the Nordic area that support the Nordic Nato members and counterbalance the Soviet image of domination in the area. These forces have a very important symbolic and political value and, besides, they familiarize the US Navy with the special operating conditions in the area.

It is important to maintain a trend of increased US naval presence in the Nordic area. The need is not necessarily for a permanent presence as in the Mediterranean. It is more a question of being there and at getting accustomed to the environmental conditions in the north—where the Soviets operate and where the US Navy most likely will be called upon to reinforce and defend, together with the northern allies. US submarines have learned to operate in the high north. They are familiar with arctic operations. Increasingly the surface units are gaining similar experience. In 1983, a US destroyer visited Greenland for the first time in many years. Such a visit gives professional experience—all sailors know the importance of having been at a place before—and conveys the important political message of commitment. What is needed is presence of a character that gives reassurance of commitment to allies, that shows neutrals in the area that the Soviets need not dominate the Northern seas, and that the United States does not concede to any image of Soviet domination of the northern waters.

The Nordic area has been an area of strategic change and innovation concurrently with the developments in submarine and antisubmarine warfare. It is on this background, the Soviet Union has managed to create an impression of dominance in the north which has cast doubt on the ability of

Nato to get reinforcements to the general area. Simultaneously, the Soviets are working to turn the Nordic countries into a nuclear weapons free zone, as a shield for the Barents and Baltic bastions for Soviet ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet naval expansion into the northern seas has witnessed Soviet submarines intruding into sensitive and sovereign waters of the Nordic countries—neutrals as well as aligned—in a way hitherto unseen in peacetime. The United States has begun to increase its naval presence in the area. It is not a continuing presence, but one with a positive trend that signals US concern over developments. Further increases in the US naval presence would indicate to the Soviet Union that the United States is backing its northern allies and emphasizing its commitment to resupply and reinforce Europe, should the need arise. More than anything else, an increased US naval presence would counterbalance the impressions promoted by the Soviet Navy of dominance in the northern maritime avenues between the United States and its northern allies.

The world judges US priorities in part by where and how it deploys its forces in peacetime. In the Northeast Atlantic when considering the fundamental lessons from the Second World War, changing military technology, and the recent Soviet developments in submarine and antisubmarine warfare, the best US response to the regional Soviet preponderance and self-confidence is an increased visible presence of the growing US Navy.

Notes

1. Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1981), p. 3.
2. Robert G. Weinland, *War and Peace in the North* (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper 265, 1979), p. 7.
3. Orr Kelly, "Sub Duels Under Polar Ice: How Ready is U.S.?" *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 March 1984, p. 36.
4. Erling Bjoel, *Nordic Security* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 43.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Chief of Naval Operations, p. 16.
7. Speech by Rear Admiral Roy Breivik, Royal Norwegian Navy, as quoted in Carl Bildt, "Sweden and the Soviet Submarines," *Survival*, July/August 1983, p. 168.
8. Betaenkande av ubaatsskyddskommissionen, *Att moeta ubaatshotet* (Stockholm: Statens ofentlige utredninger, 1983:13, 1983), p. 80.
9. Thomas H. Etzold, *Defense or Delusion* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 199.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

Soviet Navy Reactions to the Falkland Islands Conflict

Lieutenant Commander Richard N. Papworth, US Navy

Since 1982 a number of articles concerning the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict have appeared in the naval press of the Soviet Union. One Soviet commentator has described the Falklands conflict as a local war in the South Atlantic. A few years ago, Soviet naval theorist Admiral Stalbo noted that the employment of naval forces in local wars "must be studied carefully as an important element of naval history which is capable of influencing contemporary naval art and the formation of individual provisions of the technical policy of developing a navy."[1] This statement suggests that analysis of Soviet reactions to conflicts such as that in the Falklands may provide clues concerning current Soviet views on maritime warfare and trends in the development of Soviet naval warfare capabilities.

Soviet reactions to the Falklands conflict also are important because in many ways the Soviet Navy's capabilities to project power at great distances from the Soviet Union are similar to the means which were available to the Royal Navy in its operation in the South Atlantic. The supporting aircraft carriers, HMS *Invincible* and HMS *Hermes*, were limited to Sea Harrier VSTOL aircraft since neither ship is equipped with catapults or arresting gear capable of supporting conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft. Thus, the British aircraft carriers are similar to the Soviet *Kiev*-class CVHGs and the Sea Harrier is somewhat similar to the Soviet Forger VTOL aircraft which operates from the *Kiev* class. Also, the primary antiship weapon of the Royal Navy is the missile, while the premier capital ship in that navy is the submarine. Both of these points are applicable to the Soviet Navy. There also are similarities in the antiair warfare capabilities of the British and Soviet navies in that each lacks airborne early warning capabilities, and each is highly dependent upon surface-to-air missiles and guns for air defense of its surface ships.[2] Finally, as regards amphibious warfare, each country has a

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small, elite force of marines (British) or naval infantry (Soviet) with a mission of seizing and holding an initial beachhead until they can be reinforced by army troops.

It should be noted from the outset that the Soviet military press, specifically *Morskoy Sbornik* (*Naval Digest*) in which most of the articles quoted in this paper appeared, is quite different from the US military press. Articles in the Soviet military press are written primarily by military "scientists." Moreover, they are very much in line with official thinking, and usually are not used to float straw men or to express the personal viewpoint of the author as often occurs in the US military press. Thus, it is highly likely that the views expressed in the articles—quoted in this paper—are representative of the attitudes of the Soviet naval leadership regarding the Falklands conflict. It should be noted that all of the articles quoted in this paper were written by Soviet naval commentators. It is therefore uncertain whether the Soviet Navy's attitudes regarding the Falklands conflict are those of the Soviet military in general or whether the other Soviet military services hold views different from those of the Navy. In most instances, Soviet writers have ascribed the views expressed in their articles to the Western press or to "Western military specialists." It is the contention of the author that uncritical references to Western commentary by a Soviet military writer implies that the writer agrees with the Western views (in essence, is using the Western specialist as a surrogate). Therefore, in the interest of brevity, most of the references to Western specialists will not be included in the quotations utilized in this paper.

Aviation in Naval Warfare

Reactions to the Falklands campaign suggest that the war is viewed by many Soviet commentators as confirming the need for air support in order to conduct successful uaval operations. Rear Admiral I.F. Uskov[3] states, "the conflict showed with full clarity . . . that under modern conditions no ship formation (including an amphibious assault formation) is capable of effectively carrying out assigned missions without reliable air cover."[4] Another article states that the conflict "showed with full clarity" the growing role of aircraft in combat at sea. It further notes, "The necessity of winning supremacy in the air and maintaining it for a prolonged time both on an operational as well as a tactical scale remained a problem which had to be solved before one could count on the success of combat actions."[5] Admiral I.M. Kapitanets (Commander in Chief Baltic Fleet) later paraphrased these comments, stating that " . . . there is a continuing increase in the role of aircraft in combat actions at sea. Without winning and holding air supremacy on an operational and tactical scale, it is impossible to count on success of an action or an operation as a whole."[6]

Soviet naval commentators concede that air support for naval forces does not necessarily have to be provided by sea-based aviation. One article states that the Falklands conflict confirmed the importance of strikes against naval targets by land-based aircraft. It also argues that the conflict demonstrated the need for aircrews to be trained for such operations, and points out that the large number of Argentine aircraft losses during the conflict were at least partially due to the "low level of training of pilots of the naval air force to carry out combined-arms missions, and of Air Force pilots to carry out strikes against ships."[7] Admiral Kapitanets adds further weight to the arguments regarding the role of land-based aircraft in naval combat by stating, "[T]he conflict confirms one other essential factor of naval warfare—the need for preparing land-based aviation for interaction with combatants and with deck-based multimission flying craft, as well as for independent actions against enemy combatants at sea and in bases."[8]

Soviet statements about the importance of land-based air support for naval operations apply primarily to the Argentine side of the Falklands conflict, since the Soviets recognize that British land-based aviation played a less significant role in determining the outcome of the conflict than did British sea-based aircraft. In fact, one article notes, "The basic tasks were carried out by the English side by the forces of carrier-based aviation. Its effective use had a significant influence on the nature and specific results of the military operations."[9] Other commentators also stressed the importance of the British aircraft carriers. Rear Admiral Uskov states that the British "aircraft carrier force served as the main combat might and on the whole gave the formation combat stability."[10] He also notes that the British amphibious landing operations would have been impossible without the necessary aviation complement having been embarked with the fleet. Another Soviet commentator notes that the use of "aircraft carriers in an offensive operation at a great distance from the parent state increases the combat stability of the entire complex of the invasion forces."[11]

Even in references to Argentine combat operations Soviet writers make reference to the importance of aircraft carriers. Two commentators note that in operations against British forces around the Falklands, the Argentines were forced to operate heavily loaded attack aircraft at their maximum range, thus limiting the amount of time they could spend in the target area as well as the type of tactics which they could employ. One of these commentators specifically states that many of the Argentine aircraft losses which were caused by these limitations probably would not have occurred if the Argentines had been able to use aircraft carriers to increase the combat radius of their aircraft.[12]

As mentioned, the British Sea Harrier VSTOL aircraft is somewhat similar to the Soviet Forger VTOL aircraft, and one Soviet article noted that although "[v]ertical take-off aircraft showed relatively high tactical qualities"

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during the conflict, there is "no basis for overestimating their combat capabilities."[13] This article criticizes the capability of current VSTOL aircraft to detect and intercept long-range and/or low-altitude targets, and states that during the Falklands conflict the Sea Harrier confirmed its effectiveness only in the close-in air defense zone against heavily loaded attack aircraft. Moreover, the article notes that the British "did not achieve supremacy in the air."[14] Rear Admiral Uskov mentions another limitation of current VSTOL aircraft, noting that partly because "the intercept limits of the VTOL Sea Harriers coincided with the limits at which enemy aircraft could employ their missiles against surface ships," the British aircraft carrier groups were forced to operate well to the east of the Falklands "at the limit of the range of land-based airplanes."[15] Other Soviet writers picked up on this idea. One pointed out that ". . . it is necessary to insure air supremacy and possess a long range PVO [air defense force] system for [the protection of surface ships] from anti-ship and air-to-surface missiles."[16] Another said, "Deck-based aircraft performing air defense missions should have a greater range of action in comparison with the Sea Harrier . . . ."[17]

Soviet naval commentators did make some positive comments regarding VSTOL aircraft. One commentator extolled, "The Sea Harrier and Harrier gave a good account of themselves in the combat actions. They had a higher maneuverability than the Argentine Skyhawks and had advantages in speed and weaponry."[18] Another writer commented further on the maneuverability and weaponry advantages which the British aircraft possessed: ". . . for the first time in close aerial combat, English pilots made broad use of thrust vectoring in forward flight . . . . Because the Argentine aircraft were armed with obsolete Sidewinder AIM-9B missiles . . . the pilots had to approach the Sea Harriers from the rear and fire from there. But as soon as the English detected a Mirage or a launched missile behind them, they immediately reversed the force of the engines' thrust by turning the stream of their exhaust gases. The VTOL aircraft would brake sharply, significantly changing its angular position in space. The enemy plane or missile would dart by and now the Harrier would be in an advantageous position for an attack.[19]

Although this statement points out a potential maneuverability advantage of advanced VSTOL aircraft, it should be noted that the Forger does not possess a vectoring in forward flight capability such as that described above. In fact, at least in the area of air defense, the Soviet Navy's only aircraft carrier-based, fixed-wing aircraft seems to have all of the disadvantages of VSTOL aircraft noted in Soviet commentary on the Falklands conflict and few, if any, of the advantages which Soviet commentators ascribe to the Harrier.

Soviet statements regarding the use of VSTOL aircraft during the air battle around the Falklands imply that at least some Soviet naval officers realize that the combat capabilities of aircraft such as the Forger are limited and; further, in order to achieve air supremacy at sea in areas where land-based air support is infeasible, the deployment of more capable aircraft at sea is necessary. Lending further credence to this supposition, one article notes that the British fleet was deficient because of its lack of aircraft capable of conducting electronic warfare as well as its lack of long-range supersonic fighter-interceptors.[20] Moreover, many Soviet naval commentators noted that the lack of airborne early warning aircraft aboard the British aircraft carriers caused considerable losses to British surface ships, since many Argentine air raids were not detected in sufficient time for the British to take effective countermeasures.

Soviet reactions to the air war around the Falkland Islands suggest a certain amount of satisfaction with their current capabilities for conducting air warfare at sea, but also indicate that the Soviets realize that these capabilities remain limited in certain arenas (specifically, outside the combat radius of land-based aircraft) and that further improvements are necessary. References to the utility of land-based aircraft against naval targets indicate that the Soviets feel that their long-standing stress on the use of land-based naval aviation strike aircraft against Western naval units approaching the Soviet Union has been further justified by the Falklands conflict. On the other hand, Soviet statements suggest that they realize the Falklands conflict demonstrates the severe limitations of Soviet sea-based aviation. Their emphasis on the need for air superiority combined with the statement that the British Sea Harriers were unable to achieve such superiority suggest that at least some commentators believe current VSTOL aircraft would be unable to accomplish this mission against any determined opposition. This indicates that the Soviets recognize the need to develop a vastly improved VSTOL aircraft to operate from *Kiev*-class units. The need for this type of aircraft probably was recognized prior to the Falklands conflict, but the conflict more than likely confirmed it and may have added urgency to any program for the development of an improved Forger or follow-on aircraft.

Of even greater significance are Soviet statements which imply that the Falklands conflict demonstrated the need for aircraft carriers capable of conducting CTOL aircraft operations. The statement that the British force was deficient because it lacked long-range supersonic fighter-interceptors seems particularly significant in that it is unlikely that a VSTOL aircraft with such capabilities will be developed in the near future. To a lesser extent, the same could be said of the prospects for developing VSTOL aircraft with significant airborne early warning or electronic warfare capabilities, although limited capabilities in these areas can be incorporated

into helicopters. Overall, by pointing out the aviation capabilities which were lacking in the British task force, Soviet naval writers appear to be using the Falklands conflict as a further justification for the development of a CTOL aircraft carrier, particularly for use in areas where land-based aircraft operations would be limited or impossible.

Naval Surface Forces/Air Defense of Naval Forces

Soviet commentary on the Falklands conflict implies that they believe naval surface forces remain a very important aspect of a nation's overall military capabilities. While not questioning the continued viability of naval surface forces, Soviet commentators do point out that the defensive features of such vessels must be enhanced. Admiral Uskov notes, "In combat actions at sea and in the seizure of the Malvinas Islands as a whole, the main role was allotted to surface ships. Only because of them did the British accomplish their assigned missions." In the conclusions to his article, Uskov again highlights this theme, ". . . [A]ll the basic missions in blockading and seizing the Malvinas Islands were carried out by the British by means of surface ships. This . . . with full clarity confirms the growth of their role in conflict at sea." Of particular importance from a power projection perspective, Uskov notes that the conflict confirmed, ". . . [W]ithout the deployment of a major grouping of surface ships with the necessary complement of aircraft, it is impossible to carry out an amphibious assault landing operation." Thus, Admiral Uskov obviously believes that surface ships remain a valuable asset.[21]

Despite Admiral Uskov's positive statements, several Soviet commentators note that the experience of the Royal Navy demonstrated a potential major deficiency with naval surface forces under modern combat conditions. Admiral Kapitanets states, ". . . [E]ven so-called general-purpose combatants demonstrated a relatively low tactical stability under pressure from air attack means, especially cruise missiles with a low flight trajectory."[22] Overall, with the exception of the Sea Wolf surface-to-air missile system and the positive characteristics attributed to the Harrier, Soviet naval writers seem to be unimpressed with the air defense capabilities of the British task force. Rear Admiral Uskov notes, "The British . . . underestimated the threat from the air; their ships turned out to be insufficiently prepared to repulse antiship missiles."[23] Another writer noted that the main reason for the naval losses suffered by the British around the Falklands was "the insufficient reliability of the air defenses of the expeditionary forces sent there."[24] Finally, Admiral Kapitanets remarked "Anti-aircraft missiles (except for the Sea Wolf) and gunnery means for 'last ditch' self defense against antiship missiles proved ineffective."[25]

Several Soviet commentators point out that British forces lacked the capability to detect Argentine air raids in sufficient time to fully utilize the capabilities of the antiair warfare weapon systems with which the fleet was equipped. Although part of this shortcoming was attributed to the British fleet's lack of airborne early warning aircraft, the lack of shipborne radars capable of detecting low-flying aircraft and missiles also was often cited. Rear Admiral Uskov notes: "British destroyers and frigates, equipped with short-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems, turned out to be unable to repulse the strikes of air-to-surface antiship missiles at very low altitudes . . .. The operational capabilities of the ships' SAM systems were not fully realized because of the lack of long-range radar detection aircraft and modern radars for detecting air targets. Because of this, most detections turned out to be belated . . . ."[26]

Soviet writers state that these deficiencies forced the British to use insufficiently armed ships (i.e., not armed with Sea Wolf) as radar pickets without providing them with adequate air cover. One commentator points out: ". . . a weak spot in air defense organization was the fact that ships on radar picket were themselves vulnerable to air attacks. The fact that two out of four sunken destroyers and frigates were lost while they were performing picket duty is confirmation of this."[27]

These comments, a reference to HMS *Sheffield* and HMS *Coventry*,[28] are interesting in that they tend to rationalize the sinking of *Sheffield* by an antiship missile, implying that the ship would not have been lost if British early warning and air defense weapons capabilities had been sufficient. Thus, the implication is that *Sheffield* was sunk not because of any increased vulnerability of surface ships to antiship missiles, but because of insufficient early warning and weaponry. These comments also may be seen as a warning to the Soviet Navy that it must continue to develop and deploy improved early warning radar and air defense weapon systems for its surface ships.

In their discussions regarding antiair warfare, Soviet commentators also turn to an area which is of great importance in Soviet doctrine—electronic warfare. Admiral Kapitanets states: "It is noted that active and passive means of electronic countermeasures demonstrated high effectiveness in combating homing missiles. In the combat actions in the South Atlantic, electronic warfare acted not so much as a form of support as a form of combat actions directly interconnected with air defense."[29]

In the same vein, Rear Admiral Uskov notes: "The combat operations showed the high effectiveness of electronic warfare facilities in increasing the combat stability of surface ships and their anti-missile defense. In all cases when English ship captains promptly used passive jamming, the attacks of Argentine antiship missiles were unsuccessful, as a rule (sic)."[30]

Another article, which goes into great detail explaining the British use of electronic warfare during the Falklands conflict, notes that in several instances the British fleet was able to successfully utilize electronic warfare measures (primarily chaff) against Argentine Exocet antiship cruise missiles. This article also cites foreign evaluations of the sort of improvements that should be made in electronic warfare capabilities; all of these Western recommendations probably are also applicable to Soviet forces. The recommendations include increasing the sensitivity and precision of passive electronic equipment, particularly in order to increase the chance of detecting low-flying aircraft and missiles; increasing the power and spectrum of jamming transmitters; increasing the size and range capabilities of chaff dispensing equipment; and the development and improvement of aircraft electronic warfare capabilities. The article sums up these recommendations by noting: "It is considered necessary to create comprehensive countermeasures that would provide protection not only against radar homing heads, but also infrared and laser homing heads; to equip ships with automatic systems that provide rapid switching from one type of protection to another and placing chaff clouds in various directions relative to the central shipboard fire control radar; to increase the range of placement of chaff and the capacity of shells filled with passive radio reflectors so that each chaff cloud would cover the largest possible area and remain effective for a significant amount of time."[31]

Soviet commentary regarding antiair warfare also revealed the types of weapon systems which they believe would be effective in countering antiship missiles. One writer points out, " . . . under present-day conditions the mission of destroying antiship missiles with deck-level trajectories can only be carried out by fully automated air defense missile-gun systems with a high density of fire." He also comments that British sources believe that the Falklands conflict demonstrated the need for more effective long-range surface-to-air missiles.[32] Admiral Uskov concludes that "low-flying antiship missiles may be successfully combatted if ships are armed with short-range surface-to-air missile systems with minimal reaction times and automated anti-aircraft gun systems."[33] Finally, Admiral Kapitanets notes: " . . . under present day conditions, the mission of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense can be accomplished successfully only through the comprehensive employment of various means of electronic warfare and fully automated air defense, missile, and gun systems with a short 'reaction time' and high fire density."[34] All of these comments probably represent recommendations as to the type of antiair warfare systems which the Soviet Navy should be developing.

Admiral Kapitanets seems to sum up the Soviet view of the Falklands conflict in the area of air defense when he concludes his article by noting,

"Combat actions at sea confirmed the importance of . . . above all the problem of increasing [the] combat stability [of all types of ships] against the pressure of enemy air attack means."[35] Finally, Rear Admiral Uskov may be stating the principal lesson learned by the Soviets regarding antiair warfare from the Falklands conflict when he concludes his article by commenting: "In the estimation of Western specialists, a great threat for surface ships will be presented primarily by antiship missiles of the Harpoon, Exocet, and Gabriel types, which in turn move to the forefront the necessity of improving all elements of systems of antimissile defense."[36] Rear Admiral Uskov's use of a Western statement which refers exclusively to non-Soviet missiles seems to be a reminder to his colleagues in the Soviet Navy of the proliferation of highly capable antiship missiles in the West, and of the need to continue to take all possible measures to counter this growing threat to the Soviet fleet.

Finally in the area of naval surface forces, some Soviet commentators noted the damage control deficiencies of the British fleet. These views were best summed up in one article: "As a result of the combat actions it was established that series-produced warships of the British fleet possess poor survivability; this applies especially to resistance to explosion and fire. The outbreak of fires during missile or bomb hits in ships' machine rooms was promoted by the presence there of large amounts of easily inflammable fuels and lubricants. The flames spread rapidly through bulkheads along cables with polyvinylchloride insulation, and various foam materials aboard formed a toxic smoke mixture during combustion, which hampered extinguishing the fire. Some ships, for example *Ardent* and *Antelope*, had superstructures made of aluminum alloys which burned up completely. Frequently the fire reached magazines and other places for storing ammunition, which led to the explosion of a ship that was still capable of staying afloat."[37]

Many of these damage control deficiencies, with the exception of aluminum superstructures, also may exist on Soviet ships, and it is possible that Soviet commentators cite them in order to increase the Soviet naval awareness of problems which need to be corrected (the Soviets have not emphasized damage control in the design and operation of their warships to the same extent as the US Navy).

Antiship Missiles

Despite the large amount of space they devote in their articles to describing measures to counter antiship missiles, Soviet commentators still express confidence in the utility of such weapons. Admiral Uskov notes, "On the whole, the high effectiveness of cruise missiles in destroying surface ships has been confirmed."[38] Another article notes that the conflict showed the growing role of guided missiles in battle at sea. Further, "The expediency of attacking heavily defended naval targets from low altitudes was

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confirmed."[39] Although aircraft are capable of utilizing such tactics (as was demonstrated by the Argentines during the conflict), sea-skimming cruise missiles are especially adept at fully employing this method of attack. Finally, a third article points out another potential benefit of the use of antiship missiles, that of economical lethality. This article notes that a $250 million *Sheffield* was sunk by a $200 thousand missile. Soviet comments regarding the continued utility of cruise missiles are not surprising in that such weapons are the centerpiece of their antiship strike capabilities. Nonetheless, their descriptions of antiship missile countermeasures may serve as a reminder to Soviet weapon designers that cruise missiles are vulnerable and that they must be continually refined to ensure that they will be capable of penetrating antiair defenses.

Amphibious Warfare

Soviet reactions to the amphibious warfare aspects of the Falklands conflict indicate that they believe the British campaign demonstrated the continued utility of amphibious operations in modern warfare. Rear Admiral Uskov notes: "[T]he conflict showed the increased significance of amphibious assault forces and the necessity for the Navy to have modern landing ships and vessels and assault-landing craft and to provide high-quality training of Army units and Marines for operations as part of amphibious assault forces. The combat actions of the English landing force determined the outcome of the conflict."[40] These statements may represent an effort to justify the continued allocation of resources to the procurement of amphibious warfare forces for the Soviet Navy.

Rear Admiral Uskov's statement regarding the training of Army units for amphibious landings suggests that he believes the Falklands conflict confirmed the effectiveness of an important aspect of Soviet amphibious warfare doctrine. This doctrine calls for the Soviet Naval Infantry to conduct the initial amphibious assault, followed by Soviet Army units which are trained in amphibious operations. Uskov apparently is implying that the Soviet Army should continue to train its forces in this role.

Also of interest, several commentators discuss the use of British helicopters, both during the actual amphibious assault and later in support of the ground forces fighting on East Falkland Island. One article notes, "The decisive [factor] in combat operations to take possession of the Falkland Islands turned out to be conducting the assault operation using a large number of helicopters,"[41] while another states, ". . . without the support of these helicopters, the combat operations ashore would not have been so successful and so promptly executed."[42] Other articles make similar points. During the past few years, MI-8/Hip troop-carrying helicopters with Soviet Naval Aviation markings have begun to be employed in Soviet amphibious assault

exercises. Nonetheless, the two *Ivan Rogov*-class LPDs, which can each carry four Ka-25/Hormone C (or equivalent) utility helicopters, are the only Soviet amphibious warfare ships with a helicopter hangar (although a few of the smaller *Polnocny*-class LSMs have helicopter platforms, but no hangar or support facilities).[43] Thus, complimentary Soviet statements regarding the British use of helicopters may be intended to highlight a Soviet need for improved naval helicopter assault capabilities, especially in support of amphibious operations at some distance from the Soviet Union where shore-based helicopter support may be unavailable.

Finally, Soviet commentators have made a number of interesting comments regarding the tactics employed by the British during their amphibious operations. Several of them noted the importance of surprise in the success of the British landing. Admiral Uskov states, "A decisive factor in the combat actions of the amphibious assault forces was the achievement of tactical surprise for a landing on an unequipped or weakly defended shore with a rapid build-up of reinforcements on the beachhead."[44] According to Soviet doctrine, surprise is one of the major principles of military art.

In its discussion on surprise, the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* also notes, "The conduct of feints and disinformation by the troops and other cover and deception measures have also acquired important meaning." In discussing the Falklands conflict, Soviet writers commented extensively on the British use of deception and diversion to achieve surprise during their amphibious landing. One article states that the British "achieved [surprise] by the carrying out of operational camouflage and deception measures."[45] Admiral Uskov states: ". . . the landing was preceded by intensive air and gunnery bombardment of the sectors of the decoy landings while no strikes were made against the area of the main landing. Therefore, the landing of the main force was a complete surprise to the Argentine garrison . . . ."[46] These comments also seem to imply that, while surprise is important in all facets of military art, naval planners should pay particular attention to the decisive nature of surprise in amphibious warfare and that amphibious forces should receive training which will enable them to achieve surprise. The latter point is supported by Uskov's comment that the British amphibious landing "confirms the necessity of preparing assault landing forces for operations under night conditions."[47]

Submarine Warfare

Soviet comments regarding submarine operations indicate that they believe the Falklands conflict confirmed most of their previously held views concerning submarine warfare. One commentator points out, "For the first time in the postwar history of local wars, nuclear submarines were involved to carry out combat missions."[48] Admiral Uskov notes: ". . . the conflict

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confirmed the high combat capabilities of nuclear submarines, whose use the British coordinated closely with the actions of surface ships. Nuclear powered submarines permitted England's Navy to successfully effect a sea blockade of the area west of the Malvinas . . . . In the estimation of Argentine specialists, the British nuclear submarines presented the main threat for their surface ships and submarines."[49]

These sentiments were closely echoed by Admiral Kapitanets who also notes that the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* on 2 May 1982 "subsequently left an imprint on the activity of the Argentine Navy's ships forces, which practically ceased combat sorties to sea beyond their territorial waters."[50] The comments regarding the capabilities of nuclear submarines are not surprising since the Soviets have long been proponents of the usefulness of submarines during wartime. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov has stated, ". . . in atomic-powered submarines are concentrated all the main factors characterizing the power of a navy" and that since World War II "[submarines] became the main combat power of the fleet." The comment about submarine operations being closely coordinated with surface ship operations is of greater interest, however, in that it is consistent with Admiral Gorshkov's view that submarines should be protected from opposition ASW forces. Gorshkov believes that the main reason for the defeat of German submarine forces in the Atlantic during World War II was that air and surface forces were not used to support them, specifically to attack Allied antisubmarine forces, and that in modern times "the possibility has appeared of achieving the close interaction in combat and operation of submarines and surface ships, which greatly enhances their combat effectiveness."[51] Admiral Uskov apparently is using the Falklands conflict to demonstrate that Admiral Gorshkov's beliefs are correct and have been confirmed.[52]

The Soviet writers also make several comments regarding antisubmarine warfare. The gist of the comments is that "[t]he [Argentine] Navy had poor ASW capabilities" in that it was "not ready to fight nuclear-powered submarines."[53] Admiral Kapitanets notes that British "ASW forces were capable of neutralizing submarines in the Argentine Navy" and that when the *Belgrano* was sunk by a British submarine, the cruiser "was proceeding without proper escort."[54] All of these statements seem to imply a certain confidence on the part of the Soviets that there is some attainable level of ASW capability which will neutralize the enemy's submarines. The British possessed an adequate level of ASW capability and were able to neutralize the Argentine submarine threat, while, by implication, if the *Belgrano* had had a "proper escort," it may not have been vulnerable to a British submarine. A Soviet belief that submarines may be neutralized seems contradictory to the vast amount of resources the Soviet Navy has devoted to submarines. It would also be inconsistent with the limited open-ocean ASW capabilities which the Soviets currently are estimated to possess.[55]

In one other interesting comment regarding antisubmarine warfare, Admiral Uskov notes: "The British were fully confident that their nuclear submarines could not be subjected to strikes by aircraft or surface ships because the Argentines lacked fixed sonar systems for detecting submarines and modern search equipment on the ships of the maneuvering forces."[56] Besides representing a further indictment of the ASW suites aboard Argentine ships, this comment suggests that the Soviets consider permanent acoustic arrays, such as SOSUS, to be a very important factor in acquiring the capability to detect and localize submarines with sufficient accuracy to conduct attacks. If so, it is suggestive of a possible Soviet intention to develop and deploy such a system.

Logistics Support

Soviet commentators made several statements regarding the level of logistics support received by both fleets during the Falklands conflict. One article states, "The material and technical support system that was created, although complex, all the same permitted the [British] Navy to operate effectively in a remote region (the ratio of 'combat ship to auxiliary vessel' was approximately 1:1)."[57] Several commentators pointed out the 1:1 ratio of combatants to auxiliaries in the British task force. Along the same lines, Admiral Uskov notes, "Enlisting the services of a large number of auxiliary vessels permitted the grouping of the English Navy to operate continuously in the area of the Malvinas Islands throughout the entire conflict."[58] These comments seem to imply a recognition of the fact that considerable logistic support is required to support fleet, particularly fleet combat, operations at extended distances from home ports. Such recognition seems dichotomous with the limited number of large logistics support ships currently existing in the Soviet Navy, as well as the Soviet Navy's limited underway replenishment capabilities. (As of early 1983, the Soviet Navy had only 11 ships of the *Berezina, Dubna*, and *Boris Chilikin* classes; these are the only classes of Soviet auxiliaries which can be described as modern (completed in the last ten years) specialized underway replenishment ships. The Soviet Navy has been slow in developing underway replenishment capabilities and techniques; it has almost exclusively concentrated on refueling. The movement of solid stores (including ammunition) between ships underway, and helicopter delivery techniques, have not been practiced to a great extent.)

Soviet writers also made several comments regarding the British use of civilian shipping during the conflict. For example, Admiral Uskov notes: "The actions taken by the British government bear a mobilization character . . . . [T]he British created mobile rear services which included practically all modern classes of ships of the Navy and civilian departments—tankers, dry cargo freighters, liners, ferries, container haulers and hospital ships . . . . The

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significance of the constant readiness to transfer vessels of civilian departments to Navy control was underlined."[59]

Soviet comments regarding the effectiveness of merchant shipping in supporting combat operations (and Admiral Uskov's sentiments were echoed by a number of other commentators) indicate that they believe the Falklands conflict vindicates Admiral Gorshkov's definition of seapower as encompassing more than just traditional combat ships. Specifically, Admiral Gorshkov states: "The merchant fleet is considered by many countries not only as an important means of economics but also an important reserve of the navy in the event of war . . . . [M]erchant ships are widely used for material and technical supply of fighting ships at sea . . . . [T]he merchant fleet must be regarded as a universal component of the sea power of a country which has a most important role in war and peacetime."[60]

The Soviets currently possess one of the few major merchant fleets which can perform either a peacetime commercial mission or satisfy military logistics requirements effectively and efficiently should a conflict arise. The merchant marine currently provides a significant amount of the logistics support required by the Soviet Navy.[61]

Soviet commentators also discussed several specific aspects of the use of the merchant fleet in the Falklands conflict. One article notes: "Modern passenger ships were first used to transfer a sizable contingent of forces over large distances, while the reequipped container ship *Atlantic Conveyor* was used to transport aircraft equipment (it took on board up to 20 Harriers, as well as helicopters)."[62]

While most nations have reduced their passenger-carrying fleets, the Soviets have continued to expand theirs and today have the largest passenger fleet in the world. The Soviet merchant fleet also includes about 125 container ships.[63] Thus, Soviet commentary on the Falklands conflict has pointed out two very important potential combat missions of the Soviet merchant fleet. Moreover, one article states that as a result of the Falklands conflict: "[I]t has been proposed that [in the building of the merchant and passenger ships] they strictly observe the demand of designing considering their possible reequipping in a brief period of time and use as military transports and support vessels . . . ."[64]

Soviet merchant ships are designed with military requirements in mind. Merchant and naval ships use standardized parts (which simplifies maintenance and supply problems); decks and ramps of merchant ships are strengthened to accommodate armored vehicles; protection against radiological, chemical, and biological hazards are designed into Soviet merchant ships; and communications systems compatible with those of the military are installed.[65] Overall, then, Soviet commentary seems to imply that the Falklands conflict has validated, under modern combat conditions, the Soviet view that the merchant fleet should serve as an important reserve

of the navy in the event of war. One article makes this point very clearly, "[I]t [is] advisable to have as part of the merchant fleet reserve supply vessels which in the event of necessity could also be used for Navy interests."[66]

Soviet commentary on the Falklands discussed one other area of interest relating to logistics support, that of forward bases. Admiral Kapitanets notes, "In the actions of forces and individual combatants of the fleet under present-day conditions there is great significance in their comprehensive support with the use of forward bases and the floating rear."[67] Another article states, "An important conclusion reached by American specialists is that without the creation of an intermediate base on Ascension Island, Great Britain 'could never have been victorious in the Falkland Operation.'"[68] These apparently positive comments regarding forward bases seem to be at variance with statements by Admiral Gorshkov: "The reports periodically appearing in the Western press on the presence of certain naval bases belonging to the USSR on the territories of countries friendly to us are patently defamatory . . . . It must be emphasized that the USSR, conducting a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, is not after such acquisitions."[69]

Despite Gorshkov's denials, however, the Soviet presence in Angola, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam indicates that forward basing has become very important to the Soviet Navy. In any case, Soviet commentary on the Falklands conflict implies that in order for a navy (especially one with the limited at-sea logistics capabilities of the Soviet Navy) to successfully conduct power projection operations at any distance from the homeland, it very likely is going to require intermediate or forward bases. At a minimum, the Soviet Navy seems to be justifying its current overseas bases; however, it also may be attempting to demonstrate the need for additional bases, especially in areas where such bases do not currently exist.

Correlation of Forces

Several Soviet commentators discuss the correlation of forces between the British and Argentine forces engaged in the Falklands conflict. Admiral Kapitanets states: ". . . the overall relative strength in the area as of the beginning of combat actions [was] approximately equal in combatants; 1:7 in aircraft and 1:1.5 in ground forces in favor of Argentina; 1.5:1 in antiship missile launchers and 7:1 in antiaircraft missiles aboard ship in favor of Great Britain."[70]

Rear Admiral Uskov notes, "The [British] formation possessed a number of advantages in comparison with the Argentine Navy." These included more modern ships, sufficient balance, the aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered

submarines, the newest weapons systems, modern ASW equipment, and "automated systems for control of forces." On the other hand, Uskov notes: "The Argentine Navy . . . possessed a number of advantages: the availability to shipboard aviation of . . . attack aircraft with operating ranges up to 1,200 km, which is approximately three times the radius of action of the Sea Harrier; the closeness of the combat area to the basing system of their forces; the relative simplicity of supplying navy forces and the troops on the Malvinas Islands both by sea and by air."[71]

Of greater interest than these purely quantitative comparisons, however, are the more qualitative explanations of Soviet commentators as to why the conflict developed as it did. Admiral Kapitanets states, "The actions by the Argentine Armed Forces . . . were of a limited nature, were planned with insufficient precision, and lacked initiative . . . ."[72] Another article notes: "The English forces' success was ensured by more modern weapons and military equipment, the high quality of the personnel's readiness . . ., and the retention of an operational initiative at all stages of military operations . . . . [T]he principal reason for Argentina's defeat in the conflict was its unpreparedness for war, the poor professional training of soldiers of all ranks . . . and the leadership's major political and military miscalculation. According to many indexes, the correlation of forces was in Argentina's favor, however, this advantage was not exploited because of a lack of resoluteness and clearness of purpose in troop command and control."[73]

The final sentence above suggests that even when several of the factors used in calculating the correlation of forces are in favor of a particular nation, victory for that nation is not guaranteed. Rather than demonstrating that the correlation of forces is insignificant, however, this statement seems to imply that the Falklands conflict demonstrated that an advantage in most of the factors which make up the correlation of forces can be overcome by a large disadvantage in the other factors.

Of particular importance along these lines is the fact that the Argentines' command and control capabilities were insufficient to allow them to exploit their correlation of forces advantage. In addition to the comment noted above, another article notes that the large losses suffered by Argentine forces was partly due to "the low level of organization of the command and control system."[74] Moreover, as noted above, Admiral Uskov points out that one of the advantages of the British task force was that it possessed "automated systems for control of forces." The Soviets place a great deal of emphasis on command and control. According to Admiral Gorshkov: "The importance of control has now grown so much that it determines not only the degree of effectiveness and the outcome of the activity of society but the very possibility of this activity. In armed struggle at sea this is clearly manifested."[75]

Soviet comments regarding Argentina's command and control deficiencies are consistent with Admiral Gorshkov's views, and indicate that such

deficiencies can lead to defeat even when other factors are favorable. Conversely, "automated" control systems, such as those possessed by the British, can assist a military force in overcoming other deficiencies.

Another interesting facet of the Soviet discussion of the correlation of forces is that of the seizure of the initiative. As noted above, one article notes that British success during the conflict was due largely to "the retention of an operational initiative at all stages of the military operations," while Admiral Kapitanets points out that the actions of the Argentine armed forces "lacked initiative." These comments are consistent with previously held Soviet views. According to Vice Admiral Stalbo: "One of the important characteristics of the Soviet theory of military and naval strategy is its recognition of the dominance of the offensive, aggressive principle in combat operations; and this is impossible to achieve without seizing and holding the initiative in battle and operations and in the strategic employment of the fleet."[76] Thus, Soviet commentators apparently have discovered yet another aspect of the Falklands conflict which they believe validates the Soviet view of naval warfare.

Overall, Soviet commentators seem to believe that the Falklands conflict confirmed many of the Soviet Union's previously held notions regarding naval warfare. These include the utility of land-based aircraft in conducting naval strikes, the continued utility of surface ships in modern warfare, the extreme importance of electronic warfare, the utility of antiship missiles, the continued importance of amphibious warfare capabilities, the utility of nuclear submarines, and the importance of possessing a merchant fleet capable of supporting combat operations. These commentators also seem to believe that several elements of Soviet warfighting doctrine were confirmed by the conflict, including the decisiveness of achieving surprise (which includes the use of deception), the requirement for extremely capable command and control systems, and the importance of seizing the initiative.

In addition, Soviet commentators also pointed out several aspects of the Falklands conflict which imply a need for improvement in Soviet naval warfare capabilities. These modifications, if implemented, would make the Soviet Navy more similar to the US fleet. Of greatest significance is the suggestion that the capabilities of VSTOL aviation are limited, and the implication that much-improved VSTOL or preferably CTOL sea-based aviation capabilities are required in order to achieve air superiority over naval forces operating outside the range of land-based aviation. Soviet commentaries on the conflict also seemed to highlight the limited number of large logistics support ships in the Soviet fleet with the implication that improvements in this area are necessary if credible power projection capabilities are to be developed. Moreover, the Soviet comments regarding the increased threat posed by Western antiship missiles seem to imply that further improvements in the antiair warfare capabilities of the Soviet fleet are required. Finally, comments concerning permanent acoustic arrays may imply a Soviet perception of a requirement to develop and deploy such systems.

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One Soviet commentator noted of the Falklands conflict that in terms of its scope, this conflict was the most significant military conflict at sea since the end of World War II. Admiral Kapitanets notes, "For the first time in the last 40 years military actions were characterized by the significant scope of employment of naval forces with accomplishment of the primary missions of war by fleet forces." Moreover, Kapitanets points out near the conclusion of his article: "Inasmuch as naval forces played the primary role in the conflict, foreign specialists in various areas of naval art are carefully studying the experience of employing the arms of naval forces and are drawing practical conclusions on an improvement in their organizational structure and in the effectiveness of weaponry."[77] It seems highly likely that the Soviet naval leadership also is closely studying the Falklands conflict, and will attempt to apply any lessons they may be able to learn from the war to their own force structure and doctrine.

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Notes

1. K.A. Stalbo, "Naval Forces in Local Wars," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 9, 1976 (NISC translation), p. 29.
2. More accurately, the British lacked airborne early warning capabilities during the Falklands conflict. Since that time, they have installed an airborne early warning radar on a few Sea King helicopters.
3. Uskov is the deputy to the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for Combat Training, and is on the editorial board of *Morskoy Sbornik*.
4. I. Uskov, "Lessons of the Anglo-Argentine Conflict and the Role of Surface Ships in Conflict at Sea," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 11, 1982 (NISC translation), p. 110.
5. Ye. Nikitin, "A Colonial Adventure in the South Atlantic," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 11, 14, p. 3 and 15, p. 5, January 1983 (English translation of 15 January portion: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1773 [JPRS 83625], 13 June 1983), p. 75.
6. I. Kapitanets, "The Navy's Role in the Anglo-Argentine Conflict," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 2, 1983 (NISC translation), p. 17.
7. B. Rodinov, Ye. Nikitin, and N. Novichkov, "Electronic Warfare in the South Atlantic," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 1, 1983 (NISC translation), p. 74.
8. Kapitanets, p. 15.
9. A. Usikov, "Certain Lessons and Conclusions from the Anglo-Argentine Military Conflict," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, No. 4, 1983, pp. 67-73 (English translation: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1783 [JPRS 83996], 28 July 1983), p. 46.
10. Uskov, p. 104.
11. Nikitin.
12. Rodinov, Nikitin, and Novichkov, p. 74.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Uskov, p. 108.
16. Nikitin.
17. The Soviet VTOL aireraft is optimistically credited with a 175-mile combat radius in an air defense role while the Sea Harrier has a combat radius of about 250 miles in a similar role. See Yu. Galkin, "Air Defense of British Expeditionary Forces (During the Anglo-Argentine Conflict)," *Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No. 3, 1983 (English translation: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1770 [JPRS 83591], 2 June 1983), p. 77.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

19. B. Rodinov and N. Novichkov, "The Tactics of Air Operations against Ships," *Morskoy Sbornik*, No. 12, 1983 (NISC translation), pp. 65-66.
20. Rodinov, Nikitin, and Novichkov, p. 74.
21. Uskov, pp. 103-113.
22. Kapitanets, p. 15.
23. Uskov, p. 111.
24. Galkin, p. 74.
25. Kapitanets, p. 14.
26. Uskov, p. 111.
27. Charles W. Koburger, *Sea Power in the Falklands* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 76.
28. *Sheffield* was on radar picket duty at the southwest corner of the British task force, which was operating southeast of the Falklands, when she was mortally damaged by an Exocet on 4 May 1982. *Coventry* and HMS *Broadsword* were on radar picket and "missile trap" (i.e., using the Sea Wolf point defense SAM system on *Broadsword* to cover the lack of capability against low-altitude targets of the Sea Dart SAMS on *Coventry*) duty north-northwest of the Falklands on 24 May 1982, when *Coventry* was sunk by three 1,000-pound bombs dropped by Argentine A-4s.
29. Kapitanets, p. 14.
30. Uskov, p. 112.
31. Rodinov, Nikitin, and Novichkov, p. 72.
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41. A. Aleksandrov and S. Grechin, "The Falklands: A Relapse of British Colonialism," *Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No. 10, 1982 (English translation: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report: Military Affairs*, No. 1739 [JPRS 82777], 1 February 1983), p. 15.
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The Naval Historical Center and the Naval Historical Foundation take pleasure in announcing the establishment of the United States Navy Prize in Naval History. This will be an annual award of $500 and a certificate to the author of the best article on United States naval history published in a scholarly journal. This prize will be first awarded on or about 1 October 1985 for an article published during the preceding year, ending 31 December 1984. Authors and journal editors are encouraged to submit copies of nominated articles for consideration prior to 1 June 1985 to the following address: Naval Historical Center (RE), Building 57, Washington, D.C. 20374-0571.

Secrets and Deception: Implications for the Military

Sissela Bok

The underlying theme of this essay is *distrust*. It is out of distrust of one another—often quite reasonable distrust—that nations arm against one another, and that they use deception and secrecy to protect themselves. In turn, such actions on the part of any one nation generate more distrust in the adversary, who then arms yet more, and considers further increases in secrecy and new forms of deception. I wish to examine the role of *secrecy* and of *deception* in increasing such distrust and in perpetuating the arms race. I shall deal with situations that require secrecy or deception, and others where such use is counterproductive from the point of view of genuine national security.

Whatever we may think about the possible causes of nuclear war, we must all agree that it is not in any nation's best interest to bring about such a war or even to run a high risk of it. We will probably also all agree that the risks of nuclear war, whether we regard them as high right now or not, are *too* high—that *any* risk of such a war is simply too high. Then why, if no one wants such a war, should it be so hard for nations to move jointly to reduce the present risks?

Pervasive distrust is one factor that undermines joint action at every step. It causes nations to arm themselves with more and more destructive weapons; it undermines negotiations; it creates suspicion of every conciliatory gesture. Between nuclear powers this mutual distrust is especially strong, and for very good reason, since each knows that the other can annihilate it. This distrust is also self-perpetuating; for it manages to create the very evidence which reinforces it. It promotes the construction of "worst-case scenarios" wherein each nation imagines the enemy's most ingenious and devastating schemes, and then prepares to be capable of retaliating with enough severity to deter anyone from putting such schemes into action.

"Worst-case scenarios" have a long history, though they have often gone under other names. In general, they form part of *any* prudent defense policy. It

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makes sense to calculate the worst possible outcomes in order to be able to meet them. It makes sense not to blind oneself to what an enemy may be planning. Why, then, are worst-case scenarios so threatening right now? Why do they make less and less sense in the nuclear age? I believe there are two reasons why they are especially dangerous now, so dangerous that they no longer serve the function of prudent defense planning that Clausewitz and others envisaged for them in the past.

First of all, modern conditions of warfare are such that there is now almost no limit to what one could imagine an adversary may be planning, were he willing to devote enough resources thereto. And second, since there is no real defense against many of today's weapons, worst-case scenarios call for ever grimmer plans for retaliatory or preventive offensive war.

We have to make some imaginative effort to see just how conducive to mounting distrust these two new conditions make the construction of worst-case scenarios today, and just how different this makes *our* situation compared to what might have been prudent in the time of Napoleon or Bismarck. The sky is now the limit when it comes to resources that might be expended on weapons, and the offensive actions that are being planned for self-defense. And unless we take positive countermeasures, the sky is also the limit on mutual distrust between adversaries.

Seen from the point of view of nations collectively, the resulting interaction of distrust and of armaments creates a spiral that is dangerously unstable and counterproductive. The need to reverse the spiral is imperative. Yet from the point of view of each individual nation, the matter is less simple. Its policy-makers may see present levels of arms and of distrust as the only reasonable attitude in the face of the threat of nuclear attack, though admittedly far from ideal. So long as the *reasons* for distrust remain, they ask, what else can one do? Given the immense danger that nations must now contemplate, it is impossible simply to decide to be less distrustful.

Must we then give in to the momentum of the spiral of armaments and distrust even though we recognize its growing danger for us all? Must we give up the effort to reverse it? If arms talks will not succeed with the present and mounting levels of distrust, and if distrust cannot be reduced so long as the worst-case scenarios call for ever more lethal armaments for the sake of deterrence, are the great powers then powerless to reverse the spiral?

I believe that such a conclusion would be not only premature but dangerously defeatist. Nations can and should work to reverse both strands in the spiral. Much can be done to reduce the risks posed by armaments; I shall leave that vast topic for another time. What I wish to stress is that much can be done to reduce the levels of distrust in a mutually beneficial manner; and among the steps that must be taken first are actions having to do with *deception* and *secrecy*.

Both deception and secrecy have long existed between nations, but in recent decades they have, like modern armaments themselves, taken on new and far more debilitating forms because of technological innovations. They play an immense role in escalating distrust between East and West; for each side suspects far more treachery and hostility than meets the eye, again for reasons having to do with a rational and ordinarily quite prudent envisaging of worst-case scenarios.

Nations can no more survive without a measure of secrecy than they can without armaments. But while secrecy, like arms, serves self-protection, it also promotes every form of domestic and foreign aggression. And since military secrets have to be kept from the state's own citizens in order not to reach its enemies, citizens lose ordinary democratic checks on precisely those matters that can affect them most strongly. As Thomas Jefferson pointed out, citizens do assume they have a right to full information about the possibility of a war: "It is their sweat which is to earn all the expenses of the war, and their blood which is to flow in expiation of the causes to it."

When secrecy is abused, its power to do harm can be immense. Because it bypasses inspection and eludes interference, secrecy is central to the planning of every form of injury to human beings. It cloaks the execution of these plans, and wipes out all traces afterwards. It enters into all prying and intrusion that cannot be carried out openly. Not only does secrecy help conceal every form of wrongdoing; it also risks corrupting those who exercise it. Lord Acton pointed to this danger when he wrote that "everything secret degenerates." I believe he went much too far—surely we know many secrets that do not degenerate—but he does remind us of just how debilitating secrecy *can* be for those who take part in it, whenever it shuts out criticism and challenge of any kind.

Those who have written about secret societies, about working under cover, or about carrying out secret scientific work, have testified to the stifling effect that secrecy can have on judgment and creativity. The risks of secrecy are especially great when it is allied to unusual political or other power, and greatest of all when it is in the hands of government leaders. As C.P. Snow once wrote in describing the misjudgments—unchallenged because arrived at in secret—that led the Allies in World War II to undertake large-scale strategic bombing of civilians in German cities: "The euphoria of secrecy goes to the head very much like the euphoria of gadgets. . . . It takes a very strong head to keep secrets for years and not go slightly mad."

But military secrecy can also be excessive and self-defeating even from a strictly military point of view. It can delay, entangle, and undercut military efforts to the detriment of the self-protection governments aim for. Surely the secrecy concerns of the Soviet military that led to the brutal shooting-down of the South Korean airliner were misapplied and counterproductive

even from the Soviet point of view, in addition to the tragedy they brought to those who were killed and to their families.

Secrecy is especially problematic in modern states, where the systems of classification, encodement, loyalty tests, and camouflage have grown immensely complex. That they are therefore also self-defeating is hard to deny; but most efforts to cut back on unnecessary or harmful secrecy meet with the failure of so many reforms of bureaucracy. Mountains of worthless information are stamped Top Secret; levels of secrecy multiply; individuals are scrutinized from the point of view of loyalty even when their work brings them in no contact with secret military information. And still genuine security is out of reach.

For a recent American example of self-defeating secrecy, consider the helicopter incursion into Iran in April 1980. A review group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the rescue mission, and attributed the failure in part to excessive secrecy. The group concluded that many things that could have been done to enhance mission success were not done because of operations security considerations. Having to make their way through large dust clouds while coping with engine failures, and instructed not to communicate by radio but only through light signals—surely useless in the dust storm—crew members finally had to abandon the mission. Had they known more about the project and been able to pool their information, the study group concluded, they might have been able to carry on despite the difficult circumstances. As it was, while refueling for the return flight, two aircraft collided, causing the death of eight men.

Not mentioned in the official report was secrecy of yet another kind. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, known to consider the plan too risky, was kept out of the final decision to proceed with the mission. Secrecy had come to protect the project, not only from disclosure to the Iranians, nor only from enough knowledge by the participants to allow them to carry on, but from a member of the government critical of it and with the authority to disagree with its execution. In this way, secrecy directed against military opponents can come to distort domestic choices. Even from the strictest strategic point of view, considering nothing but national self-defense, secrecy can cause reasoning and planning to go astray.

Secrecy also allows government officials to manipulate and deceive the public without any accountability whatsoever. If we look at other societies that labor under official secrecy and control over what is written, over research, over travel and public service, we find that the control reaches not only what is dangerous to national security but, much more often, what would present a challenge to government leaders themselves: all that might prove embarrassing, all that stands in need of criticism and challenge, all that exposes failures and abuse, all that might stop hostilities from breaking out before it is too late.

When one adds the debilitating ways in which secrecy can affect *international* relations, one will at the very least agree that it has to be examined with care for each and every use. The relative parity between superpowers when it comes to armaments is absent with respect to secrecy. The pervasive secrecy exercised by the Soviet Union has ancient historical roots and contrasts sharply with the relative openness of the major Western democracies.

Both the arms competition and the present level of distrust put pressure on Western nations to emulate their adversary with respect to secrecy as well. Nowhere is the pressure stronger than in the United States right now. As Carl Friedrich has pointed out, there is no greater danger for free democratic political systems than the pressure that the apparatus of modern police states puts on them to respond by increasing their own security measures. Confronting an adversary who exercises much more secrecy and far more censorship, the Administration is now making a number of moves to reciprocate. It is as if it were trying to catch up in the secrecy race as forcefully as it presses the arms race. These pressures extend to efforts to impose unprecedented censorship on public officials for lifetime, as well as to new controls over scientists, universities, travel, the news media, and the Freedom of Information Act; they extend, as well, to increasing the scope of covert activities by the FBI and the CIA.

Why should the United States, of all countries, with its tried and true practices of openness, be moving in this direction? The reasons are in one sense easy to understand. Faced with the extensive controls over information, travel, research and trade exercised by the Soviet Union and other countries, leaders of the Western democracies experience a dangerous imbalance, made all the more troubling now that the arms race and rising international tensions have so greatly increased the danger of armed conflict. In addition, the new technologies of intelligence—the methods of surveillance and photography, the satellites and the spy planes—have made all nations feel that their secrets are more vulnerable than ever.

While the motives are understandable, such a secrecy race risks weakening, not strengthening, any nation that enters it, for it rests on two illusions. The first is misplaced confidence in the traditional methods of official secrecy, such as censorship. Short of turning an open society into a garrison state, it will simply not be possible to restrict trade, scholarship, scientific exchanges, publication and news reporting enough to achieve the desired security.

The second illusion is that sharp increases in Government secrecy carry no risks. A look at secretive societies around the world should surely show that, insofar as governments manage to impose censorship and secrecy they undermine the most fundamental freedoms; and they render their nations less secure, not more so. For a people to tamper with its most essential freedoms in order to increase national security is like a great museum selling its most

precious works of art to pay for a burglar alarm system: a folly compounded when the system does not even increase genuine security.

Lying, like secrecy, has its uses against enemies. It can divert their maneuvers, and help in the strategy to defeat them. In World War II, for instance, the Allies not only kept information concerning the planned invasion of Normandy a secret; they also engaged in an elaborate hoax to make the Germans believe it would come at a different time and place.

Lying in self-defense to enemies can be justified under certain circumstances; but it carries very special dangers of backfiring. All too often the lie that is directed to adversaries is a lie to the home front as well; and when it is discovered, the costs are often high. We know, from the experience of Vietnam and Watergate, how dispiriting for a nation it is when officials are found to be lying, how easy it is for them to reach for the excuse of national security when it is not in the least at issue, and how long it takes to rebuild confidence in officials who have lost the trust of their countrymen. Above all we know how the practice of deception can spread, as those who do the deceiving have more and more to conceal and as they begin to conceive of more and more enemies whom they want to deceive.

Deception among nations is hardly new; but it has acquired some new forms in this century because of the changes in communication that allow for so much more information, both honest and dishonest, to be circulated in so many new ways. Few practices are so directly injurious to all nations as that of "disinformation." The word is a neologism that stands for the spreading of false information to hurt adversaries. Common in wartime and increasingly used by rival intelligence networks even in peacetime, it now flourishes in the media as governments try to influence public opinion against one another.

When conflicting stories circulate, as in the case of the "Libyan Hit Squad" or the assassination attempt upon Pope John Paul II, accusations of disinformation are often voiced only to be heatedly denied. The same is true when forged documents such as the recent "Hitler Diaries" come to public attention in the media. Denial by one nation of having spread such false information in turn often takes the form of accusing another nation of planting it to deceive the public about its true source.

The more an agency becomes known for generating false information, the more often it will be suspected of having done so, however innocent it may be of having started a particular flurry of false rumors. Inevitably, the distrust of an agency colors the respect granted the pronouncements of the government it serves.

Each year we witness new accusations and suspicion of disinformation. They signal injury to an already defective and vulnerable system of public communication. The deterioration of public discourse adds to the difficulty, for citizens and governments alike, of knowing when a message

can be trusted. This uncertainty increases the likelihood of further resort to "dirty tricks." It is hard to think of any form of combined government secrecy and deception that is of such dubious benefit to individual nations yet so capable of damaging nations collectively.

The practice of disinformation is usually not carried out by the same agencies that do the negotiating, nor by those that take part in planning arms production. But the distrust it engenders increases two of the most serious difficulties in arms negotiations: that of obtaining accurate information about one's adversary and that of conveying credible information about oneself. It is as if the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.

As with secrecy, all may not wish to draw the line in the same place when it comes to what kind of deception is legitimate in military and diplomatic circumstances. But most may agree that practices such as those of disinformation are simply too costly, nationally and internationally, to be ignored.

Confidence between superpowers is now at one of its lowest points ever. The risks of war are correspondingly higher. It is agreed that nuclear war would be unlike anything we have ever known; but not as explicit is the probability that it might well begin after a process of the same kind of deteriorating relationships that have preceded wars in the past. True, nuclear war might also begin through an accident or through miscalculation. But even these are more likely to take place and to escalate into all-out war under conditions of strong international pressures or when domestic opinion reaches the boiling point. And even apart from such errors, war is more likely to begin as so often in the past, after communications have broken down or grown frayed; after leaders have grown used to resorting to increasingly apocalyptic name-calling; after an armaments race has impoverished nations; after lies and rumors have begun to circulate more and more wildly; after governments have become used to breaking international law whenever it suits them.

If those are the factors that contribute to the danger of war, then they must receive much more careful attention than they have in the past. Already nations have begun to negotiate increased mutual cooperation, notification of military maneuvers, and other so-called "confidence-building measures." Such measures are surely needed. But equally or even more urgent is the need to counteract government practices that undercut international cooperation directly: practices that *erode* or *destroy* what little trust still remains.

An applicable term to describe these practices might be "confidence-destroying measures." Some of the most insidious among them increase distrust by raising concern about duplicity and secret plots in the ways that I have described. They may seem only remotely connected to arms control, yet they debilitate its chances of success continuously.

The practices that intensify distrust most directly—such as highly aggressive propaganda or the spreading of false information—are ruled out by international law and regularly denounced in the United Nations; yet they

continue unabated. The steps toward reforming these activities should no longer be granted mere lip-service. Some practices are so harmful, even domestically, that they could be curtailed or discontinued unilaterally. In this category fall the various forms of censorship, the travel restrictions, and the excesses of scientific and other secrecy that do so much to drain the spirit of citizens even as they hamper international relations. Others require negotiations, chief among them the many kinds of secrecy governments now employ. In negotiating about practices of secrecy, it will be important to consider not only conditions under which they are especially troubling, but also conditions under which they may be necessary, both for each nation's security and for international security.

Certain forms of secrecy may be preferable to all involved when, for example, they cut down on the likelihood of a first strike or encourage the exploration of nonviolent resolution of conflicts. Consider nuclear-armed submarines: so long as they are in use, is not secrecy regarding their exact location a protection for all nations against the danger of a first strike and thus of world war? But how, in that case, can their capacity to escape detection be limited to prevent uses that go against the common interest of nations—for instance through territorial violations as with the Soviet submarines in Swedish and Norwegian waters, or through dangerous confrontations far from the home base?

The effort to deescalate confidence-destroying practices will have to take such questions into account. Negotiations that do so have the potential for helping to reverse the dangerous spiral of distrust and armaments that has ensnared the great powers. And defeatism here is inappropriate: just as distrust grows through reciprocal action, so it can be reduced in that manner. Once governments fully understand the harm done to all nations including their own from policies that increase distrust, they should address in a much more serious way the need to reverse these policies.

It is true that many now feel trapped in the momentum of the spiral. They may go along simply because they see no way out. But more and more military personnel, scientists, and others are looking for alternatives. And even those who would ordinarily dismiss any qualms about the risks of nuclear confrontation now have reason to fear for their own survival and for that of their children. The theologian Krister Stendahl has noted a shift of perception that has come about in the last generation. There is a new sense "that our world is not so much inherited from our ancestors as on loan from our children." This shifts *our* responsibility, in every occupation and every walk of life, from the past to the future as well. We owe it to our children to rise to this challenge.

This article is a version of a lecture given at the Naval War College, based in part upon *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (Pantheon Books, 1982).

Intelligence and the Okinawa Battle

Rear Admiral Robert N. Colwell, USNR (Ret.)

'Twas the first day of April in '45
Many a man is still alive
Who remembers that famous day and year.

This liberal paraphrasing of an opening stanza in Longfellow's epic poem sets the stage for an account, not of Paul Revere's Ride in April 1775, but of the allied invasion of Okinawa some 170 years later. As many of my former comrades-in-arms clearly remember, 1 April 1945 was not only Easter Sunday, but for the Allied Forces it was also *Love Day*—the invasion of that heavily fortified enemy-held island, a scant 300 miles south of the Japanese mainland. Just as it was Paul Revere's intelligence-disseminating ride that announced that "the British are coming" and triggered the dramatic military action that was taken soon thereafter, so there were several equally dramatic intelligence-triggered events that took place during the Battle of Okinawa, forty years ago. This article will describe the role that was played by intelligence in relation to most of the decisive events in that battle.

My job in that operation was "Chief of Photo Intelligence." The modifier "photo," describes my activities as being devoted primarily to the extraction of information from one particular source—aerial photography taken during overflights of Okinawa and surrounding areas by various US aircraft. Largely because of aerial photography's significance as a source of intelligence, I found myself not just on the fringes of the overall intelligence effort and associated battle action during the Okinawa action, but squarely in the midst of it. Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, shared this notion of intelligence, when he later commented that: "Photo intelligence has been the most important source of information throughout the Pacific during World War II. Its importance cannot be

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overemphasized." As the "Senior Officer Present Afloat," he was in charge of the *amphibious aspects* of the Okinawa operation; his Army counterpart was Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner who, as "Senior Officer Ashore," was in charge of all *land warfare aspects* of the Okinawa operation. In the Battle of Okinawa, General Buckner served as Commanding General of the US Tenth Army, comprised of six assault divisions—three Army divisions and three Marine divisions.

My photo intelligence unit during the planning phase of the Okinawa operation consisted of 35 officers and 70 enlisted men—most of whom wore the US Army uniform and were eventually assigned to the participating Army divisions. Why did General Buckner choose a naval officer to head his photo contingent? The general thought it of such consequence that he took the time to explain his rationale point by point:

- It is anticipated that the amphibious landing phase will be the most crucial aspect of the Okinawa invasion.
- The success of that phase will depend very largely on the proper selection of beaches for making the assault landings by more than 50,000 combat troops, followed by 50,000 *more* shortly thereafter.
- In the beach-selection process, accurate information will be needed—primarily from aerial photographs—of offshore water depths; coral conditions; wave heights; surf behavior; beach dimensions, slope and trafficability; height and sturdiness of seawalls; and the location and usability of beach exits. Besides, we will need to know about such enemy installations as coast defense guns, antiaircraft weapons, underwater obstacles, barbed wire entanglements, and machine-gun emplacements.
- The making of such determinations requires the expertise of a *Navy* photo intelligence officer.

"Colwell, the Navy has responded to my request for such an officer by nominating you, based on your firsthand experience as a photo intelligence officer throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, as well as your experience gained while serving recently as Chief Instructor of the Navy Photo Interpretation School in Washington, D.C."

General Buckner brought me up short by saying, "Colonel Ely, (Senior Intelligence Officer of the U.S. Tenth Army) tells me that his files contain a complete aerial photographic coverage of the island of Okinawa. At my staff meeting tomorrow I want you to give your preliminary recommendation as to the best beaches on which to make our assault landing with 50,000 troops. As you Navy people would say, it's good having you aboard. Now let's get back to work."

There was an unusual element of urgency that centered around the planning and execution of the Okinawa operation. This became further

evident to me on my first meeting with Colonel Ely when we covered the following combination of factors:

Until very recently the Allied High Command had intended that General Buckner's Forces would invade Formosa (Taiwan), approximately 250 miles north of Luzon.

That same command belatedly came to realize that the invasion of such a large and well-defended island as Formosa would require tremendous logistical support and that for many months to come the Allied Forces would simply not have enough "bottoms" to provide such support.

After careful consideration, that command decided to bypass Formosa and invade a much smaller island in the Ryukyu Rhetto, Okinawa. It was presumed that Okinawa would likewise be heavily defended and that the battle there would be intense but that, because of the island's smaller size, less logistical support would be needed.

Because of the annual weather pattern in the Ryukyus area, any 1945 invasion of Okinawa should be made no later than the month of March. During the spring months of a typical year, there is a very great likelihood of high winds and adverse surf conditions, particularly on the west side of the island. Such conditions would make it extremely difficult for amphibious landings and follow-on logistical support.

Following the initial meeting with General Buckner, I spent 18 of the next 24 hours studying the aerial photos of Okinawa, supported by two highly competent Army photo intelligence officers—Captain Atwater and Lieutenant Felchle. By process of elimination, only 3 or 4 candidate landing areas were left at the conclusion of this preliminary study. As seen in Figure 1, the most promising of these was an area on the west coast known as the "Hagushi Beaches."

The following day we met with General Buckner. After Colonel Ely's general intelligence briefing, I tacked a few aerial photos on the wall. One of these included a strip that covered the entire ten-mile coastline encompassing the "Hagushi Beaches." While at Guadalcanal, I had established that casuarina trees are usually found growing only on firm, sandy beaches that are ideal for the landing of personnel and mechanized equipment. During my briefing I highlighted both the presence and the significance of such trees along the Hagushi Beaches. The photos also revealed that the Hagushi Beaches were well defended offshore by underwater obstacles and onshore by machine-gun emplacements embedded in the seawalls. The latter were so situated that, collectively, they could rake nearly all portions of the ten-mile stretch of beach. Furthermore, there were coast defense guns and antiaircraft weapons inland, and what appeared to be barbed wire entanglements guarding road-like exits from the beach. All of these signs helped to confirm that these were, indeed, highly defendable beaches, and that the enemy knew it.

Another factor favoring our selection of the Hagushi Beaches for the assault landing was the existence of a Japanese airfield near the village of Yontan, only one to two miles inland. Once captured, there would be a need for large quantities of "borrow" materials for enlargement and repair of runways, taxiways and aprons. The large-scale aerial photos showed significant quantities of suitable borrow materials to be present quite close to the Yontan airfield; most of which consisted of uplifted coral and limestone deposits on which cycads (an excellent plant indicator) could be seen growing.*

One problem with the Hagushi Beaches was that an invasion fleet would need to pass very close to a group of offshore islands known as the Kerama Rhetto. Should enemy coast defense guns be present on the Kerama Rhetto our troop and supply ships would be vulnerable to their fire. Unfortunately, our Kerama Rhetto intelligence was seriously deficient, primarily because our aerial photography of it was of very poor quality. We also realized that if our assault troops made a preliminary landing at the Kerama Rhetto, we would alert the enemy that our main landing was to be made at the Hagushi Beaches. This would allow him to move the bulk of his ground forces to positions where he could most effectively resist our main amphibious landing. Thus, if there were coast defense guns on the Kerama Rhetto we would be obliged to make a preliminary landing to destroy them but, if there were none, we certainly would want to forgo such a landing.

At the conclusion of my briefing, General Buckner and his staff apparently accepted my recommendation that the main Okinawa landing be made at the Hagushi Beaches, but with "diversionary feints" being made elsewhere, as shown in Figure 1.

Based on these earlier intelligence estimates I requested that several additional kinds of photography be flown:

(1) Low altitude photography of Kerama Rhetto, to better detect any possible coast defense guns.

(2) Low altitude offshore oblique photography for the entire Hagushi Beach area. Such photographs would provide a "coxswain's eye" view of each beach. Thus, during his run to the shore, the coxswain could compare what he saw on the annotated photos with what he saw as he peered ahead

*One day while I was in Colonel Ely's office, poring over some Okinawa-related intelligence matters with him, his aide interrupted to inform him that a certain junior officer from another command had just arrived and hoped to pay his respects, however briefly, to Colonel Ely. At this point Colonel Ely confused me by asking me to hurriedly help him hang a nearby map of Formosa on top of the Okinawa wall map that was in his office. The visitor was then ushered in and soon was asking Colonel Ely for an update on how our plans for invading Formosa were progressing. For the next 15 minutes Colonel Ely gave a masterful dissertation consisting of completely false information (but with frequent reference to the Formosa map) about how our Formosa invasion plans were progressing. The visitor was very appreciative and after he left, Colonel Ely explained the game that he had just been playing. "That officer was here in an official capacity and has the necessary security clearances. But he also is a 'blabber mouth' as evidenced by the fact that he leaked some accurate information that I gave him when he was here a few weeks ago. At that time, of course, our target really was Formosa. Some of our best military security, now that we are to land at Okinawa instead, will be unwittingly provided by that officer very soon, probably at some cocktail bar in Honolulu."

Figure 1. The island of Okinawa and its immediate environs

(distinctive headlands, for example), and thereby improve the likelihood that he would land at the appropriate beach.

(3) At least one low altitude strip of vertical photography (preferably from an altitude of about 200 feet) made with a special kind of camera known as the Sonne Continuous Stereo Strip Camera, on which water depths could be accurately measured for each of the assault beaches. From such information it should be possible to determine the approximate point at which an amphibious landing craft would run aground along any particular route. The lack of such information in earlier amphibious operations, especially at Tarawa, had resulted in very severe casualties being inflicted on our landing forces.

These specific aerial photo requirements added up to one additional requirement: several weeks before the invasion landings were to be made, a special task unit, including at least one aircraft carrier, would need to steam to within about 200 miles of Okinawa, where our fighter planes, both ones that would take the photos and others that would simultaneously strafe the beaches, could perform their assigned missions. Such a pre-invasion mission would involve increased importance that aerial

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photography had gained in the eyes of the top military decision makers since the early days of the war.

The aerial photos of the Hagushi Beaches resulting from that mission, both offshore obliques and the stereo strip verticals, were found to be of excellent quality. Not so the ones of the Kerama Rhetto. The photos of Kerama Rhetto were so blurry that, despite their large scale, they were virtually uninterpretable. The photos contained features which looked enough like coast defense guns to warrant cautiously labeling each as a "possible CD gun?" At the next joint Navy-Army staff meeting Rear Admiral Blandy (Commander of the Bombardment Support Force) asked me, "does the enemy have coast defense guns at the Kerama Rhetto?" He was disgusted and perhaps even angry at the uncertainty of my interpretation as it impinged the development of his bombardment support plans. The admiral, seeing that he was not going to get a more definite answer made his decision then and there. In the presence of General Buckner, Admiral Blandy said, "We must secure the Kerama Rhetto first, General. Can you send a landing force ashore in order to secure any 'possible' coast defense guns?" "Yes we can, Admiral," said General Buckner; so that part of the plan was promptly agreed upon.

On Love minus 8 days, aided by Blandy's support group, our exploratory landing force was put ashore on Kerama Rhetto. Some highly significant discoveries were made. The "fuzzy" coastal guns proved to be sugarcane grinders. However, we will never know how many thousands of American lives were saved as a result of making those exploratory landings on the Kerama Rhetto, even though the decision to make such landings was made 4 months earlier by Admiral Blandy based on what must now be categorized as "faulty intelligence." Although the landing forces found no coast defense guns, they did find nearly 300 *suicide boats*, a heretofore undiscovered Japanese surface weapon intended to serve as the surface counterpart of the kamikaze. Why, with all our scrutiny of those fuzzy photos of Kerama Rhetto had we been unable to discern the presence of even one of these new weapons?

The Japanese had taken great pains to conceal the boats by hiding them in coastal caves during daylight hours. These craft were barely large enough to provide the flotation and transport necessary for one man and a 500-pound warhead. They were to remain hidden on Kerama Rhetto until most of our amphibious landing forces had been deposited ashore; then, under cover of darkness, they were to launch a smashing attack, each boat being assigned the mission of ramming one of our off-lying armada of supply ships. Thus, with the kamikazes working our supply ships over by day, and the suicide boats doing the same by night, the 120,000-man Japanese defending force would be able to annihilate our landing forces at its leisure.

The Japanese intended that their fleet, headed by the mighty battleship *Yamato*, would gain superiority over our own fleet of warships, partly with the support of the kamikazes. Their warships would then stand offshore and

facilitate the annihilation process by the bombardment of our landing force. But, the preinvasion landing which our forces made at the Kerama Rhetto and the destruction of these 300 suicide boats plainly put the Japanese plan in jeopardy.

With minor diversions, Admiral Blandy's Bombardment Support Force sailed past the Kerama Rhetto on the night of Love minus 8 days and positioned itself at suitable intervals to cover the ten miles of the Hagushi Beaches. For the next seven days these beaches took an awesome pounding. Our photo reconnaissance planes provided daily aerial photo coverage and the low-altitude offshore oblique shots were especially useful in a detailed appraisal of the seawalls at the upper limits of the sandy Hagushi Beaches.

After five deafening days of bombardment of the beaches, it came time to implement the "Ely-Colwell" plan. On Love day minus two Colonel Ely and I were directed to board a DE and proceed at flank speed in a southerly direction from Okinawa to a point where we were to rendezvous with the approaching allied invasion force. After a rather wild night of bobbing around in that fast moving DE, we gathered on the bridge of the ship shortly after dawn. At about 0740 the skipper pointed southward and remarked, "Well, if our rendezvous is on schedule we should be seeing the tops of some shipmasts, somewhere over in that sector, right about now. Roughly five minutes later the top of a shipmast came into view in the sector where the DE skipper had pointed. Moment by moment, and with almost unbelievable rapidity, the scene unfolded—soon we could see 10 or 12 masts, now 30 or 40, now the bridges, and now the hulls of the nearer and larger ships. In almost less time than it takes to tell it, this entire allied invasion armada came into view—first a forest of masts and then an ocean full of hulls beneath them.

By now we were less than 5 minutes from "closure" with the command ship so our skipper ordered reduced speed and the lowering of the DE's motor whaleboat. Despite the bobbing motion and rather high waves, Colonel Ely and I were able to transfer, complete with our intelligence packages, first from the motor whaleboat to a much larger landing craft that had been launched from the command ship, and then to the command ship itself. Based on our briefings, the flag officers and their staffs were obviously encouraged about the prospects for making a successful landing on the Hagushi Beaches the next morning.

Admiral Blandy had made a couple of sorties with his bombardment support forces to those *other* Okinawa beaches. Tomorrow morning, on Love Day, our diversionary forces would make fake landings on those beaches, synchronized with our actual landings on the Hagushi Beaches.

Dawn on 1 April saw our main invasion force standing off the Hagushi Beaches, lowering invasion craft and deploying the rocket boats that were to

augment Admiral Blandy's ever-continuing bombardment. As each fully-loaded invasion craft was hoisted over the side of one of the transports, it sped a short distance to the nearest circle of sister craft, where the circle expanded to accommodate it. Then, with almost unbelievable ease and rapidity, and still without enemy opposition, the last few amphibious craft of the assault force had entered the water and joined their respective circles.

By now it was a truly impressive site. For a stretch of about five miles to our north and five miles to our south the entire offshore area was churning with the circles of troop-laden boats. Probably at no time in the entire history of warfare has there been a smoother coordination of forces than that which was to unfold before my very eyes. The frogmen of the Underwater Demolition Teams had now completed their removal of the hedgehogs and other underwater obstacles off the beaches. The beach-masters were now ashore, each ready to signal and guide the designated landing craft to their assigned beaches (coded as Yellow 1,2,3; Purple, 1,2,3; etc.). The rocket boats were moving into place, each capable of unleashing firepower that, for a few moments, was greater than that of the mightiest battleship. And our aircraft roared through the skies around us, ready to strafe and bomb the beaches in support of our invasion craft as they made their perilous runs shoreward.

Would the weather hold, at least through the main assault landing? The answer to that question had been very uncertain even a few hours earlier, but now the answer was "Yes! A storm may strike later today—but now, H-hour of Love Day, the weather is O.K."

But will the landing craft clear the reef as had been predicted, given these weather and tide conditions, or will they hang up perhaps hundreds of yards offshore?

On schedule to the minute, those 10 miles of circling invasion craft were breaking from the circles; and now the whole armada of them was trekking landward, each craft toward its respective beach segment. Talk about "the sound and the fury!" This particular scene will never again be duplicated in warfare. Midst the cheers from those few of us who were lining the rails of the ships—cheers that certainly were drowned out by the roar of it all—the armada skimmed landward. There! See the ones heading toward the beaches directly in front of us? They have already cleared the outer fringe of the reef—now they're over the middle of it, now they're within 100 yards of dry land, now they've run aground but very near to the shoreline, just as we predicted. Look at those boat ramps splash down; look at those troops wade and scramble; wade and scramble. And look to the north, and to the south, almost as far as you can see. They have *all* cleared the reef, just as had been predicted.

But there was one major surprise: Thus far our landing was not being opposed by the enemy.

Colonel Ely had estimated, mindful of experiences that the Allied forces had had elsewhere (especially at Tarawa and Iwo Jima), that 4,000 troops would die in the landing phase—one of the most dramatic moments in war. The official report given the next day to General Buckner stated that, not 4,000 men, but *one* man had died during the assault landing. Combat-laden he had stepped into a deep hole in the coral reef and, in the confusion of things, had drowned before his buddies noted his plight.

"Why" I had wondered, "had the Japanese decided not to oppose the landing?" Perhaps such vital information was known but tightly held at higher levels. Did General Buckner and Admiral Turner know? I soon got my answer from General Buckner, who had been pacing the deck of our flagship while watching the assault landings. "Well, I don't know what the Japs are up to by not opposing our landing, but so far it suits me just fine!" I can only conclude that our preinvasion intelligence was lacking in this vital respect.

The first few days of the Okinawa invasion went smoothly in most respects. Yontan airfield was captured during the afternoon of the first day, even though previous intelligence estimates had indicated that 3 to 7 days might be required to complete that important phase of the operation. Its importance was all the more apparent as the kamikaze aircraft began damaging our aircraft carriers so that we badly needed a shore-based airfield on which to land the carrier-based aircraft. On the evening of the fifth day the wind began shifting around, gusting, and increasing in intensity, just as it customarily does beginning about 1 April of each year. As the strength of the wind increased the force of the waves in the area of the Hagushi Beaches soon became so great that several LSTs, which had too great a draft to clear the reef and were in the off-loading position just seaward of the reef, rammed into the outer fringe of the reef with nearly disastrous results. Fortunately the waves and storm subsided during the seventh day. Had the storm continued for another 24 hours, the troops ashore would have found themselves in very desperate straits because of lack of munitions and food.

Partly because of the early success of our invasion, and partly because of the hazards of remaining on board a ship that was as easily identifiable by kamikaze pilots as our command ship, General Buckner and his entire staff moved ashore ahead of schedule. As some of us were setting up camp, we got the word that Admiral Turner (who was still in charge of both naval and ground forces) wanted General Buckner and his staff to gather on his flagship for an important meeting. And so we did, at least most of us not knowing for sure what the meeting was to be about.

We soon found out for as we gathered in the wardroom, Admiral Turner began by saying: "Gentlemen, the purpose of this meeting is to decide when to make an assault landing on the island of Ie Shima, and with what forces. I will now turn the meeting over to General Buckner."

After a brief pause, General Buckner directed the following comments at

Major General Bruce, Commanding General of the 77th Division, as it was his division that was slated to capture Ie Shima: "General Bruce, as you know there is considerable evidence that the Japanese recently evacuated Ie Shima under cover of darkness, just as they did one of their bases in the Aleutian Islands. For example they have dug trenches across their Ie Shima airfield just as they did on evacuating one of their airfields on Kiska; 'airfield denial' it is called. Because at present most of your division is still on ships, fully combat-loaded, and since we may need them elsewhere very soon, what do you think of the idea of merely making an initial landing on Ie Shima with a couple of companies from your division, so that they can scout out the place and determine whether there are even any Japanese left on that island?"

Major General Bruce was quick to respond. He said, "Well, sir, that plan would work out fine if there are only a few Japs left on the island, but if they are just hiding there, and in a larger force, we could lose every man in the two companies. So General Buckner, if you are asking what I would like to do, I prefer to land, not just a couple of companies, but two entire regimental combat teams and really turn that island over to you."

Immediately, Admiral Turner stood up and said: "Gentlemen, this meeting is at an end. There obviously is no point in carrying this discussion any farther until we have much more accurate intelligence as to the strength, disposition, and intentions of the Japanese Forces at Ie Shima."

Everyone else in the wardroom seemed stunned. Here, in the height of battle, virtually the entire staff of Admiral Turner and General Buckner (augmented by the staff of Major General Bruce and several others) had been assembled—and at the risk of being blown out of the water by the kamikazes—to arrive at an important and timely decision. The presumption had been that the meeting would last for several hours, in order to plan for a coordinated Navy and Ground Force amphibious landing at Ie Shima. Yet, the formal part of the meeting was scarcely two minutes old and it had summarily been adjourned by just a few biting words from the Senior Officer Present. It was especially frustrating for Colonel Ely and me, because it placed the blame for adjournment squarely on deficiencies in intelligence, in general, and on photo intelligence, in particular. When we were departing the ship to return by boat to Okinawa, Colonel Ely asked me, "What do you think from your latest aerial photos? Have the Japs evacuated Ie Shima (consistent with their tearing up the runway) or are they still there waiting for us to land, and if so, in what number?"

My answer was the same then as it had been before the meeting and as it was two days later after I had studied those photos, plus a new set that was flown the next morning, "The whole force is still on the island, Colonel, and judging from foxhole counts that we made on aerial photos a few days ago, together with other signatures, there must be 4,000 to 5,000 of the enemy still there."

At this point Colonel Ely said to me: "But what about General Buckner's

statement that airfield denial of the type that we see at Ie Shima is evidence of evacuation of the garrison? The General had had a lot of firsthand experience with that situation up in the Aleutian Islands, you know, before he took over his present job."

"That's right, Colonel, but I've studied those Aleutian photos, too. I even gave the students a set of those photos to work on as one of the problems I taught them at the Navy Photo Interpretation School in Washington, D.C. a few months ago. Both at Ie Shima and in the Aleutians the occupying Japanese Forces cut trenches across the airfield. This is, of course, one of the best ways to achieve airfield denial to an invading force. But beyond that there are a couple of major differences. On aerial photos of the Aleutians nearly every building looked as though it had suffered a direct hit from a bomb. Obviously this was because of internal demolition with high explosives inflicted by the Japanese, themselves, just before leaving the base. There were clothes and boxes suddenly appearing, items that had been carelessly strewn all over the bivouac areas, providing further evidence that the troops had evacuated in some haste—sorting out and taking with them only the most valuable items that were transportable. There is absolutely no evidence of either of these kinds of activity at Ie Shima, so I think they are still there, hiding in the daytime, especially when one of our photo planes or observation planes is overhead."

Back to the conference room we went the next day, and the decision was made to commit two regimental combat teams just as General Bruce had recommended. It proved to be a prudent decision. After a very tough campaign in which our forces suffered heavy casualties, including the death of a famous and very well-liked war correspondent, Ernie Pyle, the mop-up forces counted almost 4,500 dead Japanese bodies and virtually no survivors.

Meanwhile, back on Okinawa, the next phase of our master plan for the invasion began to unfold. In the first few days our Marines had sped forward through the northern two-thirds of the island for a distance of some 40 miles, permitting our forces to erect a radar site at the northern tip of Okinawa. None too soon, because our picket ships, stationed between Okinawa and the southern tip of the mainland of Japan, were being ferociously attacked by the kamikazes. The ability of these picket ships to provide us with an early warning of air attack on our Okinawa forces was in jeopardy and a shore-based radar warning station at the north tip of Okinawa became essential.

In the southern third of the island, where the 3 division-Army corps was being deployed in a drive southward, things had slowed down dramatically after their first flush of ground gaining. Embarrassingly so, because by this time there had been such elation on the part of the news media over our earlier progress, that a number of war correspondents had predicted an economical and early victory.

As we learned later, the first part of the Japanese plan—predicated on our

committing virtually all of our troops in the first day or two—was to allow the initial landing to proceed, unopposed, and even to give ground rapidly until our troops had been strung out over much of the island. Then, while our forces were grossly overextended, the Japanese would mount a massive counterattack, break our lines and overrun the rear echelon and supplies.

This perilous situation existed a few days later, by the time our Army forces had progressed southward just short of the first major terrain barrier, Kakazu Ridge. Immediately north of this point the island was little more than three miles wide in an east-west direction, an ideal place for a frontal type of counterattack to be mounted by the Japanese. Or was it? This was an issue that we later learned produced a fierce difference of opinion among the top echelon of the Japanese 32rd Army, still very much intact in the southernmost quarter of the island. The following is the essence of an official report of that difference, as given to our interrogators when our forces captured the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the Japanese 32nd Army, Colonel Yahara. His story, much of which we later were able to verify from independent sources, was essentially told as follows:

"General Ushigima, the 3-star general in charge of the Japanese 32nd Army, realizing that it was time to decide about the counter-attack, called to his quarters his two top advisors, Major General Cho (his Chief of Staff) and me, Colonel Yahara. At the meeting, General Cho, who had a reputation for being somewhat impatient, even to the point of being hotheaded, was strongly advocating that the Japanese forces make their counter-attack *immediately*. My advice to General Ushigima was that the counter-attack would be much more effective if made a little later because, in the interim, the U.S. forces would likely become still further overextended, while the Japanese forces would be able to use the additional time to become better consolidated and to plan the counter-attack carefully and coordinate it fully. General Ushigima listened carefully to both advisors, thought on it a bit, and then announced his decision: 'We will, indeed, attack as soon as possible. Furthermore, to be sure that we take the U.S. forces completely by surprise let us not risk having a security leak in our plan. Since the telephone lines to our Japanese front line forces have been severely cut by the U.S. bombardment, both from offshore vessels and from shore-based artillery, as well as from aircraft, at least one division, the one on our eastern flank, will need to be contacted by our sending a *runner* there, bearing the highly classified notice of our plan to counter-attack and the timing and role that each division and unit is to play in it.'

"So the runner was sent, and the counter-attack was begun at precisely the chosen time and in conformity with the master plan—in all respects except one very important one. The runner to our eastern division, as we later learned, never got there to deliver the message. A shell killed him en route, so one of our three divisions did not even participate initially in the counter-

attack. Later, when it became apparent that our counter-attack had failed, General Ushigima called me in for a private discussion at his headquarters and, with tears in his eyes, told me that hereafter he would be guided by my advice on such matters, rather than by the advice of General Cho."

Even so, the counterattack came very close to accomplishing its intended purpose of overrunning our forces and driving us into the sea. In fact, it is very likely that it would have accomplished that purpose had all three Japanese divisions participated in a coordinated counterattack, as planned.

For the next several days, and despite the limited success of the Japanese counterattack, things seemed to be going from bad to worse for the US forces along the southern front. As they tried to continue their drive southward, our forces were confronted with one of the most formidable terrain barriers ever encountered in battle, the previously mentioned Kakazu Ridge. Although only a few hundred feet high, it ran east-west across much of the three to five-mile width of the island; furthermore it was composed for the most part of uplifted and partly case-hardened coral, full of natural caves that were ideal for occupancy by the Japanese defenders, and lending itself to the ready construction of additional caves, wherever they needed to be located for maximum effectiveness. Even if our artillery succeeded in scoring a direct hit on a cave, from which our spotters had seen enemy artillery belching fire a few moments before, the results usually were inconsequential. The weapon itself usually was not destroyed, even though it might be buried in an avalanche of coral limestone. Hence it could be dug out, by the Japanese, propped up again and firing resumed or, as was commonly the case, it could be removed to the rear and then installed in a new spot. Many of the caves extended clear through the ridge from the front side to the back and the weapon could be very quickly emplaced in another forward-firing cave not previously used and probably not previously spotted by our artillery spotters. After we had at last overrun the enemy defenses on Kakazu Ridge, the drive toward the south end of the island proceeded quite rapidly. Good use was made of intelligence gained from night photography (made possible by the dropping of flash bombs during the photographic run). Such photography showed enemy personnel and equipment at the time when the headquarters of the Japanese Army in the City of Shuri was being evacuated. They could be seen streaming down the roads under cover of darkness as they retreated toward the southern tip of Okinawa.

My next meeting with General Buckner and his staff came a few days later, at Colonel Ely's insistence. According to Colonel Ely, several of the general's staff members were unwilling to believe those portions of Colonel Ely's intelligence estimates that relied heavily on information derived by our photo intelligence experts. Therefore, Colonel Ely had arranged that I be featured at the general's staff meeting that evening. I was to select some representative

large-scale aerial photo stereo pairs, clear enough so that anyone peering through the mirror stereoscope could see the features clearly and in 3-dimensions, and I was to be sure that the examples selected were also among those that had led to vital parts of Colonel Ely's intelligence estimates, parts that were being received somewhat skeptically by certain of the general's staff. That evening proved to be one of the most rewarding for a photo intelligence professional. When I left the meeting, every staff member was not only *sold* on the value of aerial photography as a source of military intelligence, but a few were even *oversold*; something I later was able to deal with on an individual basis.

At that meeting, many members of General Buckner's staff were especially interested in viewing stereoscopically some of the previously mentioned very large-scale "Sonne" photography that had been taken long before the landing and from which we had made intelligence estimates that had since proven to be quite accurate, based on our actual "on-site" checks. Three such examples:

(1) For heights up to ten feet, the average accuracy with which we had measured seawall heights photogrammetrically along the Hagushi Beaches, was to within approximately two inches.

(2) For depths up to thirty feet, tbe average accuracy with which we had determined water depths—a much more difficult task—from measurements of stereoscopic parallax was to within one foot, and the maximum error was two feet.

(3) Our measurements on earlier photography of levees surrounding the rice paddies indicated that the levees were unusually high and steep-sloped. When, prior to our invasion, we had finally found the counterpart of such levees in terrain elsewhere to which we had access, we had determined by actual tests that most of the vehicles scheduled for use by our invading forces at Okinawa could not traverse such levees. The single exception was a tracked type of vehicle known as the weasel. This photo-aided discovery had been made several weeks prior to Love Day and thus had given General Buckner the opportunity to obtain a very large number of weasels for use in the Okinawa campaign, while canceling orders for certain other vehicles.

On June 18, 1945, just 3 days before final victory was achieved in the Okinawa Battle, General Buckner was killed. Fighting soldier that he was, he had repeatedly ventured down to the most active sectors of the front lines throughout the Okinawa operation, and he did so once too often. As he was conversing with his fellow officers at a forward observation post, enemy artillery that was directed on it killed him almost instantly. The United States lost a fine gentlemen and an exceptional warrior. He was replaced promptly by General Joseph L. (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell, who served as ComGenTen until the completion of the Okinawa campaign.

The ultimate test of the dedication with which the Japanese had been fighting the Battle of Okinawa was to be found in two facts:

First, of the 120,000 Japanese troops that had been stationed on Okinawa at the time of our assault landings, more than 100,000 were killed (as compared with about 12,000 of our Allied forces) and as usual, very few prisoners were taken, leaving quite a few of their troops unaccounted for.

Second, on dawn of the last day of the Okinawa Battle, by which time the only portion of the island that we had not yet captured was at the extreme south end of the island, the two top Japanese generals (Lieutenant General Ushigima and his Chief of Staff, Major General Cho) made the ultimate sacrifice—hari kari. Most of the remaining troops surrendered, the rest were killed, and at last the Battle of Okinawa was over.

Has the author provided a definitive account of "The Okinawa Battle of Forty Years Ago?" Certainly not. He does not take credit for even fully covering the story that pertains to "intelligence" in relation to that battle, despite the ambitious title given to this article. But what he has done is to disclose certain "firsthand" facts and observations of that battle that, quite possibly, have not previously been fully appreciated. If he has been successful in providing some new insights into what has to be one of America's finest hours, then his purpose has been fulfilled.

Nearly 2,300 years ago Aristotle—a brilliant intelligence expert in his own right—said, "The search for truth is in one way difficult and in another easy. For it is evident that no one can master it fully nor escape it wholly. But each adds a little to our knowledge, and from all of the facts assembled, there arises a certain grandeur."

I trust this intelligence-oriented article has contributed to that "sense of grandeur" that we all should feel with respect to the accomplishments of our Allied forces forty years ago in the Battle of Okinawa.

Ian Oliver

IN MY VIEW . . .

Cross Training

Sir,

I am appalled at the article "A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Battle" in the November-December 1984 *Naval War College Review*, not only for its content, but also that the War College saw fit to run it as the lead article.

The article unbelievably lightly passes off the devastating capability of the Soviet nuclear submarine forces, with the totally unwarranted assumption that "Shipping . . . was not significantly impaired, although this appeared to be more the result of a diffident Soviet submarine warfare campaign than in consequence of Allied ASW successes." Anyone who assumes that the Soviet submarine force, with its great number of nuclear attack submarines and surface-to-surface missile launching nuclear submarines, will conduct a "diffident" (Webster: timid, lacking in confidence) campaign, is guilty of absolutely unwarranted wishful thinking. Any conclusion as to the results of an imaginary war based on such wishful thinking is illogical, as well as terribly dangerous . . . .

In my opinion, should we engage in a nonnuclear war at sea with the USSR, in view of (1) the effectiveness of satellite tracking of afloat surface movements on the oceans, (2) instant satellite communications to and from submerged submarines, (3) effectiveness of submarine launched surface-to-surface missiles and sonar/wire-guided torpedoes, all high priority targets of both sides will be destroyed by the other side's nuclear submarines within the first weeks of the war. There will of course be some losses of nuclear submarines on both sides, but not enough to avoid elimination of all high priority surface targets. Certainly it is preposterous to assume "American aircraft carriers operating from within the Irish Sea could participate in the air defense of the United Kingdom."

My forty years of commissioned service included the senior course at the Naval War College, seventeen different commands, surface, subsurface and shore, one of which was temporary command of the Seventh Fleet at the height of the Vietnam campaign. During the past thirty years—I was Chief of Staff to ComSubLant when *Nautilus* first went to sea in 1955—it has been my distinct impression that many segments of our great Navy tend to play down, for one reason or another but often from lack of exposure to subsurface operations, the truly devasrating capabilities of

nuclear submarines. It would seem things haven't changed much since I retired, for the author of this article, a 1310 officer [aviator], is from one of those segments.

To shift from the negative to the positive, this all suggests to me that our senior naval officers should have some degree of cross training in the various warfare specialties. And I can think of nowhere more appropriate than at the Naval War College.

Food for thought?

J.W. Williams, Jr.
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

A Sensitive Issue

Sir,

I would like to bring to your attention an article titled, "Iran and Iraq: An Overview" written by Commander Bennice Liner of the US Navy and published in the July-August 1984 edition of the *Naval War College Review*.

In his article, Commander Liner deals with the war between Iran and Iraq. While analyzing the reasons that led to this war, he refers to the "Kurds" living in these countries as "a source of friction." He also writes and I quote that "The Kurds are of the Sunni Muslim faith and form sizable minorities in Turkey, Iraq and Iran." He correctly states that there really has never been a state of "Kurdistan." On Map 4 of the article however, a "Kurdistan" is illustrated, parts of which cover some sections of the eastern territory of the Republic of Turkey.

Allow me to clarify that, first of all, as stipulated in the International Treaty of Lausanne dated July 24, 1923, there are no muslim minorities living in Turkey. Erroneously referred to by Commander Liner in his article as "Kurds living in Turkey" are, as a matter of fact, Turkish citizens who enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms provided by the Turkish Constitution . . . .

Second, the common borders of Turkey with Iran and Iraq are clearly delineated in accordance with border agreements and there exists no "Kurdistan" as illustrated in Map 4 of rhe said article.

These are highly sensitive issues as far as the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish nation are concerned. It is also common knowledge that power centers hostile both to Turkey and the United States are constantly trying to exploit these issues with the aim of destabilizing Turkey . . . .

Dr. Sükrü Elekdag
Ambassador of the
Turkish Republic

PROFESSIONAL READING

Amphibious Operations

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, US Marine Corps (Ret.)

If one had to compare the Gallipoli and Inchon-Seoul amphibious campaigns in two words, the two words would have to be *failure* and *success*. These two books, *Gallipoli** and *Victory at High Tide*,** are a perfect pairing for a comparison of failed Gallipoli with successful Inchon. Rarely is military history written with such verve, style, and readability. Both authors were master storytellers with deep personal convictions.

The Anglo-French failure at Gallipoli in 1915 condemned the Allies to three more years of stalemated war on the western front, quite arguably made possible the success of the Bolsheviks in toppling Czarist Russia, and drove a lasting wedge of resentment between still-colonial (in thought, if not in form) Australia and New Zealand and the mother country, England. It also yielded the great "lesson" in European military thought that large-scale amphibious assaults could not succeed against a determined enemy holding well-fortified positions.

In 1950—despite the great amphibious successes of World War II, conventional military thought, numbed by the possible consequences of an atomic attack against the concentrations of men and shipping needed for a forcible entry from the sea—there was once again skepticism of the viability of

*Moorehead, Alan. *Gallipoli*. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1982. 383pp. $16.95.

**Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr. *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign*. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1979. 315pp. $17.95.

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large-scale amphibious assault. Cross-grained to this conservative thinking was MacArthur's intuitive genius. Inchon literally "turned" the war. The North Korean main force that had squeezed the United Nations Command (at that point a euphemism for South Koreans and Americans) into the Pusan Perimeter, had to face about to confront a new enemy, proved incapable of doing so, and collapsed.

Moorehead, who died last year, was an Australian journalist who covered the Middle East and North Africa in World War II. He knew his theater exceedingly well as he demonstrated first with his *Mediterranean Front* (1941) and later with his beautifully written books of exploration, *The White Nile* (1960) and *The Blue Nile* (1962). *Gallipoli* was first published in 1956.

Above all else, Gallipoli was a failure of command. Moorehead writes sympathetically, even admiringly, but above all critically of General Sir Ian Hamilton, CinC of the Gallipoli expedition, who commanded from afloat or the offshore island of Imbros and who could scarcely bear to visit the battlefield.

The battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes had cost the Russians a million men, and Czar Nicholas asked the British for a demonstration to relieve German pressure. War Minister Lord Kitchener wrote First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, on 2 January 1915, "The only place that a demonstration might have some effect in stopping reinforcements going east would be the Dardanelles." But Kitchener also said that if there was to be a demonstration it would have to be a naval affair. Sir John Fisher, First Sea Lord, wrote to Lloyd George, "Somebody will have to land at Gallipoli some time or other." General Ian Hamilton, Kitchener's chief of staff in the South African War, would command this new "Mediterranean Expeditionary Force."

On 19 February eight British and four French battleships steamed grandly into the straits and began a slow bombardment. Turkish reaction was feeble. By the end of the month landing parties of bluejackets and Marines were roaming "at will across the Trojan plain . . . . " It was optimistically assumed that the ships would get through to Constantinople by mid-March, but there were problems with mine clearance.

A new naval commander, Vice Admiral de Robeck took over and the naval attack resumed on 18 March. Fourteen British and four French battleships paraded into the straits. Four of them were knocked out. Hamilton had arrived in time to watch the attack from aboard ship. Next day he signaled Kitchener: "The Army's part will be more than mere landing parties to destroy forts; it must be a deliberate and prepared military operation, carried out at full strength, so as to open a passage for the Navy." He advised de Robeck that the army would be ready to land about the middle of April.

In Egypt, Hamilton had two divisions of Australians and New Zealanders, organized into the Anzac Corps under British Lieutenant General Sir

William Birdwood. He also had the British 29th Division, the Royal Naval Division, and a French North African division, altogether some 75,000 men. The main effort would be his best division, the 29th under Major General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, landing over five small beaches at Cape Helles at the extreme tip of the peninsula. Birdwood and the Anzacs would land 13 miles up the coast at Gaba Tepe. The Royal Naval Division would feint a landing at Bulair and the French would land at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side of the straits. There was also a surprise stratagem. Some 2,000 men would be secreted in the collier *River Clyde*, which would be run aground at Cape Helles. The men would then charge down two ramps and across a bridge to the beach. All in all, it was an appallingly complicated plan, but de Robeck and his admirals were delighted. The bulk of the invasion force, some 200 ships, staged at the Greek-owned island of Lemnos, 700 miles from Egypt.

Hamilton watched the landings on 25 April from de Robeck's flagship, the 15-inch gun *Queen Elizabeth*, determined not to interfere with the conduct of the battle unless asked by his subordinate commanders. Hunter-Weston at Cape Helles and Birdwood at Gaba Tepe also remained at sea. Signaling arrangements broke down so that no senior officer had a clear picture as to what was happening ashore.

The Turks had turned over command of the Dardanelles to General Liman von Sanders. He had six divisions which he deployed as follows: two to the west and south of Troy, two at Bulair, one at Cape Helles, and the sixth in mobile reserve near Maidos on the Narrows—the last under Mustafa Kemal, future dictator of Turkey. Von Sanders was awakened at 5 a.m. with the news that the Allies had landed. Faced with a choice of five landings, he judged wrongly that Bulair must be the main attack and rode off to take personal command.

The Anzacs missed the Gaba Tepe beaches by a mile, but by 8 a.m. had 8,000 men ashore, some of them halfway up the slopes of dominating Chanuk Bair, where they were stopped by Mustafa Kemal. The *River Clyde* beached at Sedd-el-Bahr and discharged its soldiers into a curtain of Turkish rifle fire. The other four landings at Cape Helles went better but by noon Hunter-Weston had lost all three of his brigade commanders. Only the French at Kum Kale took their first day's objectives.

At midnight Hamilton was awakened by a message from Birdwood requesting permission to pull the Anzacs off the Gaba Tepe beach. Hamilton signaled back: " . . . there is nothing for it but to dig yourself right in and stick it out . . . . You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe." Dig they did and Australian soldiers have been "Diggers" ever since.

Von Sanders received two fresh divisions, giving him 75 battalions against Hamilton's 57. There followed a series of attacks and counterattacks for control of Achi Baba, the high ground above Cape Helles.

On 9 May de Robeck proposed a fresh effort to force the straits with his battleships. While this proposal was being debated in London, a Turkish destroyer torpedoed the battleship *Goliath*. Any further naval attack against the Narrows was forbidden. Churchill, who was for the reinforcement of Hamilton, and Fisher, who was against it, came to an open break. Fisher resigned, precipitating a cabinet crisis. When a new cabinet was formed on 26 May, Churchill was out of the Admiralty.

The Turks attacked the Anzac beachhead with four divisions on 18 March and lost 10,000 men in half a day's fighting. After a truce to bury the dead, the fighting shifted south again to Cape Helles where in June and July there were five attacks "so ant-like and inconclusive that it is almost impossible to discover any meaning in them . . . . "

In London it was decided that there must be another landing. Suvla Bay, five miles above the Anzacs, was picked as the objective area. Five fresh divisions were staged in the Aegean islands. Squat ugly monitors mounting 14-inch guns came out to replace the battleships. There were also the Beetles, great landing barges with long landing ramps, capable of carrying 500 men. The landing was to be coordinated with attacks by Hunter-Weston's corps at Cape Helles and Birdwood's Anzacs. Sir Frederick Stopford, in retirement since 1909, would command at Suvla Bay.

Von Sanders had fairly good intelligence that a major attack was coming, but he did not expect it at Suvla Bay. His 16 divisions matched Hamilton's 13 larger divisions, but at Suvla Bay he had only three battalions, no machine guns and no barbed wire, under a Major Willmer of the Bavarian cavalry.

The British got two divisions ashore, something like 20,000 men, in a night landing on 6 August against almost no resistance. Major Willmer harassed them all the next day, causing 1,600 casualties. No guns came ashore that day, only about 50 mules and almost no water. Neither Hamilton at Imbros nor Stopford on board the sloop *Jonquil* knew what was happening. Hamilton finally went ashore the evening of 8 August and over Stopford's complacent head ordered an immediate advance.

On the other side, von Sanders was having problems of his own getting a counterattack organized. His solution was to shift Kemal from the Anzac front, where there had been two days of heavy fighting. At sunrise on the 9th the Turks came over the ridge in a tumultuous charge, driving the British back to the sea. Kemal then faced around to fight again on the Anzac front. By midday on 10 August the British were pocketed at Suvla Bay, Gaba Tepe, and Cape Helles, with all commanding ground in the hands of the Turks.

Hamilton told Kitchener that he needed another 95,000 men. The French promised four more divisions and the British two. Then Bulgaria came into the war. London decided that a choice had to be made between Gallipoli and Salonika. On 11 October Kitchener asked Hamilton for his estimate of losses if it were decided to evacuate the Gallipoli peninsula. The Dardanelles

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Committee met on 14 October, considered Hamilton's estimate that his losses might be 50 percent, and decided that Hamilton must go. General Sir Charles Monro was to succeed him. Hamilton left on the 18th; Monro arrived on the 28th. In six hours he had visited, by destroyer, the three beachheads. British guns were down to two shells a day. Next day he recommended to Kitchener the evacuation of the peninsula.

Kitchener came out himself in mid-November. On 22 November he cabled London recommending giving up Suvla and Anzac, but holding Cape Helles for the time being. There were some 83,000 men at Suvla and Anzac. Twelve thousand hospital beds were got ready in Egypt. The evacuation began on 12 December—in increments, by night, all tents left in position, all guns continuing their regular ration of shelling. By 18 December, 40,000 men had been taken off. The remainder went off in the next two nights. Von Sanders later admitted that not until 20 December did he know what was taking place. But now he had 21 divisions with which to march south against Cape Helles. Monro recommended that Cape Helles be given up and on 27 December London agreed. The 35,000 men in the beachhead began leaving on 1 January 1916. The Turks attempted to break the line on 7 January and failed. The rest of the British came off the night of 8 January. The last rallying point was the *River Clyde*, still firmly aground.

There was a curious symmetry to the casualties of the eight-month campaign: each side had had about a half-million men engaged and each had lost a quarter-million.

That ends Alan Moorehead's story of the failure at Gallipoli. He gets some small facts wrong. For example, he calls Liman von Sanders a "field marshal," which he never was, and he says that von Sanders had six divisions initially in his Fifth Army whereas von Sanders, who ought to know, says that he had five (Liman von Sanders, General of Cavalry, *Five Years in Turkey*). But this is carping. Royal Navy Captain Eric Wheler Bush's more recent (1975) *Gallipoli* may be a bit more accurate and has the additional fillip that Bush was a 15-year-old midshipman and boat officer serving in the cruiser *Bacchante* during the operation. But no account comes up to Moorehead's in style, and that includes John Masefield's *Gallipoli*, which was largely a wartime (1916) propaganda effort, and Ian Hamilton's own firsthand but prolix *Gallipoli Diary* published in 1920.

Colonel Heinl's *Victory at High Tide*, published first in 1968, does not begin where Moorehead's *Gallipoli* leaves off, but a link between the failure at Gallipoli and the success at Inchon, although unstated, is easily traced.

In early 1918, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Dunlap was serving on Admiral Sims' staff in London. In May, Sims sent Dunlap (a member of the Naval War College staff from 1910 until 1912) to Rome to assist in the planning of an amphibious operation in the Adriatic involving a division-size US Marine expeditionary force. The Allied Naval Council shelved the plan,

but Dunlap continued to ponder the possibilities of amphibious operations. After the war he analyzed Gallipoli and isolated the problems that would have to be solved if modern landing operations were to be successful. In 1927, while commanding officer of Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, he recommended that a "War Planning Course" be established "to influence naval thought in connection with war plans." The first term was to commence in September 1929. In 1930, Dunlap was promoted to brigadier general and sent to Paris to study at the Ecole Superieure de Guerre. The following spring he was killed saving a woman's life in a cave-in. But the seed had been sown.

In 1931 at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, a committee of three Marine majors and a Navy lieutenant drafted a manual, *Marine Corps Landing Operations*. It was never published but it provided a starting point the following year when classes were suspended and all hands, staff and students, put to the business of analyzing the Gallipoli campaign. In 1933 classes were again suspended to produce "rules and doctrine covering landing operations." The result was the *Tentative Doctrine for Landing Operations* which dealt with such fundamentals as amphibious command relations, ship-to-shore movement and communications, air and naval gunfire support, embarkation and combat loading, and shore party organization, all things that had gone wrong at Gallipoli. In 1938 a more polished version was published as *Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy (FTP 167)*. In 1941 the Army put the same document between khaki covers as FM 31-5, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores*. Thus it was that we went into World War II with a viable amphibious doctrine tested by a series of fleet landing exercises. This doctrine was successfully used both in the European and Pacific theaters and eventually was accepted by all Allied forces.

After World War II amphibious assaults against fortified beaches were again written off by many military experts as a nuclear age improbability. General Omar Bradley, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, gave his opinion to the House Armed Services Committee that there would never again be a major amphibious assault. General Eisenhower stated that it was unnecessary to have any Marine unit larger in size than a regiment. Truman-imposed reductions executed by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson brought the Corps down to 74,279 officers and men when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950, barely enough to man a half-size division and an equally weak aircraft wing on each coast.

In Tokyo, in a 10 July meeting with Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CG of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, General MacArthur moved to a wall map and stabbed at the port of Inchon with the stem of his corncob pipe: "If I only had the 1st Marine Division under my command again, I would land them here . . . . " But the understrength 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, had been gutted to provide a single-regiment

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1st Provisional Marine Brigade for emergency deployment to the Pusan Perimeter.

In his *Reminiscences,* MacArthur says, "The target date, because of the great tides at Inchon, had to be in the middle of September. This meant that the staging for the landing at Inchon would have to be accomplished more rapidly than that of any other large amphibious operation in modern warfare . . . . My plan was opposed by powerful military influences in Washington."

Joint Task Force Seven, altogether some 230 ships, was activated under Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble late in August. Task Force 90, the attack force, was under amphibious expert Rear Admiral James H. Doyle. Much of the Navy's amphibious shipping was a rusty travesty of the great World War II amphibious armadas. Many of the LSTs used for the landing had to be recalled from Japanese charters. Some came complete with Japanese crews. The rest were manned by naval reserves flown out from the States.

Task Force 92, expeditionary troops, was X Corps, activated on 26 August and command given, not to Shepherd as expected by the Marines but to Major General Edward M. Almond, who had been MacArthur's chief of staff. In addition to the 1st Marine Division as the landing force, Almond had, in reserve, the half-strength 7th Infantry Division, its ranks filled out with freshly conscripted South Koreans.

To put the 1st Marine Division on a war footing, the East Coast 2d Marine Division had to be stripped of most of its undersized battalions and these filled up with reserves and casuals from posts and stations. Even so, there were only two infantry regiments present to make the landing: the 5th Marines, which had to be withdrawn from the Pusan Perimeter, and the 1st Marines, put together from bits and pieces at Camp Pendleton not much more than a month before. The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment was assigned to the division on 3 September.

Compression of the schedule dictated by the landing date ruled out a rehearsal and many of the other niceties of amphibious preparation. The approaches to Inchon were a hydrographer's nightmare. There was a tortuous, obstructed channel, but even more of a problem were the tides, projected to be an incredible 31.2 feet on D-day, 15 September 1950. When the tide went out it ripped through the channel at seven or eight knots, leaving vast mud flats over which amphibian tractors could not expect to crawl. The hydrographers said that the morning high tide would be at 0659, evening high tide at 1919. The landing would have to accommodate to these.

First phase was the morning landing of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, to take Wolmi-Do Island, L-hour 0630. Second phase was the evening landing, H-hour 1730, of the rest of the 5th Marines across Red Beach to the north, and of the 1st Marines across Blue Beach to the south. They weren't really "beaches"; they were seawalls and the Marines went over them with scaling ladders.

The Marines got ashore, fought their way inland along the axis of the Inchon-Seoul Highway, and ended the campaign with the recapture of Seoul. The 7th Marines joined the division in the city.

General Almond dismissed the landing itself as "a purely mechanical operation." Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG, 1st Marine Division, disagreed: "The reason it looked simple was that professionals did it."

Colonel Bob Heinl, who wrote *Victory at High Tide*, died in 1979 during a sailing cruise in the Caribbean. Like Alan Moorehead, he was a journalist-historian. Moreover, he was a career Marine, seagoing before World War II and a naval gunfire expert during the war. He missed the Inchon landing but served in Korea in 1952-53 as defense commander of the East Coast islands. After retirement in 1964 he went on to a second career as military correspondent for the *Detroit News*. His out-of-print *Soldiers of the Sea* (1962), unabashedly partisan, is the most readable of Marine Corps one-volume histories. Both his *Victory at High Tide* and Moorehead's *Gallipoli*, in their present editions, form part of Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company's distinguished Great War Stories series.

As the news spread in Hagaru that the 5th and 7th Marines had finally fought through, many hurried to the roadblock to watch the arrival. Naval Lieutenant (jg) Robert Harvey, who had served as battalion surgeon for Taplett throughout the southern campaign, went to meet his old friends as they came into the perimeter. He found several hundred Marines already waiting. They saw the point come into view and the snake-line of following trucks. Six hundred yards from the perimeter entrance the point halted and the trucks ground to a stop. Those of the wounded and frostbitten who could walk crawled from the vehicles and formed on the bleak, frozen road. There, in silence, they began to march; with no word or count the cadence was picked up and the Marines at the perimeter entrance heard the frozen Shoepacs on the frozen road pounding in rhythm.

The Marines of Hagaru watched the Marines of Yudam-ni march toward them, march by them—haggard, bearded and hard. The men of the 5th and 7th received their tribute from the tears in the eyes of the Marines awaiting them. Overcome by the sight of the depleted ranks, Harvey wept with the others. He whispered over and over, "Look at those bastards, those magnificent bastards—"

Don Childs
The Chosen Few Winter 1984-85



BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

H.G. Rickover

Colonel Paul F. Murphy, US Air Force

Bass, Bernard M., ed. *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research,* rev. and expanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1981. 856pp. $39.95

With all due respect to Peters' and Waterman's *In Search of Excellence,* in my opinion, this search is more formidable. It started with an offer to pen a short discourse on the unchanging foundations of leadership and ended—almost—with a request from the editor to do an expanded review of Bass's revision of Ralph Stogdill's *Handbook of Leadership.* This review is a diary of that trip through the *leadership jungle.*

To begin the journey I returned in my memory to the Naval Academy. There my classmates and I first learned about leadership. We did not spend much time defining leadership—we were too busy trying to practice it, display it, and get a grade in it. Fortunately, in true Annapolis fashion we knew a way to be leaders. To be a leader one simply had to: "Know your self. Know your stuff. Know your men." Somehow that simple set of phrases was enough to guide us in the right direction. In our own naive way we exercised leadership in accordance with that guidance.

We even justified the entire academy experience in terms of those simple phrases.

Why Plebe year? comearounds? mandatory competitive athletics?
To know your self.
Why YP drills? Knot tying? Reef Points? Steam? Bull?
To know your stuff.

Colonel Murphy is the Vice Commander of the 351st Strategic Missile Wing.

Why Youngster cruise? boiler watches? paint chipping? and Psychology?
To know your men.

Ahh—those were the days. Navy had a football team, Bellino and Staubach won the Heisman Trophy, and Leadership was easy. Little did we or I know it was supposed to be a lot more complex and difficult.

Thank God for behavioral scientists. They "educated" me!

First of all they defined Leaderships. I use the plural because after twenty-five years of study I have learned Leadership means different things to many different people. Stogdill/Bass found the same to be true. They identified a multitude of approaches to defining Leadership. To researchers it is: a focus of group processes, an exercise of influence, an act or behavior, a form of persuasion, a power relationship, an instrument of Goal Achievement, an emerging effect of interaction, a differentiated role, the initiation of structure, and maybe even headship.

After that exercise in precision the authors identified fifty-seven research studies dealing with the types and functions of leadership. The next step was a walk through the thicket of theories and maze of models of leadership during which they cited over 125 studies. My reaction to this point was a mixture of delight and dismay. I was delighted that the researchers seemed not to know any more than I did and dismayed that nowhere had I found a single reference to "Know your self, Know your stuff, Know your men!" Could it be that the academy was wrong? Eagerly I read on searching for an answer.

The discussion of leadership traits and studies went on for forty pages. It included both Stogdill's original chapter based on his 1948 study, and a pre-seventy follow up that alone cited 163 studies. Hidden amongst the discussion in the words of a behavioral scientist I found the answer to my question. Stogdill/Bass state on page 81 that: "The leader is characterized by a strong drive for responsibility and task completion, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals, venturesomeness and originality in problem solving, drive to exercise initiative in social situations, self-confidence and sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of decision and action, readiness to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to tolerate frustration and delay, ability to influence other persons' behavior, and capacity to structure social interaction systems to the purpose at hand." Somehow it seemed like the hard way to say *Know your self, Know your stuff, Know your men.* However, it meant the same thing to me. My next question was "If it all boils down to what we learned more than twenty years ago, why bother?"

The answer to that question is clear, and the reason Stogdill/Bass is worth reading. No one who might hope to teach or learn about leadership could or should ignore the vast amount of research material available in the field.

Know your self is a simple phrase. However, knowing your self is not a simple task. What kind of person are you? What kind of leadership style fits you. Are you an extrovert or an introvert? Are you tall or short? Fat or skinny?

Hard or soft? How much integrity do you have? How aggressive/passive are you? These questions and many similar to them must be answered before you can really "Know your self."

Knowing your stuff turns out to be just as difficult. According to a number of studies, "stuff" has a lot of meanings. It includes technical competence, the "nitty gritty," as it were, of the job. Smart shiphandling, sound tactics, and simple competence are examples cited in various studies. In a less specific sense "stuff" includes problem-solving techniques and organizational "smarts," the ability to get results within and through the bureaucracy. Not too surprisingly, communicative skills are also identified in numerous research studies as an important part of "stuff." Rather interesting to me from the viewpoint of a veteran of the Pentagon and other headquarters were the studies which showed that not only the quality but also the quantity of one's talking was positively related to leadership. It would appear that "getting there firstest with the mostest" applies to staff meetings as well as combat. In summary, Stogdill/Bass provides a great deal of support for the applicability of "Know your stuff."

With the validation of "Know your self" and "Know your stuff" by a host of researchers I felt sure "Know your men" had to be supported as well. It was to a degree. The weight of evidence clearly falls on the side of a positive relation between leadership and empathy. Throughout the literature are found phrases such as leaders must be able to:

- know what followers want,
- understand the various motives,
- be insightful,
- be sensitive, and
- estimate group opinion.

However, as Stogdill/Bass point out there are enough contradictory findings in the literature to make one question the assumed positive relationship between empathy and leadership. Fortunately, for the adherents of "Know your men" the contradictions seem to be more a function of research methodology than the underlying relationship. Interestingly, strong support for "Know your men" came from studies that showed leaders had a more accurate picture of what subordinates thought of them than did nonleaders. Other studies showed that successful leaders did such things as checking on the behavior of their men more often than unsuccessful leaders. Also supportive of "Know your men" were the findings that mutual esteem and leadership effectiveness were related. As a whole the literature provides an endorsement to the belief that to be a leader you must "Know your men."

Finally the academy approach was vindicated! "Know your self, Know your stuff, Know your men" was not only a catchy set of phrases but an encapsulation of a multitude of leadership studies. In light of this, one

would hope the services, who more than any other institutions, have a stake in the quality of leadership, are still following the approach. This is particularly important if as some have written the state of military leadership is poor.

Writing in the *Washington Magazine*, Koty, Nathan, and Donohoe asked "Where Have All the Warriors Gone?" In the article is a perfunctory nod to the existence of *some* outstanding leaders in today's military; however, the bulk of the piece deals with the problems of military leadership. The authors cite: a promotion system that frequently does not reward the most promising officers; the loss of too many good officers under the "up or out" promotion system; a system that places too much emphasis on details of management and bureaucracy; officers driven more by personal ambition than by service to nation, mission, and thus our troops; a highly political system of military procurement that poisons the well of leadership. The authors ask ". . . have the classical values of military leadership-honor (Know your self), technical competence (Know your stuff), concern for one's troops, the ability to motivate soldiers (Know your men)—been eroded by a system that emphasizes less worthy items?"

If the state of military leadership is as bad as implied, the prospects for the future are indeed grim. Without an effective military there can be no real freedom and without effective leadership there can be no effective military. But before formulating a plan to *fix* military leadership, it would be wise to determine if it is really *broke*. In my opinion, the state of military leadership is not portrayed accurately by the article in *The Washington*.

The supposed weight of "evidence" cited by the authors clearly makes their case. However, the article itself includes examples that could be used just as well to argue against their indictment of contemporary leadership and much of their evidence is suspect. For example, there will always be some inequities in a promotion system that contains a human element. Some officers who should or could wear stars will never reach them. Some selectees will quite frankly "luck out" by being in the right job at the right time. However, the system, imperfect as it is, does a pretty good job. Otherwise, how would the so-called reformers identified by the authors ever get to positions they hold and make the improvements cited in the article. The people named in the article such as: the Admiral who was a 2AM visitor to the bake shop of the Kennedy (Know your men?); General "Shy" Meyer the Chief of Staff who pushed to improve the system, the Navy's Unrestricted Line Officer career pattern (Know your stuff?); the unnamed thousands of officers who everyday take the unpopular position and defend it in the Pentagon staff meetings (Know your self?), are signs to me that the system is working.

There will always be some officers not selected for promotion to general officer. The majority of them will be extremely well qualified otherwise they would not be competing. The selection board does not pick "winners" and

"losers." It tries, and I think usually succeeds, to pick the very best from a group of "winners." By the time an officer is a captain or colonel competing for flag rank, he or she has been a leader, made tough management decisions, demonstrated integrity and earned a measure of respect based on those achievements. Those officers were winners in a very tough, but fair competition to reach the rank they hold. It is not surprising that when not selected for stars some of these winners leave the service. It would be a surprise if they stayed. Few senior officers serve past retirement eligibility for the money. Many, especially the winners, stay on in hope that they can rise to even more senior positions and greater challenge. With that hope lessened by a nonselection to flag rank, some, probably most of the winners leave. Therefore, it is not too difficult to find many examples of outstanding officers, leaders in every sense of the word, who have retired. To use these people as evidence that the system does not value or reward leadership makes little sense. First, there is no evidence that the officers selected for flag rank were any less able leaders than those not picked. Second, if the system does not value leadership, how did the individual ever get to be a colonel or captain? In truth an 0-6 has been selected for advancement by at least five promotion boards during his or her career. It would appear that the much maligned system does work.

To the authors of *Where Have All the Warriors Gone?* I would answer "Look around, they are still here!" To those warriors I would say "If you can only read one book on leadership, make it the revised and expanded *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership.*" It is the finest handy reference for students, teachers, and practitioners of leadership available today. In its many pages are the data that makes it a little easier to understand why you must: Know your self! Know your stuff! Know your men!

Stockdale, Jim and Sybil. *In Love and War.* New York: Harper & Row, 1984. 472pp. $18.95

Stockdale, James B. *A Vietnam Experience. Ten Years of Reflection.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 147pp. $19.95, paper $9.95

"The important thing is not what they've done to you, but what you do with what they've done to you," said philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to Fr. Marius Perrin while both were prisoners of war in a German camp in Trier after the fall of France in 1940. What was done to POW Sartre was nothing compared to what "they" did to Navy fighter pilot Jim Stockdale, shot down over North Vietnam in 1965 and held captive in Hanoi with other US fliers for more

than seven years. More than half that time Stockdale was confined in solitary, and under torture in conditions of almost unbelievable deprivation. How Stockdale responded to this ordeal, for which he received the Medal of Honor, he sets down in *In Love and War*, the best and most fully documented of the long and moving series of prison chronicles published by or about Vietnam POWs since their release in 1973.

Jim Stockdale shares honors in this book with his wife Sybil. She has written alternate chapters describing what she did in response to what was done to her—the sudden tearing away of a beloved husband and father, the tormenting uncertainty about his fate over the years, an anxiety which twice drove her into deep depression, and the long and courageous battle with the Washington bureaucracy which for years wanted to soft-pedal what they knew about the brutal treatment of US prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese.

In Love and War is not just a POW-and-wife book, though it is that in the best sense of the term. Jim Stockdale opens the story with his own eye-and-ear witness account of the Tonkin Gulf incident which led to congressional passage of the now notorious "Tonkin Gulf Resolution," which gave President Lyndon Johnson executive license to project power into Indochina. For those crucial three days in August 1964, Stockdale, commander of Fighter Squadron 51 operating from the carrier *Ticonderoga* enjoyed "the best seat in the house" overlooking the confused situation in the sea below. According to Stockdale, a single North Vietnamese torpedo boat managed to put a single bullet hole in the USS *Maddox*. Washington interpreted the muddle of the second night as a deliberate attack on two US destroyers operating in international waters. The action on the night of 4 August, the decisive event in Washington's mind, was no action at all. There were no hostile PT boats in the sea below Stockdale's F-8, only a roiling, confused shoot-out at imaginary targets. As the truth dawned on those in the destroyers, according to Stockdale, their corrective messages to Washington were ignored. Rather, their earlier, and erroneous reports that they were again under PT boat attack, were used to justify a major escalation of military force against North Vietnam. Stockdale himself was part of the force that bombed the tank farm at Vinh on 5 August.

Stockdale draws the moral: before we respond in force to the next major military crisis our nation encounters, we should be a bit surer of our ethical grounds for deep commitment than Washington was in those fateful days following which, in Stockdale's words, "a generation of young Americans would get left holding the bag." Of course, it can be argued that the Tonkin Gulf incident simply dotted the "i" (some dot!) of a US commitment to Indochina that ran back as far as the Truman administration.

A year later, on 9 September 1965,

Stockdale, flying from the carrier *Oriskany* was shot down over North Vietnam; his target had been a string of box cars. He survived and was captured. After they beat him up, the North Vietnamese locked him into a Hanoi prison cell with a broken leg and other injuries, shackled in iron that cut to the bone. By his resistance to interrogation he was quickly tabbed by his captors as incorrigible, and suffered brutal consequences. Despite his injuries, Stockdale, as senior ranking officer, organized his fellow "war criminals" into a tightly knit band of disciplined resisters whose motto, endlessly repeated by prison tap code on the walls, sounded "Unity over Self." No claim is made about *never* breaking. Given certain extremes of physical pressure, Stockdale learned that everyone, including himself, breaks. The important thing is to make them do it all over again the next day. They don't like that!

Medieval alchemists of the superior sort insisted that their art did not aim at vulgar metal changing, that the sealed-off crystal retort, heated by dangerous, even infernal flame, was the symbol of their hermetic endeavor to affect the moral and spiritual transformation of the confined material, outwardly ordinary perhaps but with a little something extra in it to start with. The extravagant metaphor fits the Stockdales' experience surprisingly well. Not that Jim was an ordinary person to begin with, despite his image of himself as a regular golf-playing, martini-drinking, right-stuff Navy fighter pilot. The chapters of *In Love and War* that tell of his early years make clear that he was a born fighter whose high-tech plane would fit him like Roland's warhorse. But he did undergo a near-magical change in the Hanoi pressure cooker. Wounded, sick, depressed, stripped of all the sophisticated weaponry that an advanced industrial nation equipped him with, having only his will to rely on, he found in himself a fire of moral leadership that inspired and held together those who were confined with him: Denton, Rutledge, Mulligan, and other brave men who tapped "God bless you, Jim Stockdale" on the walls of their cells.

The theme of transformation under pressure is in some ways more remarkable in Sybil's case. She appears in her early biographical chapters as a standard well brought up young woman—good Connecticut family, Mount Holyoke, Congregational Church and the rest of what a proper New England background provided. But this white-gloved maiden, dreaming romantically of love and marriage with her handsome Naval Academy prince turns into a tigress capable nor only of cuffing all the wives of US POWs into a national organization to press for awareness of the plight of the captives, but of taking on as well the whole bureaucracy of the Navy, the departments of State and Defense, the Governor of California (Ronald Reagan) and the President of the United States (Richard Nixon)—not to speak of Henry Kissinger and the whole North Vietnamese "Peace" team in Paris.

Sybil and Jim Stockdale were

reunited, together with their four sons in February 1973 after a separation of seven and a half years. The photograph of their meeting at the Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, chosen for the dustjacket front of the book tells that story better than words. Sybil remembers that when Jim got off the plane he was escorted to a microphone where, she says, his remarks included reference to "his beloved Greek philosophers."

That raises a puzzling question. Why did not Jim himself refer to the role philosophy played in support of his ordeal? His 1978 *Atlantic* essay "The World of Epictetus," now required reading at the Naval Academy, the Naval War College (of which Jim was president from 1977 to 1979) and other institutions of higher learning, military and nonmilitary alike, gives explicit credit to Epictetus's *Enchiridion* and the Stoic philosophy generally for helping him understand and evaluate his predicament in prison, to reinforce his conviction that a man can be stripped of everything but his will. "Lameness is an impediment to the body, but not to the will," Jim remembered the old philosopher saying as he looked at his own (Stockdale's) leg, permanently crippled: "If I can get the things I need with the preservation of my honor and fidelity and self-respect, show me the way and I will get them. But if you require me to lose my own proper good, that you may gain what is not good, consider how unreasonable and foolish you are."

But of this, Stockdale, the friend of philosophy, writes nothing in his chapters of *In Love and War*. Perhaps his editors said to him, "Let's stick to the action. Cut the philosophy. You can put all that in your next book." The next book is already available. Though it is a backward glance over well-traveled roads, the small softcover volume makes a welcome addition to the Stockdale bibliography. Titled *A Vietnam Experience*, published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University where Jim Stockdale is Senior Research Fellow, the book is a collection of Stockdale's articles and speeches dating from 1973 on. Here one can find "The World of Epictetus" and several "Taking Stock" pieces the admiral wrote for *The Naval War College Review* during his tenure as president, as well as a useful and well-ordered miscellany of occasional lectures, articles, and occasional speeches which Stockdale fans will be pleased to have conveniently bound in one set of covers.

Stockdale is a man with a message. Since his release from captivity he has been working hard to get that message across. It is a message about courage, endurance, patriotism, integrity—an attack on guilt-makers and extortionists wherever found and in whatever guise. The message has not yet been completely expressed. Stockdale's long writing and speaking career subsequent to his imprisonment represents a struggle to get that message clearly formulated. Word has it that he is now working on a follow-on book about leadership. Odds are that here the message will be the words of the prisoner released

from Plato's Cave. Until then Stockdale holds us cheerfully with the lines from Louis MacNeice he quotes:

> Good-bye now, Plato and Hegel,
> The shop is closing down;
> They don't want any philosopher-kings in England
> There ain't no universals in this man's town.

J.G. BRENNAN
Naval War College

Ahern, Donald and Shenk, Robert. *Literature in the Education of the Military Professional.* Colorado Springs, Colo.: US Air Force Academy, 1982.

This collection of essays is written by officers and civilians who have taught English at the Air Force Academy. It is a catalog of arguments for including the study of literature as an *essential,* rather than a "nice to have" ingredient of military professional education. The polemic is derived from the authors' perception that the present system of professional education rests on an overly narrow foundation and is therefore in danger of producing automaton-technicians who will eventually rise to become unimaginative bureaucrats. The prescription proposed to set this right is a redesign of curriculum to include more of the humanities.

It is forcefully suggested that as modern warriors are exposed to belles-lettres, ranging from Homer and Herodotus to Melville and Mark Twain, they will be better equipped to understand their own humanity, deal with decisions as the determination of ends rather than mere means, achieve self-confidence, exercise their emotional, intellectual and moral facilities, discern the true nature of combat, develop imagination and insight, apply moral values in stressful situations, experience several lifetimes (rather than just one), unite science with the human condition, understand the value of that which they defend and that which they may be called upon to destroy, and last but not least, be creative.

The strength of this treatise is its practical usefulness as a litany of logic to those who must defend the teaching of literature to prospective or practicing professionals (military and otherwise) or who wish to expand the domain of English Departments in those particular halls of academe that are not friendly to the conception of humane letters as arrows in the quivers of "real world actors." Enlightened Provosts, Chancellors and Presidents of professionally oriented institutions will also find this to be a handy reference as they attempt to generate a philosophy that can stem the omnipresent tide of a post-Sputnik current of misguided pragmatism and anti-intellectualism. Such defenders of the "faith" will find solace in the echo of frustration that pervades these essays, an echo that is captured by the concluding sentence of one contributor. "If literature can really do all of this, why do you teach only one semester of it at the Academy?"

The weakness of this collection is that it is severely limited in its grasp

of the analytical and practical problems confronting those who design and implement military professional education programs. First, it is not at all clear that courses in literature taught to prospective officers would necessarily change the character of the officer corps in the way predicted by these teachers. Social scientists have demonstrated that the predominant personal traits and expectations of young men and women are formed before college age. Those who are drawn to a "life of the mind," who appreciate the complexities of life and of abstract notions about life or who have a distaste for authoritative structures, are generally not attracted to the military profession. The few philosophically minded officers who have demonstrated both a love of literature and a love of a life of action (the MacArthurs and the Stockdales) were prepared to blossom long before they entered college. The vast majority of prospective officers expect to adapt to the military because they value a physically demanding life style, have an aptitude for dealing with technology and value the sort of rationality that can come from the exercise of unquestioned authority. Indeed, prior to acceptance, they are carefully screened for these traits by the use of psychological testing instruments and interviews. Perhaps they might therefore benefit from a massive infusion of the humanities; anything short of this is bound to have only a marginal impact. Even most literature majors at the most high-minded liberal arts schools do not, in the main, turn out to be the MacArthurs and the Stockdales of our society.

Most philosopher-kings were kings long before they were philosophers. In a world where the professional military person must manage the techniques of violence, technology may not be the bottom line for success, yet it is a sine qua non. Those who are capable of absorbing an ever expanding body of technical knowledge and of learning all there is to know about the human condition are few and far between. Are there sufficient hours in a curriculum day to teach all that? Are educators wise enough to synthesize the practical requirement for technical understanding and the equally practical requirement to understand humanity? Can they avoid throwing out the "baby with the bath water"? Without the technical capacity to fight, the values that we want to protect may be destroyed regardless of our appreciation of their worth.

No doubt it would be nice to have our cake and eat it. But is this possible? If there is a tragic element in the situation of the military professional it is that he cannot be a person for all seasons, no matter how hard he tries or how hard we try to help him.

Finally, the ultimate source of wisdom with regard to the use of force lies in the hands of the politician-statesman. My Lai's real lesson is that of human frailty, particularly in stressful situations. Human behavior is a function of individual trait and situational factors. It is the civilian that determines the parameters of

the officer's situation as well as the "veil of tears" that covers both domestic and international politics.

The suggestion that programming the minds of military professionals with the wisdom of humane letters can result in the triumph of good, simply overstates (even the potential) impact of literature on national security outcomes. The particular literature that describes Don Quixote tilting at windmills should be required reading for those who would use good ideas to dilute the evil in reality. We already know that needs to be done. We do not know how to do it and this little book fails to give us even the slightest hint.

STEPHEN B. SLOANE
Naval War College

Schurman, D.M. *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914.* Malabar, Fla.: Krieger, 1984. 213pp. $15.50

Don Schurman's *Education of a Navy* is so well known and so highly regarded by practicing naval historians that the occasion of its reprinting does not require an extensive review, except to draw attention to the fact that it is happily available once more.

Originally published in 1965, it is the pioneer work of scholarship which outlines the intellectual *milieu* in which naval theory took shape. In a series of essays—on the two Colombs, Mahan, Richmond, Laughton, and Corbett—Schurman defines the contributions of the men who not only changed the study of naval history from an antiquarian and patriotic pastime to a serious academic study, but who also founded the basis for professional thought through the use of history. The book remains an important part of every naval historian's library and should be read by everyone who has an interest in the development of naval theory.

Krieger has reprinted the book without any revision to the text, but important progress has been made in the field with Schurman's own 1981 book, *Julian S. Corbett: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe* and his article, "Mahan Revisited" (*Swedish Journal of Military History*, 1982). In addition, Barry Hunt's study, *Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond* (Waterloo, Ontario, 1982) has greatly improved and refined knowledge of Richmond's contribution. The recent appearance of these works makes Schurman's earlier book all the more valuable as the basic study in the area.

Professor Theodore Ropp has written a preface to the Krieger reprint in which he appropriately hails Schurman's book as "the classic study of the intellectual change from sail to steam." Regrettably, the printer omitted five words in Ropp's preface, at the bottom of the first page. It should read: "What the current head of the [Canadian] Royal Military College's History Department was dealing with two decades ago was the policy maker's over-all mentality as he dealt with a glorious

but vanished past, a confusing present, and a future which looked even more ominous as the Victorian and Bismarckian Empires drifted into a future war which Mahan's contemporary, the Polish, Jewish banker and economist Ivan S. *Bloch saw as one of* technical, economic, and political disaster." Ropp suggests that the situation is similar to our own. With that in mind, the early efforts which Schurman describes can make profitable reading for those who ponder the best method for educating naval policymakers in a period of rapid change.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Reynolds, Clark G. *Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires.* Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger, 1983. 2 volumes, 646pp. $19.50 each

There may well be those who will argue with some of the theses and points of view expressed in Clark Reynolds' *Command of the Sea,* but few of them will be professional naval officers. This wide-ranging and encyclopedic study was first published, as a single volume, by William Morrow of New York in 1974, when one reviewer called it "one of the most scholarly and important volumes on Sea Power since E. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz . . . ." It now reappears in a two-volume format, revised and updated, with the very useful maps of the original offered in a small separate booklet.

Clark Reynolds is one of the best-known of serious American naval historians. He studied under Theodore Ropp at Duke University—to whom his book is dedicated—and he has taught at the US Naval Academy and the University of Maine, as well as lecturing at the Canadian Forces Staff College in Toronto and elsewhere. He is now at the naval museum at Patriot's Point in North Carolina.

Command of the Sea is an ambitious project. Reynolds says, "all maritime states and non-maritime-centered peoples who have plied the sea must be analyzed historically and strategically if seapower is to be appreciated, understood, and applied in the future," and this analysis is what he then embarks upon. There is a good bit of modernized Admiral Mahan lurking in these pages, and one is reminded of Secretary Stimson's remark that whenever he entered the Navy Department he felt as if he were in a realm where "Neptune was God, Admiral Mahan his prophet, and the U. S. Navy the one true church." Thus Reynolds maintains that seapower, true thalassocracy, is a mix of national homogeneity, geographic and strategic situation, political liberalism, capitalistic economics, dominance of a middle class, religious toleration, intellectual freedom, and a disposition toward a navy rather than an army. He claims there have really only been four of these—classical Athens, Venice during the Renaissance, the seventeenth-century Netherlands, and more recently Great Britain. He would like to add the contemporary United States, but regretfully decides that it does not

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entirely fit the rather exclusive parameters he has set up. Some will undoubtedly argue with his limitations and his choices; it might well be that religious toleration is a fortunate accident rather than an essential precondition, and a case might be made that sixteenth-century Portugal came as close to filling these criteria as did the seventeenth-century Netherlands.

The stage set, Reynolds begins with primitive man and works his way through to 1815 in the first volume, then goes on to present times in the second. In this new edition, after the lapse of ten years, he has expanded the final section on the Russian-American naval rivalry, and retained an epilogue on "World War III," which ends, as good history in the classical tradition, back where it all started, with primitive, post-nuclear man venturing forth once more upon the waters, trying to put his world together again. He does not see the Russians as a truly maritime power, but rather as a continental land empire playing with seapower and not entirely understanding its possibilities, or its limitations, much in the fashion of the Germans at the turn of this century casually taking on the British. Unfortunately, Reynolds does not see the United States as quite like the British Empire of 1900, who had some conception, no matter how dimly enunciated, of the role of seapower and its primacy in their scheme of things. Vietnam, Reynolds says, "exposed American ignorance of maritime strategy." In this he echoes Professor Ropp, who used to walk into his military history classes, rub his hand over the map, and say lovingly, "Everything blue belongs to us." What Americans learned in Vietnam was that everything that was not blue did not belong to us.

In spite of that, a navy remains the most visible, and quite possibly the most potent means of projecting *usable* power, as the earlier maritime states all recognized. Anything that reminds Americans of that fundamental point is welcome; this new issue of a work whose original went out of print all too quickly is highly recommended.

JAMES L. STOKESBURY
Acadia University

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 242pp. $14.95

The premise that the Soviet Union is a classic continental empire—one which has been shaped by a succession of ideological, political and economic failures is fundamental to Edward Luttwak's thoughtful analysis of the grand strategy of the Soviet Union. Failure in peaceful competition with the United States has compelled the Soviet Union to channel its energies into developing military forces to support further expansion. But how does the Kremlin plan to employ these forces? The reality of Soviet strategic intent lies between two extremes, that of a rational nation with essentially defensive aims and that of a contemporary Nazi Germany bent on war awaiting only adequate military preparations.

This book is a coherent, synthetic essay on a complex topic. As a foundation for his analysis, Luttwak cites the factors which have traditionally influenced Soviet strategy: (1) Ideology and politics cannot be separated. (2) Ethnically the Soviet Union remains a multinational empire. (3) The hierarchical nature of the society continues to foster technical and managerial backwardness; innovations and decisions are deferred to higher authority whenever possible. (4) Geographic vastness poses tremendous logistic difficulties.

According to Luttwak, the Soviet Union chose to capitalize on America's decline as a world power in the 1970s only to be confronted in the 1980s by a revitalized adversary determined to regain global primacy. Added to the problem of ascending American influence is the geopolitical reality that the USSR is encircled by enemies and the ideological reality that the appeal of Marxism-Leninism has waned dramatically. To counter these threats, the Soviets have turned to what Luttwak calls the "tools of empire"; they have built a massive military establishment and have courted terrorists as useful allies.

In the next component of this analysis, Luttwak uses a comparative analogy with the Roman Empire to examine the nature and scope of Soviet Imperialism. Accepting the hypothesis that the long-range prospects of the Soviet Union are not good, he argues that the Kremlin must feel some urgency to translate its transitory military advantage into real power before it is eroded by a stagnating economy. In assessing the prospects for further Soviet expansion, he focuses on the options this particular continental power might employ to enhance its security: political advantages can be gained by weakening the cohesion of the Nato alliance, strategic advantages can be achieved through a limited but map-changing war with China, regional advantages can be assured by maintaining a stable ring of border client states. The essay concludes with speculations on the alignment of economic and military factors expected to influence Soviet grand strategy in the future.

The remainder of the book consists of two extensive appendixes—"The Economic Basis of Soviet Power" by Herbert Block and "The Evolution of Soviet Military Power Since 1965" by W. Seth Carus. Both provide considerable statistical data which indirectly complement Luttwak's essay. The list of references is sparse for a book of this scope and consists primarily of works addressing specific aspects of Soviet military or economic capabilities.

Although this is not a readily digestible book, it clearly warrants the attention of the professional military officer. A cursory reading will enhance any student's perception of the complexity of Soviet strategic issues even if Luttwak's premises and hypotheses are rejected. Yet this essay deserves more careful study. The breadth of scope and depth of analysis Luttwak offers in *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* make it worthy of serious reflection by all

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who strive to understand Soviet strategic intentions.

FRANCES CAROLINE LANE
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Kimball, Warren F. *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence,* 3 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 2,189pp. $150

Warren F. Kimball's *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence* is an interesting attempt to integrate a coherent narrative text into a comprehensive volume of significant correspondence. It is an excellent concept, but in practice it does not seem to work all that well; for in a sense the book-length narrative comes almost to overshadow the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence. One sometimes feels that there is too much Kimball and not enough Roosevelt and Churchill.

It seems to me that the ideal multivolume work of this kind is Elting E. Morison's great compilation of the letters of Theodore Roosevelt. The format there allows the writings of a powerful personality full scope to carry the story; the editors provide explanatory notes to the correspondence and interpretive introductory chapters, which are some of the finest pieces in TR historiography. These essays focus on specific aspects of TR's career and personality and so add insight and dimension to, without detracting from, the letters themselves. TR explains himself, with the editors providing suggestive high points of interpretation. Here Kimball seeks to explain FDR and Churchill to us, rather than allow them to explain themselves, and the process seems sometimes strained and a little presumptuous, and a lot less fun.

I also found Kimball's book structurally disconcerting. The author's essays are placed before, rather than after, the relevant letter(s), which sounds logical; but in reality it is quite disconcerting to read an essay on a topic in a letter that one has not yet read! Thus, at times, one feels slightly disoriented.

Then, too, since Kimball's narrative is in a real sense a book, I often found myself with the thought that his bibliographical information and source documentation are not nearly extensive enough to support the weight of his narrative interpretations. This is especially so in relation to military and naval matters, where the author's judgments are sometimes highly debatable: for example, his assertion that had Stalin sided with Churchill as to the need for a Balkan campaign in 1944 Roosevelt would have readily scuttled OVERLORD; or his interesting but quite exaggerated idea of the political sophistication and key impact on political decisions of senior US Army officers in World War II. Kimball has fewer comments on naval matters, but some, such as ". . . the submarine was the U.S. Navy's most effective weapon against Japan . . ."—Gad, man, what about the Carrier!—sometimes merit qualification or even contradiction.

Finally, in his handling of the onset

of the cold war, Kimball seems overly dogmatic. Churchill and Truman are clearly the villains; Stalin's paranoid suspicions usually turn out to have "some basis in fact"; the Poles are reproached for not being realistic enough to smile happily as they handed over their country to the Russians; and of course no notice is taken in the narrative of such minor embarrassments as the Katyn Forest massacre (even though Churchill writes of it at length) or the Poltava affair, when the negligence of the Russian air defense command permitted numerous American strategic bombers to be destroyed on the ground by a Luftwaffe hardly at the top of its form.

Roosevelt, of course, is lauded as appropriately flexible in his management of the prickly Russians. This latter point, by the way, is quite valid. Roosevelt did hope to win over the Russians by fair treatment, and he certainly wished to keep all of his options open in dealing with them. However, as with Lincoln's desire for a policy of leniency toward the South in 1865, this did not mean that this policy was immutable; for just as Lincoln may well have been pushed to harder measures by Southern intransigence, so might FDR have been by Russian intransigence. That, too, is flexibility!

All of these views of Kimball's may or may not be tenable interpretations, but they all do need better documentation than Kimball provides. Basically, Kimball has undertaken two jobs in this work. The first—editor of a massive and definitive volume of important correspondence—he has done superbly well; the second—author of a book about that correspondence—he has done less well. But in attempting both he has aimed high, striving mightily to transcend the usual and dull manner of this genre of scholarly work.

Thus, Kimball must be esteemed for daring something rather different and creative but gently chided for not quite carrying it off.

PATRICK ABBAZIA
City University of New York

Dupuy, Trevor N. *Options of Command: the Crucial Command Decisions That Could Have Altered the History of World War II.* New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984. 303pp. $19.95

Some historians find it entertaining to contemplate the great "might have beens" of history—the so-called "turning points" where a different course of action might have changed the entire course of history. The temptation to indulge in this kind of activity is even greater for the military historian, who can assume the role of the great generals of the past, rectifying their strategic and tactical errors, with, of course, the assistance of large helpings of hindsight, to change a disastrous defeat into a tremendous victory. Napoleon I at Waterloo and Napoleon III at Sedan are two well-known examples, but the Second World War is an even more fruitful source for this kind of barren speculation. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy and his colleagues in the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization have

allowed themselves the luxury of analyzing ten of the more important battles of that war and have sought to discover what would have happened if the commanders on one or other of the losing sides had adopted a different set of options or taken an alternative decision to the ones that had led to the disaster in the first place.

The first battle to be so dealt with is an obvious one—that of the Ardennes in May 1940 which sealed the fate of France. Every armchair military buff has reminded the French army commanders since 1940 (as if they needed to be reminded) of the appalling consequences of their failure properly to reinforce the Ardennes front against a possible German armored onslaught. In Colonel Dupuy's account the French actually do realize the importance of that front and take sufficient precautions to stop both Guderian's and Reinhardt's tanks on the Meuse. The ensuing Allied counteroffensive led to the recovery of most of Belgium and the assassination of Hitler by the German General Staff who thereupon initiated peace negotiations. Inevitably this reconstruction, like all the others, necessitates the taking of considerable liberties with the historical record. Daladier has to be replaced as French prime minister in September 1939 by the "sharp, intelligent" Paul Reynaud, who immediately dismisses Gamelin and replaces him by General Weygand as Allied Commander in Chief, who, in turn, appoints de Gaulle as his deputy. This then is Colonel Dupuy's winning team of May 1940. It all rather lacks conviction, especially as Colonel Dupuy seems to have more confidence in Weygand's military abilities than either his contemporaries, or even Weygand himself, displayed at any time before, during, and after the events of May and June 1940.

The authors next turn to the Battle of Britain, suggesting a possible scenario, for if Goering had ordered the Luftwaffe to continue attacking RAF bases and radar stations after 7 September 1940, leading to the collapse of Fighter Command, Hitler would then have launched *Operation Sea Lion*—the invasion of the United Kingdom. Few will be surprised by the outcome: the Royal Navy, despite sustaining severe losses, sank the bulk of the invading force, leaving the British Army to mop up the few German troops who managed to land on British beaches.

Colonel Dupuy and his associates then turn their attention to the Eastern Front. What would have been the result if, in 1939, Stalin had recognized that Hitler was merely biding his time before attacking the Soviet Union instead of, as actually happened, ignoring all warnings of an impending German assault in 1941? If Stalin had built up in secret in the interior of Russia a Soviet Army armed with modern equipment, this powerful force could have counterattacked the invading Germans in July 1941, taking them completely by surprise and inflicting a severe defeat on them. Then Hitler would have been murdered by his generals and a cease-fire immediately proclaimed

on all fronts. Moreover Stalin would have "emerged as one of the greatest geniuses of modern times."

The authors then examine the Battle of Moscow. Would Germany have been more successful against the Soviet Union if Hitler had been forced by his generals to order the main German forces to attack Moscow instead of shifting, as he did, the weight of the German offensive away from the center to the flanks—to the south, and to Leningrad in the north? The generals claimed, after the event, that they had been horrified by the decision, and that had their advice for a massive assault on Moscow been followed, the Soviets would have been decisively defeated. The authors deny that this could have happened. They claim that the Moscow front could have been held by the Soviets even against far stronger German forces than were actually thrown at the city, and think that a check to the Germans here would have enabled the Red army to knock out Germany earlier than was the actual case.

The next essay deals with the hoary old chestnut of a United States which paid heed to the numerous warnings, culled from *Magic* intercepts and other sources that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. No reader of this book can expect any prizes for guessing the likely outcome in that case. The following case history, that of the Battle of Midway, speculates as to what would have happened if Yamamoto had suspected that the United States had broken Japan's naval codes and if he had acted upon that suspicion. In this case, however, the ensuing Japanese victory would not have been decisive. True, it would have prolonged the war, but America's superior industrial and economic strength would have told in the end.

The rest of the essays in this book follow the same pattern: what if Germany had won the Battle of Stalingrad, thrown back the Allied landing forces on the beaches of Normandy, or succeeded in breaking through the thin Allied defenses during the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944? The authors conclude that in all these cases very little would have changed in the long run. Axis successes would have been merely temporary in nature since Germany and Japan had no hope of ultimately defeating the powerful coalition they had raised against themselves. Thus Allied victories would have been decisive and the war would have ended earlier than it did; Axis victories would have made no difference since "sometimes the forces involved—geographical, numerical, industrial, and technological—have so predetermined the outcome that not even the most brilliant or imaginative decisions could change the inevitable outcome."

If this is true (and it certainly seems to be so in the twentieth century, although perhaps rather more problematical before 1850), one is tempted to ask why bother to write a book devoted to changing defeats into victories if the final

outcome was in any case predetermined by other factors? I am afraid that I do not find this kind of theorizing either rewarding or useful. It seems to me to be both sterile and misleading. It may be, as the authors assert an enjoyable "game," but it is not history.

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Horner, D.M. *High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945.* Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1982. 556pp. $40

For an American, even one familiar with the history of the Second World War, D.M. Horner's book comes as a revelation. Americans know that Australians fought in the Western Desert, Syria, Greece, Malaya, and the South Pacific, but the problems facing the Australian government and High Command generally elude them.

Australia, Horner points out, had to operate as a small power engaged in coalition warfare with Great Power partners, Great Britain and the United States. In World War I Australia simply sent troops to the Middle East and the Western Front where they operated under British direction. Australia also occupied German holdings in the South Pacific. By contrast in World War II Australia had not only to participate in Imperial defense but also provide for home defense against the Japanese.

This situation created serious problems for the Australian government since the British and Americans often regarded Australian concerns as secondary to their own. The Australians therefore had to use a number of techniques to assert their views, including face-to-face meetings with the Great Power leaders, the refusal to commit troops according to allied wishes and the establishment of a good fighting reputation which in turn enhanced the impact of Australian proposals.

The war was not without friction with the allies. The British, for example, often ignored Australian advice and sensibilities. British commanders in the Middle East tried to use Australian divisions as *ad hoc* formations parceling out brigades and even battalions instead of placing them under direct Australian divisional and corps headquarters. In the Pacific MacArthur became Prime Minister Curtin's chief military advisor and like the British avoided the creation of higher echelon Australian commands.

Horner also explodes some of the war myths, so necessary at the time to sustain the nation's morale. General Blamey appears to be at best an average commander whose personal ambition led him to advocate strategic proposals designed as much to enhance his own role in the war as to win it. Prime Minister Curtin lacked the military expertise to deal effectively with MacArthur and was overly diffident in defending Australian interests.

The war, nevertheless, ended in victory and Horner concludes that on the whole Australia played a signifi-

cant role in winning that victory. Horner's careful research rises above the drums and trumpets style that frequently limits the scope and value of military history, and his effort to view Australia's role in the broader context of a lesser allied power within a great power coalition is both interesting and successful.

STEVEN T. ROSS
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Erickson, John. *The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War With Germany.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 877pp. $42.50

In *The Road to Berlin* John Erickson completes his study of Soviet military operations during the Second World War. This monumental work traces Russian campaigns from the counterattack at Stalingrad to the fall of Berlin and the capture of Prague. In addition to detailed operational narratives Erickson also provides a bibliography of such volume and detail that it virtually constitutes a second book.

There is much to learn from Erickson's book. Every major Soviet operation is described in great detail, and it is apparent that Soviet command talent went well beyond the names of the famous generals like Zhukov, Rokossovskii and Konier, who are well-known to Western readers. Generals like Vatutin, Bagramyan and Tolbukhin were able, even brilliant, commanders, who had mastered the art of leading combined arms formations with drive and dash.

Erickson also explores in much detail Stalin's wartime relations with FDR and Churchill and examines the evolution of his policies toward Poland and the Balkans. He also notes that there was a plot to kill or capture the Big Three at Teheran, that the Russians were in fact unprepared to help the 1944 Warsaw rising and that the Soviets were in fact in favor of having allied forces in Italy advance into Austria and northern Yugoslavia in 1945.

Problems with the book include a number of pointless illustrations, too few maps which too often fail to include cities, towns, and rivers mentioned in the text and some minor errors with the German order of battle. The Hermann Göring armored division, for example, was not an SS formation.

Such problems are, however, trivial when compared to Erickson's overall achievement. What Weigley in *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* has done for the US Army in Europe, Erickson has now done for Soviet operations on the Eastern Front. In the future no history of the Russo-German war can be written without reference to Erickson's detailed research and brilliant narrative.

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Morris, Eric. *Salerno: A Military Fiasco.* New York: Stein and Day, 1983. 358pp. $19.95

For most Navy and Marine Corps readers, the term amphibious warfare evokes a mental picture of such World War II landings as Tarawa and Iwo Jima. This view is under-

standable because the Pacific war, in large part, was the model on which current US amphibious doctrine was patterned. In the Pacific campaigns, for example, the objectives were typically islands that could be isolated by naval forces and then subjected to intense air and naval gunfire bombardment. The enemy situation—primarily his inability to reinforce—made the need for surprise secondary to the need for a thorough preparation of the beaches and offshore approaches.

Ironically, however, the European landings such as the one described in Eric Morris's *Salerno: A Military Fiasco* may more closely resemble the landings facing amphibious commanders in any future, global war. In the European theater, the amphibious objectives were beachheads on the continent. This fact of geography and the mobile nature of the enemy combined to make isolation of the objective area more tentative than in the Pacific landings as was attainment of sea control and air superiority. These conditions placed a premium on surprise and resulted in a style of amphibious warfare characterized by night landings made with a minimum of air and naval gunfire preparation. Additionally, the combined US-British nature of these landings increased the complexity of a type of operation already known for its complicated character. Operation AVALANCHE, the Allied landing at Salerno, Italy, on 9 September 1943, is a good example of the European style of amphibious warfare.

Salerno: A Military Fiasco is an interesting, easily readable account of Operation AVALANCHE. The book is written in a popular style that relies heavily on accounts of the individual activities of participants ranging from the Army Commander to individual riflemen. At times this style makes following the flow of the battle difficult, but it does give the reader a sense of how small, apparently unconnected actions fit together to determine the outcome of a battle. The author also does an excellent job of describing the confusion and uncertainty that attend any large combat action and the effect those factors have on the battle.

Although Operation AVALANCHE was one of the major amphibious operations of World War II, the author concentrates mainly on the land battle for the beachhead. Fortunately, however, students of amphibious warfare will find material of current interest ranging from comments on the command relationships for a combined landing to descriptions of the effectiveness of naval gunfire against tanks and the effect of air-launched smart weapons employed against an amphibious task force.

A number of small errors detract from the overall quality of *Salerno*. None of the errors are significant—incorrect designations for German tanks, for example—but they do tend to distract the reader. In spite of these distractions, however, *Salerno* remains an interesting account of an important step in the evolution of modern amphibious warfare.

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Editor